

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 September 2012

Mr. Trevor Griffey
PO Box 2887
Olympia, WA 98507-2887

Reference: F-2012-01747

Dear Mr. Griffey:

This is a final response to your 9 July 2012 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for a copy of the CIA's June, 1970 version of "Restless Youth." We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. Our processing included a search for records as described in our 24 August 2012 acceptance letter.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located one document, consisting of 255 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). A copy of the document and explanation of exemptions are enclosed. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, e.g., Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization, functions, including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Because you are entitled to the first 100 pages free of charge, the total cost to you is **\$15.50**. Please send a check or money order in this amount to me, made payable to the **Treasurer of the United States**, citing **F-2012-01747** to ensure proper credit to your account.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Explanation of Exemptions

Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information, which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source ; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

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
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Youthful dissidence, involving students and non-students alike, is a world-wide phenomenon. It is shaped in every instance by local conditions, but nonetheless there are striking similarities, especially in the more advanced countries. As the underdeveloped countries progress, these similarities are likely to become even more widespread.

A truly radical concept of industrial society and its institutions prompts much of the dissidence--but it, alone, does not explain the degree to which young agitators have won a wide following in such countries as France, the Federal Republic, and the United States.

Some measure of dissidence is traceable to generational conflict, psychic problems, etc. But most owes its dimension to the number of students, a profusion of issues, and skillful leadership techniques.

The proximate causes are rooted in the university; they are chosen for their appeal, for the support they will engender. However, the confidence of the agitators in the likelihood of their being able to expand a limited protest rests--sometimes fragilely--on a growing base of student cynicism with respect to the relevance of social institutions and to the apparent gap between promise and performance.

Perhaps most disturbing of all is the growing belief of the militants--and many less committed young people--in the efficacy of violence as a political device.

The Communists can take little comfort from any of this, even though Moscow and its allies may exact fleeting advantage from the disruption sowed by the dissidents. In the long run, they will have

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to cope with young people who are alienated by the more oppressive features of Soviet life.

Because of the revolution in communications, the ease of travel, and the evolution of society everywhere, student behavior never again will resemble what it was when education was reserved for the elite. The presence in the universities of thousands of lower- and lower-middle-class students has resulted in an unprecedented demand for relevant instruction. Today's students are a self-conscious group; they communicate effectively with each other outside of any institutional framework, read the same books and savor similar experiences. Increasingly, they have come to recognize what they take to be a community of interests. This view is likely to influence their future political conduct and to shape the demands they make of government.

Denied a voice in shaping the affairs of state or--what seems more likely--confronted by a less radical majority willing to invoke police sanctions against them, the militants may well become more organized, more clandestine in their approach to political action. It is apparent already that in the Western countries, at least, many of the militants seem to be opting for careers in teaching or the communications media--professions where they are likely to exercise an influence far out of proportion to their numbers. Whether greater maturity will soften the viewpoint of today's dissidents is moot; in West Germany and the United States there are attempts under way to organize former student militants into political groupings apart from the major political parties.

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Thanks to riots in Rome, West Berlin, Paris, and New York and sit-ins in more than twenty other countries in recent months, student activism has caught the attention of the world.

What are all these students trying to tell us? What do they have in common?

Apprenticed to but not yet part of the "System," the activists and their malleable fellow students are not restrained by the sanctions which most adults place on themselves. Pragmatic and searching, they refuse to accept many of the premises of an older age; instead, they retreat to gut reaction. Their mode is indignation.

Some of the activists clearly are unwilling to participate in the political process. Their choice of tactics is dictated by a conscious wish to disrupt. A far larger number wish only to reform our social and political institutions so that they will be more responsive, less ponderous.

The optimism of the anarchists is a hallmark of youth. So, too, are the energy and rebelliousness which provide student protest so much of its thrust. The protesters, after all, are adolescents or post-adolescents; the vehemence of protest cannot be understood without some appreciation of the emotional crises attendant on both stages of development.

Some adolescents rebel against their parents, bridging the gap between childhood and maturity within the confines of the family; others shift this rebelliousness to authorities beyond the home--the school, the law, the state. Some, such as those who were active in the early 1960s in the Civil Rights Movement, succeed in doing so in ways that win the approbation of the community. When this occurs the consequences more often than not are constructive--both for society and the individuals involved.

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This paper is an attempt to explore the reasons underlying student unrest. Part I examines such questions as motivation, history, leadership, and tactics. It focuses chiefly on the emergence in most of the industrialized Western countries of what has been dubbed the New Student Left. University-centered, the New Left has proved most disruptive to traditionally oriented, sometimes inept governments and anathema to equally hidebound Communist party leaderships.

Part II consists of a series of country chapters chosen to illustrate the influence of local conditions on the evolution of dissent and the many forms it takes. The chapters on France, Spain, West Germany, Italy, and the Communist states of Europe--the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia--highlight the remarkable parallels between East and West in patterns of dissent. Those on Africa, India, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan explore the problem as it is found in emerging states. The chapter on Japan highlights the consequences of mass education and points to the degree to which the political system in Japan has come to accept student activism as a quasi-legitimate expression of legislative opposition. That on China treats the phenomenon of the Red Guards, which all too many commentators see as little more than a Maoist version of the Western dissidents. The Argentine chapter discusses the effects of the 50-year-old Cordoba Reform on Latin American education and the efforts of the Onganía regime to depoliticize students; that on Brazil has a more current focus.

This paper does not discuss the broader Peace Movement to which organized student groups contribute manpower, the Communist Party/USA, or any parties of the Left--except insofar as they contribute to student dissent. It deals only indirectly with the Civil Rights Movement, the latter-day current of Black Power, urban riots and violence in American society. These have been the objects of study by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Neither does this paper discuss such other symptoms of alienation as the use of drugs, the so-called hippies or teenage runaways, even though all exemplify many of the same problems that give resonance to organized dissent.

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Africa
Arab World
Argentina
Brazil
China
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
France
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
South Vietnam
Soviet Union
Spain
Turkey
West Germany
Yugoslavia

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RESTLESS YOUTH

Student protest is visible, highly vocal and increasingly militant.

In the last two years, it has closed down several great universities, fomented civil strife and altered political careers in more than twenty countries. Indeed, if one accepts Richard Neustadt's definition of power as "the *effective* influence upon the conduct of others," then Student Power is no longer a chimera. It is a reality which has similar characteristics even though its form may vary from country to country.

Students are an elite and volatile group--to a great degree imbued with an almost mystical faith in the ability of an aroused "people" to generate reform and with a marked distrust of governmental bureaucracy. They have a knack for being among the first to espouse unpopular causes and have been quick to call society to account for its shortcomings.

Student rebelliousness is not a recent phenomenon. It predates the university: it was commonplace in ancient Athens and in imperial Rome. Socrates complained woefully that the students of his time had "bad manners, contempt for authority, disrespect for older people." In the Thirteenth Century students in Paris elected their professors and the illuminated texts of the time describe the rampages of medieval English students who burned lecture halls and sacked nearby villages when their wishes were unheeded.

However, it was not until the early Nineteenth Century, following the rise of the nation-state, that students became an important force for social and political change. They were in the forefront of the revolutions in 1848 in Germany and Austria, went "to the people" in Czarist Russia, and to their deaths or

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exile in 1905. At home and abroad, African and Asian students agitated against colonial regimes during the interwar and post World War II periods.

During the 1950s, aroused students figured in the downfall of Peron in Argentina in 1955 and Perez Jiminez in Venezuela in 1958; students rashly encouraged Imre Nagy and fought Russian tanks in Budapest in October-November 1956, as they seemed prepared to do in behalf of Gomulka during Poland's all too brief "October" of the same year. Rioting Japanese students forced cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Tokyo and the ouster of the Kishi government in 1960. That same year, Korean students were in the van of the anti-Rhee riots in Seoul and in Turkey they took to the streets against Menderes.

In the United States, beginning early in 1960, students supplied much of the manpower and inspiration for the Civil Rights Movement. At first tentatively and then with growing confidence, American students used the sit-in and similar tactics to confront the power structure of the south--appealing for the support of a lethargic but influential public far beyond the confines of Mobile or Birmingham. And they demonstrated to their satisfaction that the tactics of confrontation work; indeed, many came away from Civil Rights with the conviction that only confrontation works.

The vein of Black Separatism which is becoming a distinctive element of the student protest movement in the United States has no exact counterpart in protest movements elsewhere. However, belief in efficacy of confrontation and the acceptance of violence threaten to become characteristic of student protest everywhere, whatever the color of the activists on the front lines.

Student activism depends for much of its strength on the way it is regarded by the adult citizenry. In most Western countries, at least, there has long been a feeling that politics is *not* a proper arena for students. This notion has been strengthened by the fact that in Europe and the United States student movements hitherto have proved transitory and vulnerable to fragmentation.

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The incidence in the past of student demonstrations in widely separated places, the Middle East, Japan, or even Latin America, did not excite undue concern in the U.S.--even when such outbreaks impinged briefly on American interests, as in the case of President Eisenhower's abortive trip to Tokyo in 1960. They passed unnoticed by all but a few or were dismissed as some kind of seasonal madness.

In many countries, however, student political activism has been a more durable phenomenon and because of its durability has been accommodated in the political process. Argentine students won recognition of their political rights and a role in the administration of the universities in the Cordoba reform of 1918. That reform opened the door to many abuses and is at the root of much of the difficulty which besets Latin American education today, but it has served to sanction student political activity to the extent that participation in campus organizations more often than not constitutes entré to adult careers in government and law. Since World War II in Japan student demonstrations have become so common a tactic of the political opposition that they are taken for granted and occur within guidelines accepted by the public. Japanese student agitators enjoy a quasi-legitimate place in the legislative process. Indonesian students were a bulwark of Sukarno's regime for most of its existence--but turned against him because of his suspected complicity in the attempted Communist coup of 1965. African students are xenophobic; accorded special recognition and privileges, they hunger after more tangible rewards and pose a threat to several governments.

Campus activism may not be the central issue of our times; but none other now excites a greater response. Those who view the dissidents as fledgling conspirators are constrained to blame too permissive parents or lackadaisical teachers. Some point to a general breakdown in public morality for the unease which permeates so many campuses. Others credit the dissidents with reacting to the oppressive demands of an outmoded educational system and to the growing impersonalization of everyday life, to stagnation, to racial injustice. Yet a third group points with alarm to the influence of the mass media, warning that radio and television have a curious "three-dimensional" quality which exposes sham and stimulates discontent. There is no simple explanation.

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The interplay of emotions, ideologies, and attitudes which constitute the motive force behind youthful dissidence is infinitely complex. Those who would lead the dissidents, or stay a step ahead of them, are constrained to identify and exploit issues which promise the support of a wide following. Quite naturally, some issues prove more meaningful and therefore evoke a greater response. Naturally, too, the issues change or are replaced by broader demands as protest develops and a confrontation with authority ensues. At Columbia University, for example, an *ad hoc* protest against an administration decision to erect a much disputed gymnasium was transformed by the effects of outside intervention into an assault on the structure of the university itself. But by far the largest number of students who participated toward the close of the crisis were moved to do so out of indignation over what they regarded as police brutality. A similar evolution of issues and substitution of targets took place during the French disorders in May 1968.

This substitution of issues and broadening of demands has been dubbed "expedient escalationism" by Zbigniew Brzezinski. It often begins with a series of minor confrontations between university authorities and a small band of dissenters whose complaints are limited to some facet of university life. The authorities do not entertain whatever proposals the dissenters are advocating--either because they are too far removed from day-to-day developments within the university to appreciate what is occurring or because they are unsure of their own position and prefer to procrastinate in the hope that time alone will solve the problem. The dissenters, rebuffed, become increasingly vocal and search out allies among other students or, crucially, among faculty members who have their own grievances.

There follows a series of "dress rehearsals," such as attempts to interrupt ROTC exhibitions or to mar faculty convocations in honor of visiting dignitaries. In some instances, the dissenters are turned

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upon by student critics and are assaulted--as at Nanterre where a rightist clique, the Occident, several times manhandled leftist students. The authorities respond with minor administrative sanctions or do not act at all out of fear of calling attention to a situation going out of their control.

A spontaneous incident, perhaps the arrest of a student away from the university, electrifies the community. A picket line or sit-in follows, and the students seek to negotiate with the authorities. Rather than confront the dissidents directly, however, the authorities welcome the advent of self-appointed middlemen, often disgruntled faculty members. The brokers attempt to clarify the issues and in doing so prolong the crisis.

Under pressure from all sides, the dissidents seek to legitimize their stance by demanding more and more, particularly if authorities dribble out piecemeal concessions which have only a negative impact, thus buttressing the popular view that they have lost the initiative. Reconciliation becomes impossible, and the authorities, after having sought to avoid confrontation, rashly invoke force without regard to its ultimate consequences. Bystanders are involved, sometimes injured, and a cause celebre results.

Sociologists have come to call the process by which more and more participants are drawn into protest *radicalization*. There is little agreement over the dynamics involved--and less evidence that any great number of students remain radicalized once the initial exhilaration of combat is past.

Certain considerations become extremely important to the leader. He must seek to sustain the protest, flexibly moving it to new ground when the occasion permits. To achieve this escalation, he must be prepared to welcome and adjust to the participation of a variety of people--negotiators, the voices of authority, public commentators, etc. Their involvement will tend to broaden the protest, spread its effects, and touch a multiplying number of people--students and non-students alike--each at his own level or point of sensitivity.

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In every country the militants are a small minority, but a minority able to weave a strand of vague, inchoate resentments into fulminant protest. The leaders of protest have learned that there is much to protest about. The reasons for this go beyond the revolution in communications or mere leadership techniques. They have to do with the gulf between society's institutions and the people those institutions are designed to serve. Next to the surface almost everywhere are complaints which grow out of the conditions of student life and a demand for university reform. Poor administration-faculty-student relations, inadequate facilities, outmoded curricula, bureaucratic licensing requirements, "sudden death" examinations for the purpose of reducing swollen enrollments--all provide fuel for discontent.

And there are issues which grow out of the image which students have of society--its impersonality, bureaucracy, and the ponderousness of its political dynamics. The real activists view the university as only a proximate cause, the foe close at hand. For them, the real enemy is distant from the scene. It is society organized for efficiency at the expense of the individual, a treadmill that destroys initiative and traps the unwary.

For the Black, and not exclusively the US Black, all too often it is an educational system whose values are totally alien to his cultural experience. In an era of global stalemate, many young people, both Black and White, find the slogans of the Cold War singularly unconvincing. To young Frenchmen the resurgence of the 19th Century nation-state in De Gaulle's Fifth Republic was anachronistic, and to many other young Europeans the participation of ruling and opposition parties in coalition governments which sometimes have the parliamentary support of Communists is proof that latter-day politics are a charade.

These attitudes, particularly in Europe, are a consequence of the failure of social and political institutions to accommodate themselves to the remarkable economic strides of the postwar period, the absence of compelling ideological issues, such as those embodied in the 1930s in the Spanish Civil War, and the diminution everywhere of moral authority. Many political parties--for example, the Socialists in Italy, France and Germany, the Anti-Revolutionary

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Party in the Netherlands, the Republicans and Monarchs in Italy, the Communists in most places--no longer are issue-oriented or responsive to the needs of the constituencies they purport to represent. A younger generation finds government bureaucracy--especially in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands--antiquated, cumbersome, and in the hands of a generation that came to power twenty-five years ago and remains committed more to preserving its authority than to utilizing political power to renovate society.

French students bitterly criticized De Gaulle's "arbitrariness," his fascination with nuclear armaments at the expense of badly needed public works, his disregard of public opinion, and the manner in which he staged plebiscites to legitimize his "mandate" and perpetuate what they considered to be one-man rule. And they were no more attracted to De Gaulle's pretensions to national glory, as witness Daniél Cohn-Bendit's rejection in March 1968 of "national flags and frontiers."

Few single issues can impel large numbers of students to demonstrate, although the role of the United States in world affairs, particularly US involvement in Vietnam, is most evocative. It is especially so in the United States where students who are critical of American policy and who regard Selective Service as a means for quashing dissent are distressed by the prospect of being coerced into supporting physically a course of action to which they object on moral grounds.

Abroad, local US involvement and the alleged role of the Central Intelligence Agency provide a backdrop against which to mount a protest over the Vietnam war--the first major conflict in the lifetime of the dissenters. Opposition to American involvement in Southeast Asia and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was fueled in Germany, for example, by the Kissinger government's advocacy of the so-called Emergency Laws and the distrust of many students toward government by coalition. Egyptian students, hypersensitive to the appeals of Arab nationalism, see American participation in a "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at establishing Israeli hegemony in the Middle East and

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blame the rout of Arab troops by the Israelis in June 1967 on US aid. In Argentina and Brazil students take to the streets against unpopular military regimes which they are convinced are maintained in power through US support. In Mexico they do so out of resentment over malfeasance or corruption of one-party rule--but always against a backdrop of US involvement.

In Communist countries, anti-American demonstrations are hardly a valid manifestation of student dissidence. Anomie nevertheless exists. Russian students resent the heavy-handed attempts of party leaders to bolster a myopic view of history. Dismayed by the revelation of Stalin's perfidy and the fall of Khrushchev, they have been quick to ask whether the Soviet system is at fault. They have turned back in upon themselves, according to most accounts, searching for a new value system grounded in individual worth. Polish and Yugoslav students, far from seeking to overturn the Communist state, hope to nudge it into fulfilling its avowed goals and have rioted against the obstructive tactics of party bureaucrats who bar the advance of a younger and better educated generation.

The children of a generally affluent generation--West or East--are less concerned with matters of economic livelihood or the challenge of building a revolutionary state on the ruins of autocratic rule than were their fathers. Not a few, however, are deeply engrossed in matters of life-style.

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
~~SECRET~~The Student Explosion

As a general observation, student activism has emerged in times of political flux, when social values have been subject to challenge. The mid- and late 1960s were such a time. The concern with which present-day activism is viewed by many is traceable, of course, to the violence which sometimes accompanies it. It also is due to puzzlement over the ultimate objectives of the protesters, who arise out of student bodies drawn from a far wider social base than before, and apprehension over the number of people who might become involved if protest truly is symptomatic of a deeply rooted malaise. There also is a vague feeling that the dissidents are likely to prove more effective with time and the opportunities afforded them by expanding communications.

Next to defense, education is the biggest business of the modern state--and the greatest need of the underdeveloped countries. University populations have more than doubled world-wide in ten years. There are over 650,000 students in France, 205,000 in the United Kingdom and 300,000 in the Federal Republic. The USSR has 1,900,000 full-time university students--4,700,000 if all who are enrolled part-time in technological institutes are counted. Japan, which like the United States has committed itself to the goal of mass education, has more than one million. There are more than six million Americans enrolled in colleges and universities.

Of these six million, approximately 260,000 are Negro. The Black student movement is of more recent origin and gives evidence of growing more rapidly than White student radicalism. In the words of the interim Progress Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, "Black Student Unions and Afro-American Associations now exist on most of the campuses that have a significant number of black students. Task Force studies indicate that until a few years ago, the extremely

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small minority of black students tended to be individualistic and on most campuses politically inactive. The Black Power Movement, however, coupled with substantial increases in the number of black students, has offered some black students a vehicle for giving collective expression of their particular grievances and at the same time to identify them with the larger black community...."

The implosion of students has strained facilities in allbut a few countries; the construction of buildings and the expansion of faculty have not kept pace. Neither has pedagogy made adequate use of modern invention. The situation is especially critical in the great metropolitan universities abroad, e.g., in Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Rio, where scores of thousands of students live for long periods of time in hostels and tenements under conditions approaching genuine hardship. At the Sorbonne, for example, more than 100,000 students live in congested quarters and study in obsolescent buildings designed for far fewer than half that number.

More important than antiquated buildings and crowded living conditions, however, has been the failure of university authorities and faculties to modernize administrative techniques, reform curricula to meet the needs of an increasingly technological society, or improve teaching methods. Many courses have little if any relevance to contemporary life. Degree requirements dating back a hundred years force a student to commit to memory great bodies of what he may regard as irrelevant data.

Many of the new generation of European and Latin American and Asian students are from lower or lower middle class families; they have first-hand knowledge of the socioeconomic ills of the day, although their own childhoods may have been relatively comfortable. They arrive at the university with high expectations and an acute appreciation of the type of course content which is likely to prove functional in their lives. All too often the reality does not live up to the expectation.

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There is an unmistakable correlation between academic discipline and propensity to protest. While it is somewhat misleading to generalize, students enrolled in professional schools, such as Law, Medicine, or Engineering, seldom are found among campus demonstrators. Where there are exceptions, as in parts of Latin America where medicine is regarded as a "liberal" undertaking, the explanation usually can be traced to the effects of immigration on a university faculty or to a significant event in the development of the particular school.

In most countries, professional and preprofessional students are vocationally oriented; they are obliged to master a clearly defined body of data and to submit to regular examinations designed to test their progressive skill in applying that data.

The protesters come from what are described as the Liberal Arts--precisely the faculties which have had to absorb the brunt of increasing enrollments and which are hard pressed to maintain any semblance of high standards.

Except in the United States, there is too little information to shed any light on the character, academic standing, etc., of most of the prominent student dissidents. Men like Rudi Dutschke or Karl Kietrich Wolff of West Berlin's *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund* and Daniel Cohn-Bendit of Paris' 22 March Movement are reputed to be better than average students, with considerably more than average oratorical skills. Dutschke, for example, survived the taxing routine of undergraduate study in Germany and was admitted to advanced studies at the Free University.

There are ample data to support the view that some of the best of the students in US universities are involved in protest--and that they often are found at schools judged among the finest in the country. Kenneth Keniston, whose books *The Uncommitted* and *The Young Radicals* provide valuable insights into the student psyche, maintains that

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socially-directed protest requires a special cultural climate, that is, certain distinctive values and views about the effectiveness and the meaning of demonstration and about the wider society.

Summarizing a large number of academic studies published since 1965, Keniston notes that almost all student protesters in the United States are outstanding performers in the classroom; the higher the student's grade average, the more likely it is that he will become involved in any given political demonstration. Similarly, students come from families with liberal political values; a disproportionate number report that their parents hold views which are essentially similar to their own and accept or support their activities.

Finally, some historical situations are especially conducive to protest. Keniston believes that there may exist what he terms a "protest-prone personality."

More than 1800 of the 2100 colleges and universities in the United States have reported no significant dissidence. The most serious outbreaks in the United States have occurred in a handful of universities--mostly in the so-called multiversities, or their subordinate colleges, which have reputations for arbitrary management, restive faculties, high drop-out rates, etc.

Open communications between administrators and students are critical to the maintenance of the kind of climate which operates against dissidence; so too, are close student-faculty ties. A restive junior faculty proves an irritant and frequently provides protest with its initial impetus--especially when more senior faculty members abdicate teaching responsibilities.

In much of the world, the real executive authority is vested not in the university but in a government ministry; day-to-day control is entrusted to a political appointee. In Mexico, for example, university rectorship often seems a steppingstone to

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the governorship of a state. Given the prospect of election to high office in a one-party state at the close of a brief university career, no rector will prove too tolerant of dissident students. Elsewhere, in much of Europe, administrators have little sway over autonomous faculties; rectors are elected for brief terms from among senior faculty and are unlikely to oppose for long their past and future colleagues.

The tenured faculty long have been the autocrats of the academic world. Thanks to government-sponsored research and consultant contracts, private practice in medicine or law, political careers, and a plethora of other outside interests, they have become absentee autocrats. At the University of Rome, for example, a few senior professors appear in class only once or twice a term. None of the law faculty at Lille lives in Lille. Faculty members at Nanterre, outside Paris, commute from homes in the capital and seldom can be found on campus anywhere outside the classroom. When present, many European faculty are unapproachable; they are mandarins. First- and second-year students in the Netherlands are prohibited by custom from addressing professors. The problem is further complicated when, as in the Federal Republic, senior professors because of economic interests or professional jealousy conspire to keep down the number of post-graduate students admitted to teaching positions, and candidates whose progress thus is stymied further swell already large enrollments.

In the United States the compulsion to publish has stimulated increasingly narrow academic specialization and less and less meaningful classroom instruction. Actual teaching all too often is left to graduate assistants or is designed to further some line of esoteric research being pursued by a professor. As David Reisman and Christopher Jencks observe in the recently published *The Academic Revolution*, the inquisitive or sensitive students who hope to find a "visible relationship between knowledge and action, between the questions asked in the classroom and the lives they lead outside it"

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may receive, instead, "pedantry and alienated erudition."

In the Middle East, Japan, Latin America, and even Europe violence has been a hallmark of student dissidence.

Protest has grown more militant in the United States because those who speak for it are convinced that docility does not succeed, that over the past several years only violence or the threat of violence has won a respectful hearing. In short, they believe that society is structured in such a way that it can ignore or blunt peaceful protest, but that it abhors interruption and will pay attention to the noisy picket line or raucous demonstration that closes down a vital institution.

While their choice of tactics puzzles many observers, Black students generally seek relief of specific, race-related grievances. Like the labor strikes of the 1930s, their demonstrations, sit-ins, etc., are directed, i.e., they are meant to set the stage for "negotiation" of those grievances with university authorities.

Most demonstrations that are not exclusively Black, are *expressive*, rather than directed; they are calculated to dramatize an issue and attract public notice. The demonstration itself becomes the focal point of the action.

This view of the efficacy of confrontation is rooted in the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, where a few hundred activists employed sit-ins and other means to expose to public view regional customs which became an intolerable embarrassment to be remedied under the pressure generated by an aroused public opinion. It has been buttressed by the urban riots of recent years.

Rightly or not, the dissidents sense that latent support for their cause exists and can be galvanized by direct action, that their critical view of society is shared by a far larger number of their age group.

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The Black students who were in the vanguard of the Civil Rights Movement earlier in the decade found a wide following among both races. Now Black Militants are having some success in enlisting allies among the younger, disadvantaged non-college population of the urban ghetto.

American white student dissidents have looked in vain for allies. In April-May 1968, however, French dissidents enjoyed for a short time the support of the younger workers in the industrial complexes which ring Paris.

It is debatable whether television or newsreel coverage of a demonstration or a riot can spark similar outbreaks elsewhere, although several commentators have remarked on the likelihood that a disturbance at Columbia, for example, may embolden dissident students at other schools and cause them to press for relief of their own grievances. French officials found no evidence of significant foreign involvement in the Paris riots--but they do cite what they describe as the "grapevine effect" which television coverage of earlier riots in New York and Berlin and other cities had on the mood of the students at Nanterre. It seems likely that the media, by their emphasis on violence, police intervention, etc., add to the intensity and duration of a disturbance. They also tend to evoke sympathy at least on the part of like-minded students elsewhere--sympathy which confirms the belief of the protesters in the probity of their cause.

A student in the US, France, Brazil, or Japan probably does identify with his peers in other countries and is more likely to share their values and feel that their problems are his. Because of the accessibility of foreign-language books and newspapers and the type of *avant-garde* art and films which are so popular in most university communities, there are few, if any, cultural impediments to this kind of identification. Moreover, today's students are highly mobile; they travel within their own countries and abroad, frequently enrolling for study at foreign universities. Many universities

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have a cosmopolitan character. In the academic year 1967-68, for example, there were 90,000 foreign students registered in American schools and 80,000 Americans studying abroad. In 1966, the last year for which cumulative totals are available, there were more than 100,000 students from the lesser developed countries enrolled in European or US universities. An estimated 10,000 were in the USSR in December 1967.

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~~SECRET~~Theory, Practice and Inspiration

The 1950s, during which many observers were perplexed by the indifference of American university students to political and social issues, witnessed in Europe and then in the United States a rebirth of interest in Marxist social criticism. A conscious effort to construct what since has come to be called "a new politics," this neo-Marxist current was a reaction to political developments of the day--on the international level, to the nuclear arms race, Suez and the Hungarian Revolution, Khrushchev's Secret Speech and the Algerian conflict; and, nationally, to a host of causes. It first found voice in England in *The Universities and Left Review* in 1956, and then in the United States in 1959 with the University of Wisconsin's *Studies on the Left* and Chicago University's *New University Thought* in 1960.

Whether in England, France, Japan, West Germany, or the United States, like-minded young people--mostly university-centered--grouped together independently of one another. To date, they have eschewed one creed or one approach. Loosely dubbed the New Left, they have little in common except for their indebtedness to several prominent writers, such as American sociologist C. Wright Mills, Hegelian philosopher Herbert Marcuse, and the late Negro psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, and a few contemporary revolutionary heroes like Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. (The term New Left, itself, has little meaning--except as a device to distinguish between today's young radicals and the Communist-Socialist factions of the interwar period. It is taken to mean an amalgam of disparate, amorphous local groups of uncertain or changing leadership and eclectic programs.) The consequence was an amalgam of anarchism, utopian socialism, and an overriding dedication to social involvement.

This intellectual response to the international and domestic crises of the 1950s coincided in time with the emergence of student activism in the United

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States, i.e., with the first stirring of the Civil Rights Movement. The experience of the Civil Rights Movement electrified the American university community. Nor did its lessons go unnoticed abroad.

In a few countries nearly moribund student organizations were revitalized; in others, where existing organizations clearly were pawns of old-line political parties, new alignments emerged.

Since then, the two currents, neo-Marxist social criticism and student activism, have co-existed in a mutual search for a meaningful program, a lever for overturning social structures. It is easy to belittle their efforts; more difficult to ignore the thrust behind them. Lacking any useful prescriptive advice from the few intellectual mentors whose writings they value, the dissidents have sought to define a *political* role for students and young intellectuals. The 100,000-member *Union Nationale des Etudiants de France*, for example, decided that students are "intellectual workers" and entitled as such to recognition by the state. Carl Davidson, an American radical theorist, has argued that students "share many of the social relations and conditions of production with many of the skilled workers of large-scale industry," and are becoming the *new working class*. Hence, for him, student revolt is "an important historical phenomenon," the "rising of the trainees of the new working class against the alienated and oppressive conditions of production and consumption within corporate capitalism."

Much of the writing of the New Left has an unmistakable improvisational quality about it. The publication recently in France, Italy, and the United States of collections of personal mementos and mimeographed press handouts issued in the course of demonstrations at the Sorbonne, Rome, and Columbia make clear that many of the dissidents are concerned most passionately with limited issues of local consequence and have little conception of what they seek once the conflict is broadened.

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~~SECRET~~Exchange of Ideas

Most of the activities of the dissidents, whether in the Communist or Free Worlds, take place not within but against the framework of established student organizations. Such organizational activity and co-ordination as exists among and between dissident groups is conducted out of view of most student organizations and out of operational control of their leaders. The mass of dissident students, whether or not affiliated with existing organizations, does appear to have--like the more radical students in the US--an amorphous and frequently changing, *de facto* leadership, functioning effectively outside an institutional framework. Such *de facto* leaders make frequent use of personal contact and may assist one another financially.

The impetus toward some form of international liaison exists and is likely to grow. Since July 1968, for example, members of the American Students for a Democratic Society have participated in several conferences with representatives of foreign student organizations.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit traveled to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Berlin--all centers of student radicalism--during the French crisis. The now disabled Rudi Dutschke and other West German students have visited Prague. The West Berlin unit of the *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund* reportedly provided what the French have described as a "modest" financial assistance, and German students in Paris served in some kind of liaison capacity between the two organizations during the riots.

A number of French radical students visited Spain during the summer of 1968 to meet Spanish student leaders, and an unknown number of young Spaniards went to Paris in September to study the techniques employed by the French in the May demonstrations.

These contacts result in little more than an exchange of mutual experience--largely between individuals who may or may not represent the organizations to which they belong. They are brief, frequently public, and held too irregularly to accomplish much. Nevertheless, they do constitute the nucleus of what could become a source of direction.

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~~SECRET~~The Communists and the Students

There is very little hard evidence of control, manipulation, sponsorship or significant direct financial support of student dissidents by any international Communist authority. In Latin America local Communists, not always loyal to Moscow, sometimes figure in student unrest. Elsewhere--in France and Italy, for example--pro-Chinese Communists or Castroite/Trotskyite factions are alleged to have rendered assistance to the dissidents in recent months. However, even if this allegation is correct, there is no factual basis for surmising that as a consequence these Communist factions retain any control over the students.

The militants to a great degree are anti-Soviet; they blame the Russian leadership for substituting one form of bureaucracy, albeit a Marxist-Leninist one, for another. The Cuban and Chinese leaderships enjoy somewhat greater favor because they retain a measure of revolutionary fervor.

The most vocal of the dissidents have been wary of being caught up in any of the international youth organizations controlled by Moscow. The dissidents are contemptuous of the neanderthal leaderships entrenched in most national Communist parties of the West, including the CP/USA.

The Bloc parties have reacted to student dissidence by harshly suppressing riots in Eastern Europe and with expressions of anxiety and dismay at their eruption in the Free World. Underlying these reactions is the unmistakable concern of the ruling Communist parties over the "anarchist" thrust of the students and the lip service they pay to "Maoist" and "extreme leftist" slogans. (There also is a healthy measure of respect for the dialectical skills displayed by the dissidents in debate with party functionaries in the West.) On 30 May 1968, *Pravda's* Yuri Zhukov denounced Western student rebels as "werewolves" determined to split progressive movements and denounced French student radical Daniél Cohn-Bendit as a "provocateur."

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A division between the *de jure* and *de facto* student leaderships exists within Soviet-orbit countries. In Poland, for example, the Polish Students Union (ZSP), a member of the Soviet controlled International Union of Students, is under the leadership of Communist zealots--some of whom hold office in the IUS. Rank-and-file ZSP members have been in the core of "anti-establishment" dissent among Polish youth for years.

In Western Europe, student dissidents have shaken governments in which national Communist parties have had a stake. Nowhere has this been demonstrably in the interests of over-all Communist policy. Relations between the dissidents and the Communist parties of Western Europe have grown grotesque. In West Berlin students deride the Communists as Stalinists on the one hand and revisionists on the other. Both the illegal German party and the French Communists have been aghast at the antics of the leftist students. The indecisiveness of the French Communist Party during the early stages of the Paris riots and Daniél Cohn-Bendit's antiparty strictures once the Communist-controlled labor unions had reined in their stalwarts and abandoned the students to face the riot police illustrate the dilemma. Cohn-Bendit's impassioned denunciations of the French "Stalinists" were listened to attentively by student dissidents everywhere. The message was clear: threatened by anarchy, bureaucrats of all stripes embrace.

Neither is there evidence that the romantic appeal of Mao Tse Tung has led to significant Chinese influence. The Chinese have from time to time covertly funded sympathetic factions within Communist-sponsored youth groups in a number of countries--exploiting them to embarrass local party leadership and counter pro-Russian propaganda. A few French students under Chinese influence were active in the early days of the disturbances at Nanterre; they soon lost influence, however, and never played a directing role.

The Cubans maintained no such contacts in France or elsewhere in Europe before the outbreak of disturbances,

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and Cuban personnel abroad shunned participants in the French riots once trouble began. Castro does find favor among the dissidents, who apparently regard him as the embodiment of the student revolutionary. The Cuban leader is determined to counter Russian influence wherever he finds it and welcomes activists anxious to visit Cuba. As a counter to the recent Ninth World Youth Festival in Sofia, the Cubans organized a "Vietnam summer" to attract young European radicals during the summer of 1968. There is marginal evidence that the Cubans have supplied limited funds to Black Separatists in the United States; there is nothing to corroborate speculation that these monies have found their way to white student activists.

For years the Russians have funded two instrumentalities for influencing world youth movements, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). Neither organization seems disposed at present to exert control over student dissidents in the Free World and both may prove vulnerable to infection from without. A hard core of the IUS remains responsive to Moscow; nevertheless, the twists and turns of the Cold War and the increasing degree of ideological diversity within Bloc and Free World parties and especially the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia have vitiated the effectiveness of Soviet influence and divested IUS of most of the sway it held over member national organizations in non-Communist countries.

Those who see the IUS from its organizational and operational viewpoint stress the maintenance of Soviet control and point to sporadic efforts by dissidents associated with the IUS to impose some measure of structure within the diffuse mass of students in the non-Communist world. The opposite view is that the IUS is all but dead, that it is split among internal factions and cannot advance the interests of anyone. The truth appears to be that although it is not completely impotent, neither is Russian control over its leadership nor efforts to reinvigorate and expand its efforts relevant to channelling "student power" in support of Moscow's interests.

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The leadership of the IUS has attempted without noticeable success to enhance the attractiveness of its propaganda and to attract broader participation in its seminars and meetings. It also has supported the demands of many Western students for academic reform.

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~~SECRET~~Prospects

Organizations like the SDS in the United States, the 22 March Movement in France and the *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund* in Germany have received considerable notoriety as a consequence of their activities. For a good many students, that notoriety probably is directly translatable as effectiveness. For the short run, it would appear that they are the only vehicles open to most student radicals and the less militant young who are impelled for personal reasons to move from mere indignation to protest.

Many of today's students--far more than are directly involved in protest--share the activists' disillusionment with the political process. Because of the diverse and changing issues which fuel dissent, an end to the Vietnam conflict would not automatically signal the close of student protest. Other issues quickly would come to the fore.

The social and political malaise that underlies much of the present-day dissidence will not be speedily cured; there are, in fact, striking parallels between the situation today and the conditions of cynicism, despair, and disposition toward violence which existed after World War I and which later helped produce Fascism and National Socialism on the Continent. In Scandinavia, where the Vietnam issue has been central to dissent, an end to the conflict in Southeast Asia might well diminish the level of protest. Elsewhere in Europe, the prospects are less encouraging. In Italy, France, West Germany, Spain, and Portugal, the democratic base ranges from fragile to non-existent and could well be threatened should the dissidents provoke frightened governments into repressive measures of the kind that would broaden the nature of the dissent.

Several Latin American governments are observing closely the efforts of the regime in Argentina to depoliticize the universities and to end the abuses of fifty years. Meanwhile, an increasing number of them are disposed to quash student dissent with

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military force, as witness the case of Mexico. In Brazil, student agitation helped induce a reactionary military clique to pressure a reluctant but harried government into adopting far more harsh domestic policies. Meanwhile, local Communist parties have made inroads into student organizations, in some cases enhancing the chances of violence.

If an education is everywhere necessary for "success" by today's standards, it is doubly or triply so in Africa and other underdeveloped areas. For the educated African, then, political activity and government service become the most promising path to money, status, and power. The professions are limited, industry still is largely under European control and management, and military service holds little attraction. Until these conditions alter, student dissidence will be fed locally and will pose a threat to the stability of a number of governments.

In the United States, where the question of university reform is real but not as pressing or as explosive as in Europe, peace in Vietnam probably would cause dissidence to subside--but not disappear.

International Communism has not been able to employ its student/youth mechanisms to channel dissent in support of its objectives; nevertheless, Moscow benefits from whatever notoriety attaches to Free World institutions as a consequence of activism. The national Communist parties, particularly in Europe, have been unable to cope with the dissidents and view with alarm the possibility that their malleable youth organizations will be drawn toward the radicals.

A word of caution is indicated. Many sociologists and psychologists believe that industrial societies are disjunctive, that they tend to aggravate conflict between generations. If this is so, there is a likelihood that dissidence will worsen and that its base will broaden--unless the youthful energy which makes it so potent a force can be rechanneled to more constructive purposes.

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It is possible, too, that adverse public reaction or governmental sanctions will cause the student militants to operate more clandestinely. More tightly structured, less likely to receive funds or to win a following among rank-and-file students, they could become more dependent on covert means of support and, hence, more vulnerable to manipulation by any power willing to subsidize them.

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AFRICA

Introduction

The pace of student activities in Africa has fluctuated considerably in the decade since the rush to independence in 1960. At present, most student organizations are quiescent or are acting in concert with their local government. Students do present a potential political force in some countries, however, as was demonstrated in Senegal in 1968. In certain countries, such as Ivory Coast and Mali, the governments have shown considerable concern over potential student problems.

Detailed descriptions of student movements in Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Morocco, and Senegal follow.

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CONGO (KINSHASA)

Summary

Student strikes are not new in the Congo, although during the past year they have been more frequent, wider in scope, and more militant. In all strikes--or threats of strikes--the university authorities, backed by the government, have dealt harshly with the students. Student resentment has built up over the past several years and may partially account for the present increased student militancy.

Higher Education

The Congo has three universities with a total enrollment of about 4,300. Lovanium University in Kinshasa is the largest (about 3,000 students in 1968) and the oldest. It began operation in 1954 as a government-subsidized branch of the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. The Congo Government currently underwrites about 40 percent of its budget. The Official University of the Congo at Lubumbashi (OUC) is a much smaller, government-sponsored school with an enrollment in 1966 of about 800. The third university, the Free University of the Congo at Kisangani, had an enrollment in 1968 of just over 500.

In addition, there are at least eight special public schools at a post-secondary, but nonuniversity, level to provide training in specific fields, such as mining, teaching, and medical training. In 1967 these schools had a total enrollment of about 2,100.

According to estimates, the universities and special schools had a combined faculty of nearly 450 in 1964. Of these, approximately 415 were non-Congolese. About 80 percent of the university students are Congolese nationals; other Africans make up an additional 10 percent, and non-Africans 10 percent. About 1,200 Congolese are studying abroad--the majority in Belgium.

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~~SECRET~~Student Expectations

Because so much emphasis was placed on the Congo's shortage of college-educated young men when the country gained its independence, most university students today regard themselves as a unique group and share what has been dubbed the "future leader" complex. They see themselves as an intellectual elite deserving of a government job in Kinshasa, and they totally reject the idea of returning to the bush where their newfound skills could be profitably employed. There have been at least two attempts to establish a type of domestic peace corps, but both times the university students sent their regrets.

The students range from left of center to radical in their political thinking. Most espouse some sort of socialism or vague Marxism and generally reject capitalism. Unable to identify with any Congo regime since independence, they are dissatisfied with the present government and are among the few with the courage to say so.

The politically significant students are those at Lovanium. Lovanium is the best university and the one with the most prestige; moreover, it is located in Kinshasa where most meaningful political activity takes place. Student activity at Lovanium is controlled and directed by the General Association of Lovanium Students (AGEL). Recently, however, the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC), an international organization which includes Congolese students throughout the world, has made inroads into the student political structure at Lovanium.

Information on the size of these two groups and the proportion of their membership to the entire student body is unavailable. They probably represent only a small minority.

Feelings of student solidarity do exist, however. Following the arrest and rather harsh treatment of several AGEL leaders in early 1968, for example, most students not sympathetic with the leaders or their leftist concepts were nevertheless

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bitter about the government's repressive tactics. Many felt that the government had exaggerated an "alleged subversive plot" as justification for further repression.

Those students several years out of the universities who have joined the government usually have tempered their views. They become more conservative--in keeping with the present regime--and more middle class in their orientation. Graduates who are unable to "compromise" their principles find jobs with private business in the Kinshasa area.

Recent Strikes

Congolese students have been demonstrating periodically since independence. Generally, their strikes have called for better living conditions, a role in the administration of the university, and freedom from government interference in academic affairs. In the early years of independence, student strikes were short-lived and relatively peaceful. In more recent years, however, they have increased in intensity, reaching a peak in June 1969 when a dozen students from Lovanium University were killed in a clash with security forces. Nevertheless, student activities marking the first anniversary of this clash were peaceful and confined to campus.

Students first brought their grievances into the open with a general strike in March 1964 at Lovanium. Classes were quickly resumed when a joint study committee was formed to consider student complaints. The committee lasted only a few weeks, however, and few student demands were met. With the beginning of the new academic year in October 1964, there was talk of renewing the strike, but nothing came of it.

In February 1967, a student strike closed Lovanium for nearly two weeks, following the suspension of four students for assaulting several university employees. President Mobutu personally

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mediated between the students and university officials. He reaffirmed to the students his support of the university authorities, although he did agree to consider student demands for a greater voice in academic policy. For two weeks the university was garrisoned by army units; this and Mobutu's firm stand dampened student enthusiasm. Again, little was done to meet student demands.

Students took a stronger stand in 1968. At the Official University of the Congo (OUC) at Lubumbashi, students demonstrated for two weeks in January for increased housing and transportation benefits. Radicals among them took advantage of the situation to circulate Marxist tracts and introduce a revolutionary tone. Lovanium students held a small-scale, off-campus, anti-Vietnam demonstration during Vice President Humphrey's visit to Kinshasa in January 1968. Over the next several months, demonstrations broke out on other campuses, and security forces were called in to restore order.

On 4 June 1969, Lovanium students again went out on strike, demanding an increase in their monthly stipends. The demonstration soon spread to downtown Kinshasa, where it was violently dispersed by security forces on orders from President Mobutu. A dozen students were killed, at least 20 were injured, and many more were arrested. In August, 35 students were put on public trial for fomenting a riot during the June demonstrations. A total of 31 were sentenced to prison terms ranging up to 20 years and scores more were expelled from various universities and technical schools. Two months later, president Mobutu announced an amnesty, releasing those imprisoned and reinstating all students involved.

Despite Mobutu's gesture, reconciliation was accompanied by increased restriction on student activities. All student organizations were banned, and all students were required to join the youth army of the Congo's only political party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR). New consultative bodies were also established at each university.

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For the most part, however, the MPR youth arm has been unpopular with students, and the consultative bodies have become moribund.

The first anniversary of the 4 June 1969 clash was marked by a peaceful procession at Lovanium and quiet observances at OUC. Although the government was prepared for large-scale disturbances, the anniversary passed without incident and student activities were held to the campus.

The government has dealt harshly with student demonstrators, usually calling troops to restore order and protect property. President Mobutu has consistently taken a firm stand against students involved in demonstrations. Although government officials have paid lip service to student complaints, they have taken little concrete action. The legitimate grievances of Lovanium students, fairly peacefully presented in 1964, have yet to be resolved. Although students have become resentful of the cavalier treatment they receive from university and government officials, they have lacked unity and a strong leadership and have been largely unable to take any positive action to solve their problems.

Outside Influences

Soviet-bloc financing for student leaders has often been rumored or assumed, but it is difficult to prove. Student leaders more likely act on their own in accordance with their political philosophies and immediate grievances. They reportedly maintain contacts with members of the Belgian Communist Party, which prepared several of the more inflammatory tracts circulated by the students in recent demonstrations.

The mass media are government controlled and have not supported the students. Following the February 1967 Lovanium strike, the Kinshasa press commented favorably on some student grievances, perhaps reflecting a divergence of views within the regime.

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The Mobutu government has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to win over the university students. The youth wing of the single political party has been singularly unable to attract students--many of whom may consider themselves above its level of politics.

Anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism have seldom been a real issue, although many students are critical of Kinshasa's open support of the US and would prefer to see the Congo join the non-aligned bloc. So far, little blatantly antiregime sentiment has surfaced in the strikes and demonstrations. But the government's harsh treatment of student demonstrators has produced discontent that will probably continue to smolder and could lead to more serious trouble in coming years.

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ETHIOPIA

Summary

Ethiopian students basically are the same as students in most developing countries. They suffer from the same anti-establishment views including a deep-seated suspicion of the developed world, which sometimes approaches paranoia. However, the Ethiopian has the additional burden of an autocratic traditionalist government that he views as unprogressive, corrupt, and unwilling to accord responsibility to the newly educated class.

The dissent of students--the young elite--actually seems to be an aspect of a generation gap within the Amhara-Tigre family from which most of them come. Their dissent does not mean, however, that the dominant ruling Amhara-Tigre minority, roughly 40 percent of the population, is likely to relinquish its long-held power over the other ethnic groups of the Empire, or bring them more actively into national life.

The Students

The students have no clearly defined goals. They talk of replacing the conservative establishment, including Haile Selassie, with progressives--preferably themselves--so that Ethiopia can catch up with other emerging countries. They do not, however, seem to envision destruction of the Imperial system, or any dramatic break with Ethiopian tradition. Most seem to favor a constitutional monarchy with the Crown Prince replacing Haile Selassie, and some degree of open political activity. While virtually all students share the same frustrations regarding the regime and feel that as educated Ethiopians they have a responsibility to promote actions on national problems, the large majority still is relatively moderate. They are leery of tactics that might jeopardize their own education--they are almost wholly subsidized by the government--and skeptical of the Marxist radicals. The radical minority has openly stated that political action

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against the regime is the proper goal of student life. Thus, there have been periodic clashes between student organizations and the university administration over the degree of permissible political activity, with the administration awkwardly caught between students and the government.

The hard-core dissidents are a relatively small group, generally described as Marxists, centered on the Addis Ababa campus of Haile Selassie University. The government security apparatus has the ring-leaders fairly well identified and keeps them under observation. If trouble seems in the offing, they are often placed in detention. Such stiff government measures have kept the radicals in check throughout the first half of 1970, and they have been unable to generate any serious trouble at the University.

The radicals first entered the picture when they gained control of an Addis campus political group called the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) soon after it had been formed in December 1966. The National Union of Ethiopian University Students is also dominated by the radicals. More important than these open organizations is an informal, clandestine student group called the "Crocodile Society," composed of some of the influential members of the other two groups.

Anti-US Overtones

Since the USUAA became active and the "Crocodiles" more aggressive, their propaganda has grown more hostile to the regime and more anti-US, using the vitriolic language learned from Communist countries. A probable result of this radical influence was revealed in the riots of April 1968, which were the first to show noticeable signs of an anti-US bias that had existed beneath the surface for a long time. It is not surprising that the US was singled out, however, since the American presence in Ethiopia is large and obvious, both in the economic assistance field and through the extensive US military assistance program. Consequently, the US is regarded as the principal prop of the regime in the minds of the students.

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~~SECRET~~The University

Haile Selassie University, the center of student life in Ethiopia, contains six components. The principal and oldest is the University College of Addis Ababa. The others are the College of Agriculture, College of Engineering, Institute of Building Technology, the Public Health College, and the Theological College. Not all of these are in Addis Ababa, but the capital is the focus of student discontent. Total student enrollment at the university in 1968/69 was 3,460. The university faculty totals approximately 517, of whom a large number are foreign nationals. Americans comprise the largest number of foreign faculty members.

The university is run by a board of governors consisting of Imperial appointees and elected members. Administrative authority is vested in a president (Ethiopian) and two vice presidents, one of whom is an American. All three are appointed by the Emperor. Final authority in academic matters resides with a faculty council.

Most of the day-to-day administration rests with the American vice president, who somehow keeps the campus functioning in a businesslike manner. Because of his exposed position, he was the focus of much student criticism during the April 1968 riots. The president, while well thought of, tends like most Ethiopian bureaucrats to avoid responsibility for unpopular decisions and has depended on his American deputy to act for him. The government does not intervene directly, except to quell student disorders and discipline recalcitrant students. The success of any university effort to discipline the student body depends in the last analysis on the backing given it by the government. The government sometimes will prove conciliatory if that course is tactically convenient, but generally responds to student activism with various forms of repression. The police have been particularly brutal in repressing students in the past.

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Faculty views of student protests have depended on the issues involved. In the demonstration in early 1967, the faculty--both foreign and Ethiopian--united in support of the students. In April 1968, however, the foreign faculty reacted adversely while Ethiopian faculty members were generally sympathetic, primarily because they shared the students' anti-regime sentiments.

The 1968 riots began on the pretext that a campus fashion show was "invading and corrupting our national culture." Basically an antigovernment and anti-Western protest, it quickly degenerated into a looting spree joined by secondary students, street urchins, and some of the unemployed of Addis. Several days of police action were required to restore order, and the USIS building was considerably damaged. In the spring of 1969, the students prepared for another confrontation. Prompt action by the government prevented any disturbances, although the students did manage to all but close the university for the first half of the year. There has been little trouble since the university opened in the fall of 1969 and the school year ended quietly, but this could change at any time.

Inasmuch as there are no political parties in Ethiopia, the traditional links between students and established parties are not possible. Student activists maintain close contact, however, with politically minded members of the young elite in the university faculty, the civil service, and the private sector. Student links to younger army officers are less direct and close, but some sympathy for student views does exist in the officer corps. The students have also been fairly successful in gaining support from secondary students, both in Addis and in the provinces. A new ingredient was added to student unrest during 1969 when strikes and disturbances broke out simultaneously in a number of provincial schools.

All embassies, including the US, cultivate students; the East Europeans, not surprisingly, concentrate on the local radicals. The extent of foreign

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Communist involvement with the radicals in Addis is not clear. When the police raided a student headquarters in April 1968, they found considerable propaganda material and even an espionage training film.

The students also maintain contact with both pro-West and Communist-front international student groups. Perhaps the most important outside tie of the activists is with organizations of Ethiopian students in Europe and North America, all of which are violently antiregime, anti-US, and Marxist-oriented.

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MOROCCO

Summary

Discontent among Moroccan youth, particularly among the 10,000 students at the university level, is one of Morocco's principal political problems. Youth in general are dissatisfied with the authoritarian government and the lack of dynamism among the political parties. Students are restive over the deteriorating quality of instruction and inadequate physical facilities at the schools, as well as with the arbitrary promotion system and general lack of job opportunities after graduation. They also resent the fact that many high-level positions in government, business, and industry are still held by foreigners while specialized training for educated Moroccans is inadequate.

The Students

Morocco's educational system does not meet the needs of its rapidly expanding population, and student-government relations are poor. Morocco's traditional elites are still in command and the generation gap is very wide, particularly in centers of traditional culture such as Fez. As a consequence, student politics since independence have had a strongly radical flavor.

In the late 1950s, the national student union, the Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM), became closely associated with the radical faction of the Istiqlal Party and subsequently joined with it to form the leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). When the UNFP leaders were arrested en masse in July 1963 for "plotting" against the monarchy, the UNEM became even more radical in tone. Its congress that year called for the abolition of the monarchy.

In the fall of 1963, a military tribunal condemned the UNEM president to death in absentia for

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expressing solidarity with Algeria's revolutionary socialist government during the brief border war between the two countries. The following year, the government cut off the subsidies paid to the UNEM and threatened to abolish it entirely. Although that threat served to dampen student ardor somewhat, political strikes have since become endemic at Mohamed V University in Rabat and have spread to lesser campuses at Fez and Casablanca and even into the secondary schools.

In March 1965, a student demonstration in Casablanca against new educational restrictions triggered bloody riots that cost the lives of several hundred persons. Several months later, the King imposed a "state of exception" under which he suspended parliament and re-assumed direct rule. This system still continues, despite the demands of politicians for the re-establishment of representative government.

No further violent outbreaks have taken place since 1965, but agitation and recurrent strikes continue. Officials reacted to antigovernment activity before the annual UNEM congress in 1966 by drafting all but one of the UNEM's executive committee on the eve of the meeting. No congress at all was allowed in 1967, in the fear that such a meeting would further inflame opinion already stirred up by the Arab-Israeli war. A largely uneventful UNEM congress was held in 1968, while in 1969, the congress dissolved into a struggle between rival factions for control of the organization.

The 1969-1970 school year has been disrupted by three periods of prolonged student strikes. In November, university students struck to protest inadequacies in physical facilities, teaching cadres, curriculum, food, and scholarships. In January, these university-level strikes spread to the secondary schools and continued intermittently until the end of March. The issues again included demands for more and better facilities as well as easing scholarship requirements and changes in courses.

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The final student strike, however, was purely political, lasted nearly six weeks, and ended in a truce between students and authorities. It was touched off by the arrest and subsequent drafting of student leaders for attempting to participate in a labor parade on 1 May. Although the government backed off somewhat and suspended the induction notices, the students were not moved by either concessions or threats and the government eventually cut off student subsistence payments. The strike movement finally collapsed when the students opposed their leaders and voted to return to class in order that the whole year might not be lost.

Educational Problems

Both educational and political grievances are at the root of the student malaise. Progress since independence has been frustratingly slow toward the announced goals of universal primary instruction, Arabization, Moroccanization, and unification of diverse curricula. At present, only about 30 percent of the school-age population attends the primary grades and Moroccan officials talk openly of abandoning the goal of universal primary education because its quality has been declining.

The shortage of qualified teachers adds to the problem. Foreign personnel, mainly French, continue to staff a large part of the teaching positions at all levels. The ambivalent official policy on the use of Arabic and French--Arabic in primary education and French in secondary education--compounds the problem. As a result of the struggle between Arabic-oriented politicians and French-oriented educators, a wasteful year of supplementary education in French has been added in an attempt to bridge the gap. The system works to the detriment of students from those segments of the population that have had the least exposure to French--the lower classes and those from rural areas. At higher educational levels, the employment of arbitrary criteria to select the very few who are allowed to continue their studies causes considerable frustration.

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Graduates of the primary system and all levels of the Arabic curriculum find few jobs available. Vocational education and manpower planning are neglected.

Political Difficulties

Many students have tended to blame the monarchy for these shortcomings and to consider the system responsive only to the interests of a narrow oligarchy. At least a minority (perhaps 30 percent) of the Moroccan students who are active in student affairs have long held anti-monarchical sentiments. What is new is a growing activism among student radicals, who now feel encouraged to spark revolutionary change.

The government's response has been to mix firm repressive measures with occasional changes in organization and personnel and, less frequently, a few genuine concessions. Student demonstrations have been suppressed periodically by pervasive police power, and the arrest or conscription of student leaders and the termination of scholarships have been used to force the striking students back into the classroom.

Organizational changes prompted by student unrest have included dividing the ministry responsible for education into several ministries in order to deal more effectively with the different problems encountered at each educational level, and the establishment of joint advisory committees composed of officials, faculty, students and parents. These methods have managed to contain student activism and, as in the disturbances of early 1970, a tenuous truce has followed each outburst. None of the basic problems underlying student discontent in Morocco has really been addressed, however, and recurrences of student trouble are inevitable.

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ARGENTINA

Summary

Student unrest which resulted in violence during 1969-1970 points up the continuing problems that Argentina is encountering from its sizable student population. To meet its student challenge the Onganía government emphasized conservatism and tradition, repressing antigovernment demonstrations and showing little sympathy for student demands. The military-backed regime which was installed following Onganía's ouster on 6 June is unlikely to soften the previous administration's hard line on student dissent, and may even be less tolerant of student protests if they occur again in an attempt to abolish the University Reform Law of 1967 which eliminated student participation in university government.

Background

As in most of Latin America, the university system in Argentina in the nineteenth century was modeled after the Spanish. Students were required to memorize large amounts of unrelated material in rote style. The curriculum was concentrated on classical themes, such as Greek philosophy, ancient literature, medicine, and law; sciences and the humanities were not included. Also adopted from the Spanish was the "faculty system." Students entered a faculty which was self-contained. All courses were held there, whether or not related to their field of specialty. Thus a student in the Faculty of Medicine had all his history, language, and other non-medical courses within that faculty.

Not only the Spanish influenced the Argentine university system in the nineteenth century. The Positivist philosophy through its emphasis on the development of scholars and experts who would manage the affairs of the nation established university graduates as an elite group. In addition, the immigrant wave from Europe which markedly altered the ethnic make-up of Argentina introduced a more enlightened university background from non-Spanish

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Europe, and some modern ideas began to penetrate the Argentine system. The role of the Roman Catholic Church in Argentine education was, in the meantime, declining, and by the early 20th century political reforms had ended the Church's sway.

It was not until 1918, after a student campaign against the university system at the city of Cordoba, that a reform program was achieved. Under "the Cordoba reform," students were given a voice in university administration, including the right to vote on course content, professors, and rectors for their schools. The reform was basically a middle-class phenomenon. The universities--previously citadels for the sons of the upper land-owning class--were now opened to the middle classes. The working classes, however, were still largely excluded by tuition and fees. With the opening of the universities to the middle classes and the inclusion of students in university government came the involvement of students in national politics--a role they have been reluctant to relinquish.

Peron, when he assumed power in 1945, took control of the universities at all levels. He opened them to the lower classes by eliminating tuition fees, ended the use of part-time teachers, and established a "Workers' University." Although political activities were banned by Peron, student organizations became even more politically oriented and shifted leftward in their ideology.

The fall of Peron signaled a return to the system that had prevailed under the Radicals. Student political groups ran the gamut from Communist to far right, but the most important were the Reformists, who had originally sparked the Cordoba reform, and the Humanists, who were oriented toward Catholicism. Although student political groups were independent of national party affiliations, the Reformists were later dominated by the Communists, and the Humanists leaned toward Argentina's poorly organized Christian Democrats.

Dr. Arturo Illia was made president of Argentina in the 1963 elections, which were held at the

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insistence of General Onganía, commander in chief of the Argentine Army. By 1965, the military were beginning to lose patience with the kindly old doctor from Cordoba--and so were Argentina's activist university students. Demands for improvements in the universities, including increased budgets, were mixed with student complaints about many of Illia's policies. In 1966, the leftist-oriented and Communist-run Argentine University Federation, to which most important student groups belonged, mounted increasingly violent demonstrations. These disorders were one of the factors which led to the 1966 coup and Onganía's assumption of the presidency.

The Onganía government took over the national universities in September 1966. It claimed that its aim was to end student involvement in politics and to improve the educational system, but the exercise of undue force against students at the University of Buenos Aires drew world-wide condemnation. When the government demanded that university rectors take an oath of loyalty, many resigned; teachers at all levels, some fearing repressive measures, followed suit. New university regulations in 1967 placed the universities under the control of the Secretariat for Education of the Minister of the Interior. University administration was now to be handled by faculty and the Secretariat. Students could have no vote in the governing council, though they were permitted one elected representative, and all students were required to pass at least one course a year to maintain university status. In February 1969, some deans resigned from the University of Buenos Aires in protest against a move by the university president to take personal charge of all university operations, including the functions previously filled by the deans.

Universities Today

Argentina probably now has the best system of higher education in Latin America. Between 35 and 40 percent of Latin America's university students and several thousand students from outside the hemisphere are enrolled in Argentine schools. Enrollment in the nine national universities and 16

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private institutions totals more than 265,000. The University of Buenos Aires with close to 80,000 students, is the largest in Latin America. State-owned university education is tuition-free, although private schools are permitted to charge tuition.

In 1968, Argentina's primary school system had 3,481,000 enrolled students--about 90 percent of the school-age population--and its secondary schools 887,000. Well over 90 percent of primary school teachers have teaching degrees, and the ratio of teachers to students is the lowest in Latin America. About 3.8 percent of the national budget each year goes to education--close to the 4 percent figure recommended by UNESCO.

There is another side of the Argentina educational picture, however. Only 50 percent of primary school students complete the total program. About 43 percent of those who enter secondary school go on to graduate, and only 25 percent of students who enter the universities eventually receive degrees.

The system also wastes resources because of its distorted pattern of degree specialization. About 25 percent of the university students study medicine. (Argentina has more doctors per 10,000 population than the United States.) Another 20 percent study law. Despite the fact that Argentina has serious shortages in the natural and social sciences and in many technical fields, few students enter these disciplines.

Argentina's school system, like most in the world, suffers also from regional imbalance. Schools are concentrated in the major cities; the rural areas are largely neglected. The universities--both public and private--are scattered through downtown buildings of major cities. Students find private accommodations, at home or in rented rooms, and social facilities are for the most part nonexistent.

Private universities, which are relatively new in Argentina, must meet stringent academic and financial standards and submit to government supervision. Most of the 16 schools are affiliated with the Catholic Church. Only about 15,000 students--six percent of the total university enrollment, attend private institutions.

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When students attempted to hold demonstrations to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Cordoba reform in 1968, the Onganía regime proved that it was determined to bring order to the national universities. Police, both within the schools and on the streets, dealt quickly with the demonstrators.

In 1968 it was estimated that there were nearly 19,800 professors in Argentine universities. The limited number of full-time professors, however, is the most striking feature of the universities. At the School of Economics at the University of Buenos Aires, for example, there are only 12 full-time professors for 15,000 students. Most classes, especially at Buenos Aires, are held in the evenings to allow both students and teachers to hold other jobs. Professors devote little time to research or writing, and many textbooks are collections of earlier printed works, rehashed and padded.

Many professors are politically to the left, ranging from mild Socialists to Maoist Communists. Although several former deans of the University of Buenos Aires have held far-leftist views, none is thought to have been a Party member. The faculties of Philosophy and Letters of the same university have been strongly Communist, but their following has been limited. In 1965, however, they did prevent Presidential Assistant Walt Rostow from speaking at the Faculty of Economics.

The Communist activist professors were cautioned by the Communist Party not to resign after the 1966 take-over. Many who did leave their posts no doubt feared reprisals, either for their political views or for their Jewish origin. This year, however, most faculties are operating normally, with shortages mainly in the natural sciences, psychology, and sociology.

The University Students

The large majority of students in Argentina's universities come from the middle and upper classes, with a small minority from the lower working classes.

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For the most part, they live in the same large cities where the universities are situated. In racial and ethnic background, they match the national profile--a mixture of Spanish and Italian, with other European strains and a few mestizo (mixed Indian and white). Unlike other Latin countries, the upper classes in Argentina are not exclusively of Spanish derivation. They also have Italian, German, and British heritages. Argentines tend to be highly discriminatory, however, especially toward dark-skinned people of any race. Although some conservatives still hold anti-Semitic beliefs, Jews have not been excluded from the universities. The upper classes resent the middle classes and distrust the lower classes, which make up a large part of the activist or radical university student groups.

Students from the upper classes can afford to attend schools in the US or Europe, and many do. They are, therefore, not as involved with university activities in Argentina as are other groups. Middle-class students attend the universities to cement or expand their standing in society. Most recognize that they must attend graduate schools abroad for a complete professional education. Lower-class students go to the universities to escape the ranks of the working class; many of them become the politically oriented activists and professional students.

Eighty percent of university students avoid demonstrations. They do not want to jeopardize their standing at the university or their future entry into Argentine society. Moreover, student protest or "rebellion" in Argentina is usually directed more toward revision of the existing system than to its complete overthrow. A number of student organizations provide centers for student opinions and actions; many of them are leftist.

The Argentine University Federation, until the Organia regime the principal student confederation, now operates with much reduced membership. Orthodox Communist youth, Communist dissidents, and other left-wing groups are all still involved in the organization, but the government keeps a close eye on their activities, and the organization has been able to do little within the country.

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The Humanists, like the FUA, oppose the Onganía reform, although they are apparently more circumspect about the prospects of a confrontation with the government. As an organized force, they now appear to be semimoribund. The Integralists are a pro-Catholic and somewhat leftist group, limited largely to the University at Córdoba. Although they were a major force in the 1966 riots against the Onganía take-over, they did not participate in the 1968 demonstrations, citing as a reason the Communist domination of the FUA. The Communist Youth Federation and the relatively new Communist Youth National Committee for Revolutionary Recovery vie for the membership of Communist youth.

Despite the diversity of orientation among the student groups, some common attitudes seem to prevail. Generally, organized students--Communist and non-Communist alike--oppose the restrictions imposed by the Onganía reform. They want the tripartite system of administration returned so that they can have a voice in the running of the schools. They oppose the rule requiring a student to pass one course per year and any requirements for payment of tuition or penalties.

The students mourn the loss of student politics--formerly their major diversion. They opposed the Onganía government because it was a dictatorship, and they disagreed with its rightist policies, both foreign and domestic. Since many activist students come from lower-class origins, it is understandable that they favor Peronism and more benefits for labor. Although the activists bitterly opposed Illia when he was president, they now support the ousted Radicals as one means of opposing the present administration.

There is no evidence of serious contacts with activists in other countries, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit in France or Mark Rudd in the US, although the FUA, through contacts in Communist front groups, probably is in indirect touch with alien student leaders.

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~~SECRET~~Students and Organized Labor

A recent split in the 2.5 million-man General Confederation of Labor has led to the formation of the so-called "rebel" CGT. Avowedly more leftist than the main stream and with more of an orthodox Peronist stripe, the "rebel" CGT actively opposes the government and has, therefore, attracted support from the FUA. The fragile alliance between the "rebel" CGT and the FUA, however, has offered little threat to the government.

Prospects

In some respects, Argentina's university students are faced with a situation similar to that existing in 1918 before the university reform. They are virtually excluded from any control over the administration of the universities, and requirements of academic performance mean that the schools are no longer open to all. It seems likely, therefore, that the pressures that motivated the students in 1918 will do so again. Students are expected to bring pressure on the new government to abolish the University Reform Law of 1967. Their chance of success is slight.

There are, however, significant differences. The Onganía government was quick to suppress anti-government demonstrations and lacked the sympathy for the students' demands which the Radicals had in 1918, and its successor is likely to be much the same. Moreover, the failure of student participation to improve university administration or the educational system was demonstrated over a period of many years and student involvement in generally unstable politics after the reform was not on the whole well received.

The outlook for the universities is probably one of general order but little progress in the next decade. There are few funds to direct toward university improvement in the present austerity campaign, which may last at least two or three more years. And there is less sympathy for innovation or change among Argentina's traditionalist leaders. Innovations, either good or bad, can come only with a progressive government in Argentina. The prospects for this are not bright.

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BRAZIL

Summary

Brazilian students have a long tradition of protest. Many of their grievances are legitimate, and although they presently are relatively quiescent, they could pose a long range threat to the maintenance of stability.

Cycles of student provocation and police repression have tended to feed off each other. Military frustration with the Costa e Silva administration's failure to halt student agitation was one factor that led to the declaration in December 1968 of Institutional Act Number Five that gave the executive sweeping new authoritarian powers. The government's use of powers such as the suspension of the right of habeas corpus in cases involving the broadly defined concept of national security, and the authority to expel students who participate in political activity, has outwardly cowed the majority of students. This repression has, however, contributed heavily toward driving some student activists into clandestine terrorist groups, and has resulted in widespread sympathy for the leftists among moderate students. Unless the government moves imaginatively and rapidly to bring about meaningful educational reforms, a resumption of student protest is almost inevitable.

Government Attitudes and Actions

Until the April 1964 revolution that ousted leftist President Joao Goulart, the dominant student organization was the National Students' Union (UNE) and its state level affiliates. The UNE was supported by the government and controlled by a united front of Communists and members of the radical student group, Popular Action (AP).

The revolution weakened but did not completely destroy the effectiveness of these groups. In late 1964 the Castello Branco government realized that the tradition of left-wing student organizations

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would not die easily, and that there would be little control over student activities in the absence of administration action. In November 1964 Congress established a new student representation system, headed by a National Students' Directorate. Disenchantment with this step--which set controls on student activities as a requirement for continued financial support--undercut its effectiveness.

In early 1967, the government abolished student organizations at national and state levels, permitting only groups within individual universities and faculties. The 1967 law also banned student strikes and political activity and, further, declared illegal all secondary school organizations--except athletic, civic, cultural, and social groups. It has been no more successful than the earlier version, and in effect has created a vacuum in which left-wing and radical groups have thrived in the absence of recognized student organizations.

The post-1964 governments have moved only desultorily to fill this void. One student group, Decision, received government backing, but it has never produced anything approaching a national organization. A government-sponsored civic action program, Project Rondon, designed to involve students in helping the poor, especially in rural backward areas, has not yet had a major impact.

Neither the Costa e Silva nor the predecessor Castello Branco administrations were able or willing to establish rapport with the students. Security forces have viewed student political activity as subversive, and treated it as a police problem.

This [redacted] attitude has merely facilitated a trend toward the left in student politics. Much of the blame for the inept handling of the student problem can be laid at the door of the Education Ministry, which has been a morass of bureaucratic inefficiency. Costa e Silva's Education Minister, Tarso Dutra, [redacted]

[redacted] was widely regarded as the least effective member of the cabinet. When President Medici took office last October, he appointed to the

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post retired army Colonel Jarbas Passarinho, who had performed well as Labor Minister under Costa e Silva. Passarinho is an intelligent and able man, but he will be faced with a massive challenge in trying to correct the serious faults in the educational system that have been pointed out by numerous experts and commissions that have studied it.

"The System"

Secondary education depends largely on private schools which have been a bottleneck for the education of children from lower income families. Higher education brings together part-time students and part-time professors in part-time, overcrowded universities with outmoded curricula and ill-qualified instructors who are so poorly paid that they must hold more than one job. The catedratico system, whereby professors hold life tenure in university chairs, results in a powerful force opposed to reform. Further, university facilities are usually widely scattered. Government decrees aimed at rectifying these ills have proved ineffective.

Students take courses only within their own faculty. Many study law, preparatory to careers in politics or business, rather than the more demanding technical courses required for the understaffed fields of engineering, agriculture, and medicine. There is little emphasis placed on regular class attendance; students often remain for years without graduating, thus creating a professional student class that is particularly inclined toward politics and agitation.

The Role of the Student

Brazilian students traditionally have exerted an influence out of proportion to their numbers. This derives in large part from the prestige that Brazilian society accords to intellectual attainment and from the elite nature of the educational system. Participation in university politics long has been a first step toward a successful political career.

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Although the majority of Brazilian students are apathetic and apolitical--only 10 to 20 percent ever participate in student politics--they share many attitudes in common with the activists. One of these is an inordinate faith in Brazil's destiny and a deep disappointment over present day reality--poverty and illiteracy, undeveloped natural resources, and lack of opportunity. Few, however, are prepared to do more than protest.

Students generally place part of the blame for Brazil's difficulties on widespread corruption and on inefficient and mismanaged government institutions. Some few may blame the inflexibility of Brazilian society, while others accuse Communists and other radicals of vitiating development. For the majority, however, the most obvious scapegoat is foreign imperialism, which they believe siphons off the country's wealth and conspires to prevent Brazil's accession as a "Great Power."

Clearly the US is the most visible foreign power on the Brazilian scene, and as such the target of student, as well as popular, wrath. Even "democratic" Brazilian students state confidently that the US government is dominated by economic groups that control international politics and prevent the development of the "third world;" that the US initiated the planting of coffee in Africa in order to maintain Brazil in a colonial status; that US involvement in Vietnam is aggression and doomed to fail.

Student Organizations and Leaders

There are no effective national student organizations except those which operate clandestinely. The legal central student directorates and faculty-level academic directorates most often are controlled by leftists, many of whom simultaneously hold office in the clandestine organization and are members of a radical political movement.

A bewildering variety of splinter organizations come to prominence and then fade out, depending

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primarily on the ability of their key leaders. Students--like the majority of Brazilians--tend to support charismatic leaders, rather than ideas, which accounts in part for the disparities in student organizations from state to state and even from city to city. For example, leaders and organizations prominent in Rio de Janeiro may well be almost unknown in Curitiba or Recife.

The illegal UNE remains the dominant organization and probably commands at least the tacit support of most students.

The thirtieth national UNE congress held in Sao Paulo state in October 1968 turned into a disaster for student political activists. Government security forces intervened and arrested some 700 students, among them several of the top national student leaders. Most of those arrested were released soon after, but the debacle was impressed in the memories of the participants. UNE leaders who managed to escape arrest staged state and local congresses to select new leadership, and Jean Marc van der Weid of the leftist Popular Action (AP) movement was chosen as UNE president. He was arrested by security authorities in late 1969, and his followers charge that he has been brutally tortured in a naval prison where he is still being held. The Swiss Government has recently asserted that he holds joint Swiss-Brazilian citizenship, and has attempted--thus far without success--to see him to check on his welfare. Van der Weid's chief rival in the student political ranks, Vladimir Palmeira, also was arrested, and in June 1969 was sentenced to 30 months in prison for violation of the national security legislation. In September, however, Palmeira became one of 15 prisoners who were flown by the Brazilian government to Mexico in exchange for the safe release by terrorists of abducted US Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick. Palmeira and 12 others of the 15 soon left Mexico for Cuba, where he apparently has remained.

In addition to the clandestine student organizations, there are also political movements or parties that have student wings. One of the most

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radical and certainly the most controversial of the student-oriented political groups is the AP. It was created in the early 1960s when some activists in the Catholic University Youth and the Catholic Student Youth groups broke away to participate in political and social reform movements. Young Catholic activists had been gradually moving further left since the mid-1950s, and their views consistently came into conflict with the conservative-moderate views of the church hierarchy. Although the AP's views were originally fairly typical of Catholic action groups, its clandestinity and cell-type organization led to a growing radicalization.

From its formation until the 1964 revolution, the AP controlled the UNE through a united front coalition with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and grew rapidly. Despite government efforts to destroy it, the AP has retained its hold on UNE, and until the recent schism appeared to be thriving. Now there is evidence to suggest that the AP may disintegrate in some states. Dissension and defections have occurred in Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, and in Guanabara the AP has been virtually moribund since the police swooped up most of its state leaders in 1967. Subsequently, a considerable number of AP members who were involved in urban terrorism have been arrested, further weakening the organization. The organization now apparently follows the principles of Mao Tse-tung, moving it even further into the radical camp. It now reportedly is cooperating with the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil.

The PA's total membership is not known, but it is probably something less than 1,000. The source of its finances are murky. At least some funds came from within the Church--particularly from the Dominican Order which has long had a special relationship with the AP. Other funds also came from Christian Democrats abroad, especially in Western Europe. Probably the majority of the money comes from the AP's own members and sympathizers.

Marxism in its many shades and hues traditionally has appealed to Brazilian intellectuals. Many

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educators and students are influenced by its tenets and are easily led into supporting Communist causes. It is not likely that many students actually join the Party, but many are willing to follow the Communist ideological lead and will end by giving at least tacit support to one or another of the Communist factions.

The PCB has long made a special effort to attract students. Despite the recent splits that have racked the party, it has continued these efforts and its leaders reportedly were much encouraged by their success in attracting new members as a result of student demonstrations in 1968. There has been little evidence, however, that the PCB has made any real progress in attracting younger members.

Working through regular student organizations, the Communists, though few in number, have been able to dominate policy through parliamentary maneuver, militancy, and superior organization because most Brazilian students are inclined toward Marxism and disillusioned with democracy as they see it practiced.

The PCB sends students to the Soviet Union and to Eastern European countries for academic and political training. There are probably about 350 Brazilian students studying in the bloc--perhaps 150 in the USSR and the others in groups no larger than 20 in other Eastern European countries and Cuba. Few of them appear to be Communists; rather, they are mostly persons willing to take advantage of an opportunity for a higher education which few could have obtained at home.

Rather than the Moscow-line PCB, most radical student activists have joined several terrorist groups that have developed since late 1968. This minority of students, completely alienated from "the system" and willing to use violence to express their opposition to it, have formed the rank-and-file of these organizations. Many of the students who have adopted this course claim that they have done so because all channels of peaceful opposition have been cut off by

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the government's authoritarian measures. One of the most powerful of these was decree 477 of 26 February 1969. This decree stipulates that students who take part in demonstrations or distribute political propaganda will be expelled from school and banned from matriculating in any other educational institution during a three year period; if they hold a scholarship, it will be cancelled and they will be prohibited from applying for another one for five years. Faculty members or other employees who participate in these activities will be summarily dismissed and banned from employment in any other educational institution for five years.

The terrorist groups which the most militant student activists have joined have often drawn leadership from professional leftists, many of whom have been expelled from the PCB because of their espousal of Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro. Others who have joined the terrorist groups include some politicians who have been stripped of their political rights, former military and police men cashiered because of their leftist political or subversive activity, and some members of the radical wing of the Catholic Church who consider the government and the military reactionary forces. These groups have been responsible for a wave of terrorism over the past 2 1/2 years that has included bombings, kidnapings, assassinations, robberies of banks and stores selling arms, and airliner highjackings. Following the kidnaping of Ambassador Elbrick last September, the security forces went on an all-out campaign to wipe out these subversive groups, and they recently have claimed to have effectively neutralized some of the most important ones. Their triumphs include trapping and killing last November Carlos Marighella, the country's most effective subversive leader. This role has now been taken over by Carlos Lamarca, a former Captain who deserted the Army in January 1969, taking with him a large cache of arms.

Backing for the Students

The government's tough line toward students and its frequent refusal to recognize the validity of

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many of their complaints has been responsible for a general increase in public sympathy for students, including those who have turned to violence. There is now probably a considerable sector of moderate students, and of society in general, that does not engage in violence, but at times expresses considerable sympathy--and may even give some concrete assistance--to those who do. Some vital support has been forthcoming from the sectors of the Catholic clergy, who have taken part in demonstrations and sheltered students being pursued by the government. These prelates, particularly those belonging to the Dominican order, have also assisted the clandestine student organizations such as the UNE, and some individuals, without the approval of their superiors, have had a major role in aiding terrorist groups. The growing coincidence of student-Church interests, coupled with charges of police torture of some students and clergymen, has added to the tension between the Church and the government.

Student leaders have also sought to attract support from labor in the past. Several unions have issued manifestos of support, and some workers have participated in student demonstrations. In general, however, workers have shied away from too close an association--partly because of a traditional suspicion of "rich men's sons" who merely wish to exploit the workers' grievances for their own ends, and also because fear of government repression and a belief that association with radical students will lessen the effectiveness of worker protests. Such considerations militate against a meaningful worker-student alliance. Should they be overcome, the government would face serious trouble.

Prospects

The post-1964 government's failure to deal effectively with the student problem is largely the result of a lack of understanding of the forces at work. Costa e Silva repeatedly attributed the student disturbances to professional agitators and profiteers, opposition politicians, and persons who had lost their political rights after the revolution. He

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frequently expressed his belief that the unrest was a symptom of a "vast, subversive plot," but failed to attribute any of the problems to his administration. The conviction that Brazil is threatened by "subversive warfare" continues to be held by a large sector of the military and a considerable number of civilians, some of whom are in positions that enable them to affect important policy decisions in the education field. Thus the government's rigid posture assures that plainclothes policemen will remain on campuses to identify potential student activist ringleaders and sympathizers among the faculties, and that those who protest too loudly will be promptly arrested.

Some officials of the Medici administration are attempting to approach the problem realistically, but they are discovering the magnitude of the gulf that has grown between the government and students since 1964. The Foreign Minister has told US officials that the administration regarded the establishment of communications with students as a highly important task, and that the appointment of the intelligent and energetic Passarinho to the Education post was a sign of this high priority. Passarinho had been meeting informally for several months with students, but he recently met with a major rebuff when he attempted to formalize these encounters into a Student Advisory Group that would meet once a month with Ministry officials to discuss university problems. On 21 May, the Ministry distributed a note lamenting the fact that the attitude of some students who did not understand the objectives of the proposed group had prevented its formation, and Passarinho added that since a majority of students had rejected his attempt at reconciliation, he felt free to name whomever he pleased as student advisers. The underlying cause for the fiasco was that the indirect method of electing the student representatives would mean that it would be a captive and non-representative group, while both sides were aware that if a direct vote were permitted many of the candidates who were selected would be militants who would be automatically disqualified by the Ministry's stipulation that students who had reprimands or any disciplinary penalty were disqualified.

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Heavy student rejection of Passarinho's attempted gesture may be a sign that there is no middle ground left for establishing a government dialogue with students, between the boundaries of what most students on one hand and the conservative military on the other can allow. If this should be the case, it would appear that even a man of Passarinho's capabilities can at best hope to keep a lid on student discontent during his time in office. In any case, Passarinho probably has had it brought home to him that, after a long period of government repression of student organizations, most students are skeptical of any government approach which does not restore to them the freedom to elect their representatives directly.

Passarinho reportedly plans to continue informal contacts with students and to push reforms such as letting students pay back tuition by teaching illiterates. These are long-range programs which, like the basic reforms he favors, will have little immediate impact on student-government relations.

It is difficult to predict whether the current lull in the cycle of student provocation and government repression will continue. Student demonstrations, no matter how well-organized and widespread, will not bring down the government. They can, however, cause divisions within the military over the handling of the turmoil. Military discontent over the inept performance of President Costa e Silva and some of his key ministers during the unrest in 1968 helps to explain the repressive Institutional Act Number Five and other severe curbs on students. Continued governmental failure to effect meaningful educational reform can only lead to mounting student frustration. Such frustration does not bode well for long-range stability in Brazil.

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scholar-elite. The way to advancement was through study and examination--and the rewards frequently were very great. Beyond material advantage, the educated man traditionally was accorded a position of honor in society. The pace of success was very slow. Rewards and honor went to the old and aging. The young were subordinate. "Scholarship" was devoted to quasi-Confucian ends bearing little relationship to the needs of the modern world.

The famous "May 4th" movement (1919) that followed the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty stood all this on its head: the youthful students who were the spearhead of the movement were exalted over their hidebound and repressive elders; traditional concerns and attitudes were denounced in the name of the liberating influence of modern techniques and Western intellectual currents. "May 4th" was the fountain-head of both the Communist movement and the Chinese nationalist movement in its modern form, as well as the source-point for most Chinese intellectual trends of this century.

The implications of this movement, however, really were not clear-cut as they once seemed. Elderly scholars were denounced and derided--but by younger scholars. Modern Western intellectual fashions, including Marxism, flowed into China--but the Maoist version of Marxism, which in time became the new orthodoxy, contained a heavy infusion of notions derived from a romantic view of the traditional, peasant-based uprisings that had punctuated Chinese history. Above all, although Confucianism as an administrative and philosophic system was discarded, the ethical and cultural assumptions on which it rested in large degree survived. The specific gravity of a culture that had remained virtually intact for some three thousand years proved very high, and the consequences of this fact still are working themselves out.

One immediate result of the "May 4th" movement was to fuse the connection between students and politics. Students not only played a major part in mobilizing public opinion against "imperialism" in the early 1920s, but also were prominent in the growth

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of the nationalist movement later in the decade. Student disenchantment with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomingtang was an important factor in the long duel between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. The idealistic fervor of these "children's crusades" was important in the fluid politics of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. It was much less so after the Communist take-over.

The diminished importance of the students as a political force, despite lip service from the regime, contributed to the disillusionment built into a situation that obtains when the "outs" who have been inveighing against "things as they are" must grapple with the intractable reality of attempting to run and modernize a country as vast and backward as China. In short, the Communists in power have proved as unsatisfying from the idealistic point of view as the nationalists before them.

These circumstances, frustrations, currents, and countercurrents were an explosive mixture, but it took a deliberate act on the part of the regime to set that mixture off. The secondary explosions continued for two years, and in some respects a chain reaction only partly under control appeared to be operating.

Red Guard Dynamics

Peking could at any time have cowed, controlled, or shut down Red Guard activity through the unlimited use of force. Until it did, Red Guard chaos, feeding on itself, continued of its own momentum.

Mao and his radical friends were manipulating the students as a means of striking down or intimidating those officials they consider unreliable. But Mao was also unquestionably concerned about the state of the Chinese revolution--about the inevitable loss of revolutionary elan that had overtaken his movement after nearly 20 years in power. To crack down hard on the students would entail a further disillusionment and alienation of the nation's youth, which is--as he keeps saying--China's future.

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The regime, particularly in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, portrayed the Red Guards as the repository of all virtue, a claim that the students could quite easily believe. But there were Red Guards and Red Guards: some formed in the name of Mao but actually manipulated by "local power holders" for immediate political ends; others, offshoots of authentic "revolutionary" groups; still more opposed to one another on obscure local issues. All were intractable and compromise, a betrayal of principles, was virtually impossible.

To conciliate one group was to alienate the others. Even partially to satisfy one group's demands was to increase that group's appetite for further gains. In the process, original grievances were long forgotten and the theme of "beggar thy neighbor" was dominant. Bloody sectarian battles bred new resentment. Whatever the intentions of the political manipulators in Peking, at the level of the average member of a Red Guard group a kind of nihilism--battle for its own sake--became the ruling passion.

A further problem in controlling and channeling Red Guard excesses lay in the nature of the goals of the Red Guards. At best these were ill defined, but even as generalities they were shot through with contradictions. Some organizations, manipulated by local officials, tended to defend given individual officeholders, but the true "revolutionaries" agitated to "bring down" local, provincial, and national "power holders" whom they regarded as symbols of a frustrating status quo. This "program," if it can be called that, was essentially negative.

Insofar as Red Guard groups of any persuasion had a positive program, it was to acquire "power"--that is, to replace disgraced former officials. This ambition probably was confined to the leaders of the various guard groups, but at all levels there was an amorphous hope that the log-jam blocking the way to relatively rapid advancement could be broken. In fact, however, there was never much likelihood that Red Guards would secure an appreciable

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number of important official positions. Movement in this direction in December-January 1966-67 led to utter chaos and quickly had to be repudiated.

Implicit in Red Guard attacks on "power holders" was the larger, less well-defined aim of purifying the system. Starting from the Maoist premise of the corrupting influence of "revisionism," the Red Guards tended to lay their collective frustrations to the ideological mistakes of the "power holders." Their attacks on bureaucracy, routinization, specialization, and pragmatic devotion to efficiency in production at the expense of ideology, however, pointed up the ambiguous heritage of the "May 4th" movement, as well as the paradoxes inherent in the Maoist version of Marxism. The attacks on the old culture and on established ways of doing things that the Red Guards emphasized particularly in the early days of the Cultural Revolution were in the "May 4th" tradition. But routinization, specialization, and concern with pragmatic problems rather than ideological principles--an aspect of "things as they are" that came under strong attack--were all inevitable manifestations of the modernization process. The demand for purity was in effect a call for a romantic, primitive Communism, at once utopian and nostalgic. It was an attempt to return to the heady days on Ching Kang Mountain, where Mao held out with a small band of true believers after the insurrectionary debacle of 1927.

These romantic and idealistic strands in the Red Guard program, because they were unrealizable, bred a counterreaction. Cynicism and "careerism," those objects of Red Guard scorn, tended to grow, rather than diminish, among Chinese students. As inconclusive battles between rival Red Guard factions dragged on, there was a steady increase in individuals who have "opted out" of the struggle entirely and were uncommitted to any side. Many became drifters, living from hand to mouth--the "flower children" of China. Others gravitated toward criminal and semilegal activities.

In Red Guard ranks the general hope for advancement tended to degenerate into a cynical "what's in it for me" attitude. Implicit in many of the fights

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over the apportionment of the positions and perquisites of "former power holders" was the idea that to the victors belong the spoils. Moreover, many Red Guard leaders, elevated to posts of responsibility, evidently tended to lord it over their fellows in the manner of the "corrupt" officials they had just replaced.

The Current Phase

The success of the Red Guards--and their mentors in Peking--in destroying the party apparatus placed Mao on the horns of a dilemma he probably did not anticipate. With the party machine hors de combat and the Red Guards themselves clearly incapable of administering the country effectively, Mao had to call in the army--the ultimate weapon of coercion and control--to keep China running. But hardly had he done this when the Red Guards began attacking army leaders as a new set of "power-holders," much to the anger and disgust of the military establishment. Ultimately Mao had to choose between two constituencies: the army, essential to the survival of the regime, on the one hand, and the Red Guards, his "revolutionary successors," on the other. The outcome was never really in doubt, but Mao postponed it for a year and a half, in part because he recognized that to choose against the Red Guards would alienate and antagonize much of the youthful element who would eventually inherit his revolution.

The choice was finally made in August 1968. Since that time most Red Guard organizations have been broken up, Red Guard activists have been brutally suppressed by the army, and the Red Guard movement itself has largely ceased to count politically in China. Nevertheless, there are signs that the nuclei of some Red Guard organizations have remained intact. Red Guard leaders who managed to acquire positions in local governing organs during the Cultural Revolution are still a force to be reckoned with in many locales, thereby contributing greatly to the political instability besetting many lower level administrations. However, the very large numbers of former Red Guards who failed to enter the establishment during the Cultural Revolution have been dispatched in droves

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to the countryside, where they have been churlishly received by the indigenous peasantry. Indeed, the overt suppression of ex-Red Guards has been intensified since January 1970 when the regime began a bloody repression campaign against various alleged "criminal" elements. Some of these elements evidently include the sizeable number of youths who have illegally returned to the cities from their rural work posts and have been forced to turn to crime in order to survive because they can find neither jobs nor opportunities for further schooling.

The results of the variety of repressive actions taken by the regime might easily have been anticipated. Their fair hopes blasted, students and other young people are now probably more alienated, apathetic, and unhappy than at any time since the Communists took power in 1949. As the regime makes its inevitable compromises with reality, the fervor and idealism of the Red Guard movement is petering out in the sands of frustration and perhaps despair.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Summary

The dynamic and nearly universal Czechoslovak student movement that played such a dominant role in 1968, like all other reformist groups that strove to fulfill the promise of the Dubcek era, has been silenced by the new regime intent on re-establishing dictatorial control over the Czechoslovak people.

The disappointment of the students with the snuffing out of their brief emancipation is real. The shock of repression has taken its toll. A year after Dubcek's fall, the Czechoslovak students have reverted to their traditional attitude of political apathy and benign rejection of governmental dictat. While scattered voices of student discontent continue to be heard there is no indication that the students will soon seek new ways to assert themselves. The potential for outbreaks of student discontent in response to governmental provocation remains, however.

The Husak regime has attempted to re-establish the traditional Communist institutional control mechanisms that were abolished in 1968. A new government-sponsored Czech and Slovak Unions of University Students, earmarked for major roles in the planned Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth, have received little student support.

Traditional Attitudes of Czechoslovak Youth

Despite unceasing efforts to indoctrinate the students and to organize the youth into party-controlled institutions (primarily the Czechoslovak Youth Union (CSM) in the pre-Dubcek era), the Communist regime has never been able to attract the great majority of youth or even to win the loyalty of those who, for selfish reasons, accepted its blandishments. At one point in the mid-1960's, a poll revealed that about half the country's youth, although members of the CSM, were politically "neutral" and had no intention of joining the Communist Party.

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In recent years, youth has generally avoided challenging the regime face to face, preferring to express their dissatisfaction more subtly. Most have stood mute responding to constant political indoctrination with indifference and apathy. The more creative have made "socialist realism" the focus of discontent, replacing lyricism with expressionism in poetry and prose and realism with abstraction in the visual arts.

Czechoslovak youth has been continually disturbed by the difference between socialist theory and socialist reality. Slovak writer Chorvath once found that the "revolution betrayed" had produced a vacuum of faith; the young generation had lost its belief in the future:

Is not their indignation, loss of confidence, pessimism, rather a disappointment because today they do not find enough socialism at home, enough human socialist relations, sufficient opportunities for making use of their education and for asserting their opinions? Are they not angry about the older generation because, to their taste, socialism requires "a historically too long time" for its implementation? Indeed. This must be so.

The Communist education system, with its stress on political indoctrination, led almost inevitably to discontent. Candidates seeking admission to a university were judged by class affiliation as well as their academic standing. In practice, the children of workers and peasants were favored over the children of "bourgeois" parents. As a result, many of the brighter students, those who suffered for the "sins" of their fathers, were alienated. More important, however, instead of laying the groundwork for the creation of a "socialist man," the regime's demand that political indoctrination be made an integral part of schooling resulted in disillusioned and indifferent students.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~The Prague Spring

The efforts of Alexander Dubcek to combine democracy with socialism--"to put a human face on socialism"--were eagerly received by the students and other young people. Already restive over the failures of the Novotny regime the students took to the streets in support of Dubcek and his political allies. Dubcek, recognizing that support of the young was beneficial, virtually gave them their head.

A major concession to the students was the government's allowing them to determine their own organization. With the ensuing proliferation of independent youth groups, most of which were politically oriented, the authoritarian CSM became a dead letter.

The Invasion and Its Aftermath

Heady with success, the young people of Czechoslovakia were in the forefront in opposing the Russian invasion in August of 1968. By changing or destroying road signs, by haranguing the invaders (in Russian), by distributing underground newspapers and pro-Dubcek petitions, by operating clandestine radio stations, and by staging continual protests, they formed a body of resistance which, together with intellectuals, and other disaffected groups, the Soviets were later to call "counterrevolutionary."

Ironically, however, the boldness of Czechoslovak youth was to become a major contributor to the ultimate tragedy. On 16 January 1969, Jan Palach set himself afire in Wenceslas Square to protest censorship and Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia. His death sparked tumultuous anti-Soviet demonstrations and brought the Dubcek regime to the brink of crisis from which it was unable to extricate itself.

Repression

The reformist youth movement became an early casualty of the ensuing pro-Soviet regime led by Husak. Curbing public displays of antiregime and anti-Soviet sentiment was the first order of business of the new Party leadership, which through the use

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of police and military force was able to quell disturbances without Soviet involvement. In June 1969 the Ministry of Interior cut short the trend toward student self-government by abolishing the Union of Czech and Moravian University Students, the leading reformist student organization, for its refusal to join the Communist controlled National Front and for directing its activities against "important foreign political interests" of Czechoslovakia.

The Husak regime also moved to re-establish strict state control over the entire educational system. Reversing the policies of the Dubcek leadership, the government on 1 January empowered the Czech and Slovak ministers of education to appoint and recall academic administrators and professors, and to create, abolish, or reorganize educational scientific institutions. Political reliability again became a prerequisite in the hiring of teachers and in the admission of students to the universities. Disciplinary commissions were set up to deal with student radicals, and political indoctrination was reinstated in the curriculum. Nevertheless, as late as May 1970 there were still isolated instances of anti-regime and anti-Soviet protest on the part of the young.

The Future

The government's attempts to reinstitutionalize its control of the Czechoslovak youth have been somewhat confused. While all existing youth organizations have accepted the Party's demands that they recognize the leading role of the Party and abide by the Communist-controlled National Front, the government has been less decisive in determining how to amalgamate the various youth organizations. Party leader Husak has called for a "unified" organization in Czechoslovakia, but has cautioned against a precipitous imposition of centralized control. One problem has been the efforts of Slovak student and working youth to retain a measure of regional autonomy. At the same time, Husak has stressed the importance of winning the youth over to the government's side, suggesting that he may seek a compromise between the

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desires of youth and those regime members calling for highly centralized control.

Meanwhile, the government is proceeding with the basic framework of a nationally consolidated youth structure. The government has already provided instruments for student organization through the counterpart Czech and Slovak Unions of University Students. The inability of these organizations, however, to attract student support has been dramatically emphasized by enrollment figures. In May the government acknowledged publicly that only 4,500 of the 100,000 students in the Czech lands had joined the Czech Union. The membership was scattered among the 54 Czech universities and colleges, with no representatives at all in several colleges of the important Charles University in Prague. In contrast, the vast majority of Czech students had been members of pro-Dubcek student union in 1968.

Disappointing though the student response has been, the student unions are being groomed as key elements of the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth, scheduled for inauguration later this year. As the supreme organ for channeling government direction to the country's youth, this body will incorporate all student, industrial and cultural youth agencies.

Full Circle

The status of the Czechoslovak youth has come full circle. While the present government is not likely to become any more popular than the repressive Novotny regime, it too will probably be able to develop a facade of support among the country's youth. As long as toeing the party line remains the sine-qua-non for social and economic advancement, many will see little alternative to passive cooperation. The fleeting hope of the young to participate in the nation's affairs on their own terms, however, is but a memory.

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EAST GERMANY

Summary

Young people in East Germany (GDR) present a special problem for the government and party. They take for granted many of the "achievements" which are the product of decades of struggle. They have done battle against capitalists. They will not listen to those who waged that battle.

The party has attempted to manage the problem of dissenting youths by adopting an attitude of toughness and determination coupled with a belief that positive opportunities must be held out to young people and full use made of the techniques of indoctrination and controlled discussion. As a result youths with energy, ability and willingness to conform stand a good chance of attaining positions of power and privilege. The party can monopolize all social relations among the younger generation and enforce exclusion from any real hope of upward mobility. The dissenter thus has little hope of attaining social goals, can expect to encounter only suspicious police and party functionaries, and may even face imprisonment.

The Situation

Because of wartime losses and the population exodus prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, East Germany is critically short of middle-aged people, a situation likely to continue for years. Nevertheless, the ruling elite is committed to create a society of material abundance, free of economic and social inequities. To accomplish this goal the regime must increasingly rely on the young and in the mid-1960's a conscious decision appears to have been made to focus on youth and its problems. A number of reforms were adopted in education, in scientific programs and in the economy to provide avenues of advancement for young people and to enable them to receive

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the training and practical experience needed for rapid advancement. The party, and first secretary Walter Ulbricht in particular, appear aware that a calculated risk is involved and that unless extraordinary efforts are made to instill desired values and attitudes among the younger generation there is a danger they will reject the leading role of the party. Only too well aware of the enthusiastic role young people played in supporting Czechoslovakia's Dubcek in 1968 the party is determined to keep a tight rein on the direction of youthful energies.

There is a trend in East Germany toward an earlier assumption of responsibility by young people which in some measure is also a conscious effort on the part of the regime to involve youth in the affairs of the state and to instill a sense of national identity. As early as 1950 the age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18 and under a new constitution adopted in 1968 18-year olds may now hold elective office.

Youthful Attitudes

Nevertheless, the spirit of dissent among East German youth is fairly widespread although it has never assumed any significant organized forms. But it is not exempt from the disorganized, anarchic manifestations similar to those found among western youth. East and West Germans alike use the word Gammel to describe rebellious, hippie-type youth.

Unlike their western counterparts, however, East German anti-establishment protesters are predictably much less vocal and overt. In the politicized society of East Germany protest may more often take the form of an expressed lack of interest in politics and unresponsiveness to the party's exhortations. In one sense the party may not be entirely against apolitical behavior, for the only sanctioned political activity is that of its supporters. On the other hand, its expressed goal is to involve all youth in its programs and to the extent it fails it must regard such failures

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as having political consequences. The most visible such failure was the series of demonstrations against East Germany's part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The new Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Brandt with its more flexible and realistic approach to East-West German contacts has also enabled East German youth to give their criticism of the SED and the East German government a definite identifiable political focus. An example are the mimeographed leaflets protesting the regime's inflexibility toward Brandt's initiatives which circulated last January at East Berlin's prestigious Humboldt University. More recently, the first intra-German summit between East German Premier Stoph and Chancellor Brandt in the East German city of Erfurt saw large groups of youths travelling far to see Brandt and express their support for him. East German authorities arrested a number of these youthful demonstrators.

There is an obvious desire on the part of East German youth for more contact with the West. Western radio and television, particularly West German, can be heard and seen in most areas of the GDR and is a daily reminder and stimulus of such a desire. What particularly rankles the young is their inability to travel to the West and the regime's attempts to discourage contacts with westerners and relatives in West Germany. Long hair, beat music, and blue jeans are only some of the overt manifestations of western influences on East German youth which greatly displease party officials.

Countermeasures

The regime has attempted to counter such western influences and to bring youth around to its support without the obvious use of force or coercion. Western music and fashions are permitted, even to the extent of setting up special state-run shops catering exclusively to the tastes of the young in these fields.

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Modern western literature, books and magazines, on the other hand, do not circulate freely, and periodically the regime launches campaigns to discourage listening to western broadcast media.

An important part of the regime's youth policy is the effort to monopolize the free time of young people. The major vehicle for this is the Free German Youth (FDJ) organization, the sole youth group permitted. It is estimated that every second youth at least nominally is an FDJ member. The FDJ is organizationally patterned after the East German Communist Party and is used primarily to prepare the party's future cadres. It maintains an all-encompassing range of activities that keep its members busy, including sports events, excursions, rallies, parades, vacation camps and recreational centers. Most East German high school students are FDJ members (younger students are members of an FDJ auxiliary, the Young Pioneers) as are a large percentage of university students. The FDJ has, however, had problems attracting and keeping young workers and farmers, a source of particular embarrassment for the party which bills itself as leading the first "German Workers and Farmers State." The SED is studying ways to make the FDJ more attractive to these segments of East German youth.

Other methods employed to fill young people's spare time and bring them into contact with the state and party apparatus include sports organizations, special para-military organizations such as parachutists clubs, compulsory pre-induction military training during vacations, and special "voluntary" work brigades. The East German trade union (FDGB) also seeks to involve its more than 1 million young members in its activities. In all cases the party and state officials attempt to use youths' involvement in these activities to further the sense of identity with the German Democratic Republic as a separate state and to instill in them "socialistic class consciousness."

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The regime is aware that, despite its efforts, numerous young people remain outside its sphere of influence insofar as its ability to motivate them for positive political action is concerned. Yet the regime cannot afford to openly antagonize them as a whole. In labor-short East Germany in order to meet the country's ambitious economic goals, the party must tread lightly, keeping the stick of reprisal visible but in the background.

To check on the political reliability of young people (and as a measure of the SED's concern that it keep abreast of current opinion among them) the party employs methods ranging from open questioning by its functionaries, to student questionnaires camouflaged as university "research papers," to outright recruitment of young informants enlisted to spy on their peers. Should "dangerous" political tendencies come to light the party is initially apt to try persuasion to bring the malcontent around. Only as a last resort are such punitive measures as imprisonment likely to be used, depending, of course, on the seriousness of the transgression.

Outlook

The cynicism toward the promises of their elders, the streak of rebelliousness in youth, the dissatisfaction with labyrinthine bureaucracies and their tardy responsiveness, the frustrations inherent in feelings of impotence in one's ability to influence the direction of national affairs are attitudes many East German youths will continue to have in common with their counterparts in the West. In the Communist, and essentially closed, society of East Germany, however, derogatory political jokes, discussion of western broadcasts or literature, or even long hair and bell-bottom trousers, to say nothing of demonstrations, leaflets and strikes, may be seen by the party as threatening its very foundation and that of the state it runs. The party maintains a close watch on the youth and

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while it has not managed to mold it in its image, it has been able to prevent the coalescing of dissent into organized opposition. Its grip on East German youth remains essentially iron, although cloaked in velvet. It is obviously hoping that its efforts to bridge the generation gap by bringing young people rapidly into positions of responsibility will head off dissatisfaction among potential leaders and by force of example carry along the rest.

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~~SECRET~~Student Politics

Although the goal of la loi Faure was to satisfy the needs of the "moderate" student majority, almost none of France's major student organizations could be classed as moderate--with the possible exception of the Communist-dominated Union des Etudiants Communistes (UEC). Alone among the organizations with a nationwide following, the UEC officially supports most of Faure's reforms and participates in elections for the university councils. In addition, the UEC has formed a caucus within the UNEF called the UNEF-Renouveau, which urges the organization to support la loi Faure and concentrates much of its energies on trying to capture control of the UNEF.

The UNEF, France's largest and oldest student union, is deeply divided between those groups that favor reform and those that favor revolution. It is presently controlled by the Etudiants Socialistes Unifies (ESU), which is in turn controlled by Parti Socialiste Unifie (PSU), a small splinter-left political party that fielded a candidate in presidential elections and that holds only one seat in the National Assembly. In addition to the ESU and the UEC, the third major group in the UNEF is the Alliance des jeunes pour le Socialisme (AJS), which is in turn an amalgam of Trotskyist groups, many of which were banned after the 1968 disorders.

At its last National Congress in early April, quarreling among the various groups that compose the UNEF reached a new high. The key issue was whether to participate in elections for university councils. Like the UNEF-Renouveau, the AJS favors participation. But while the UNEF-Renouveau favors participation in the elections to prevent the "bourgeoisie" from dominating the student community, the AJS justifies participation on the grounds that it is a revolutionary tactic designed to capture secret power points within established organizations to be exploited when a pre-revolutionary situation emerges. The ESU sees the university only as a staging ground for attacks aimed at "exploding" bourgeois society and therefore opposes participation altogether. Aligned to the ESU are various small "Maoist" groups that hold a similar position.

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Given such divergent viewpoints, no two of the three major groups were able to agree on a common program. Thus, although the AJS and the UNEF had a theoretical majority at the Congress, they could not work together long enough to oust the ESU from power. And although the ESU--which had only about 30 percent of the delegates--proved unable to convince either of the other major groups to cooperate in a coalition to run the UNEF, the other groups agreed to allow it to continue as the minority ruler of the UNEF.

Compared to the UNEF all other student organizations are minuscule; compared to the French student body as a whole, the UNEF membership itself is minuscule, with only some 30,000 members in a student population over 20 times that large. And, as we have seen, these 30,000 members represent only an alliance of quarreling factions.

In opposition to the left-wing student organizations are a variety of right-wing, semi-fascist groups. The most vocal and well-organized of these is the Ordre Nouveau (New Order) which is composed for the most part of ex-members of Occident, a right-wing group outlawed after the May 1968 crisis. Ordre Nouveau vehemently rejects the Marxism and Maoism of the left and advocates a nationalist ideology that puts the abstract concept of "la nation" above class and other slogans of unity. Numerically small, the Ordre Nouveau contributes to tension in the universities by sporadic assaults--both verbal and physical--on left-wing student groups.

To date no student organization has emerged that both advocates a middle way between the extremists on the right and the left and has been able to mobilize significant student support. The Gaullist party's student subsidiary, the Union des Jeunes Patriotes (Union of Young Patriots), has only a handful of followers and little influence on student affairs.

Outlook

With the advent of a more democratic university system, which permits any student who has passed the

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baccalaureat to enter a university after paying only nominal fees, more and more Frenchmen are questioning the value of trying to maintain for all students the rigid and high educational standards set in an era when only a small elite enjoyed admission to the university. One reform proposal currently under consideration would introduce a "short cycle" for many students, a kind of junior college program that would be conducted within the present university structure. Although this plan has been attacked by the left as an attempt to perpetuate class divisions within the university, it is probably the only way to cope with the continued expansion of the student population.

Even with such a plan, the Pompidou government is still going to be confronted with hard decisions in the educational field. Minister of Education Guichard observed at the outset of 1969-70 that "the new school year is a budgetary problem"; this analysis strikes to the heart of the matter. Under de Gaulle, education was not given a high enough national priority to keep pace with the expanding student population, and in the final year of his presidency, when he tried to make up for years of neglect, he faced a problem that was simply insurmountable in the short-run.

The Pompidou government is aware that the universities are one key to the future of the "new society" Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas has so eloquently proclaimed, but a decision has not yet been made to commit the massive funds required to meet the goals set by former Minister of Education Faure. Guichard has already abandoned Faure's goal of campuses limited to 10,000 students, and cannot even meet his own standard of 20,000. Nanterre, for example, was built for 16,000 students, but more than 25,000 students enrolled in the fall of 1969. In Paris, only 4,500 of 20,000 new students enrolling in the fall were able to attend the new campus at Saint Maur, thus increasing the already overcrowded Sorbonne by 15,500 students.

In addition to failing to provide physical facilities for the student population, no funds are available for new teaching personnel. Faculty studies recommended that a minimum of 7,000 would

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be required for 1969-1970; the government budget for the year only provided for 1,400.

For the government, as well as for the future of French higher education, the failure to commit substantial new funds to the universities spells serious trouble. It is precisely these conditions that allowed "New Left" groups to gain widespread support among the majority of moderate students in the 1968 crisis. It is precisely these conditions.

[redacted] that account for the absence of moderate resistance to student riots like those that occurred at Nanterre in March. And it is these conditions that are likely to continue to be the underlying cause of French student unrest.

The government's present emphasis on police controls will probably only increase general student sympathy for the radicals. In any case, scattered student strikes and occasional flare-ups of violence are likely to be the rule rather than the exception over the next few years.

The size and seriousness of these conflicts will probably depend more on the government's handling of the over-all university crisis than on the activities of the radicals. The radical groups are presently so fragmented that no concerted mass action is possible unless the government or university authorities mishandle a small provocation in such a way as to blow it into a major incident. In that situation, a momentary unity of purpose would prevail.

Nevertheless, such incidents are not likely to lead to a recurrence of the 1968 crisis, primarily because French labor is in no mood for massive strike action on the scale of 1968. The economy is performing well, and under the leadership of Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas a number of innovations in labor relations have calmed the mood of the French worker. Even in the 1968 crisis, French labor was more intent on gaining a larger share of the affluent society than on destroying it. The often-proclaimed student-labor alliance was in fact never more than a hope.

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Student efforts to create such an alliance since 1968 have borne little fruit and, given the history of labor antagonism toward students, such an alliance is not likely to emerge.

As long as students remain isolated from other numerically significant social groups, they pose little serious threat to the Pompidou regime. By adopting harsh antiriot measures, however, the Pompidou government may inflame rather than damp down the forces of discontent. Only if the government takes a longer view and devotes its energies to dealing with the underlying causes of student unrest will any lasting solution be found.

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HUNGARY

Summary

After a relatively cursory examination last year, the Kadar regime has found that, below the calm surface in Hungary, there lies an inimical pattern of apathy, disaffection and latent hostility among the young far more widespread than it had expected. While these trends represent no organized threat to the party's control, the regime can take no solace in the formlessness of the disaffection because of the danger of unforeseeable and uncontrollable outbursts of general frustration. Moreover, the prevailing mood of the elite youngsters in society does not bode well for orderly development in the future. With these concerns in mind, the Hungarian party leadership has taken moves to correct some of the worst features of its current youth policy and has ordered a nationwide study of youth problems. Beyond this, the regime is relying on its gradual political democratization program to institutionalize a positive role in society for the young. However, its paternalistic approach and its extreme caution born of the political sensitivity of such moves probably will fail to instill a new sense of purpose in the majority of the frustrated youth.

Warning Flags Flying

Throughout the past decade, the young people of Hungary presented the Kadar regime with very few serious political problems and there was a sense of smug complacency in official circles over the student turmoil in the West. In the late 1960's, however, events in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia raised a warning flag for the Hungarian party which, after the Czechoslovak crisis, undertook a cursory review of its own youth policies. Initiated in a spirit of "let's see what we are doing right," the survey's findings surprisingly suggested that almost nothing was being done "right."

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The Hungarian Communist Youth League (KISz) was the regime's sole agency for implementing its youth policy but investigative bodies from the party center found the KISz leadership to be drastically out of touch with youthful attitudes. Investigators found symptoms of widespread disaffection and an alarming lack of identity with the regime's goals. Concerned by these preliminary results, deeper samplings of the youth situation were made; including a day-and-a-half marathon talk between party boss Kadar and the students of Budapest University in April 1969. As a result of these findings the party leadership in early 1970 ordered a nationwide program to both accurately define youth problems and offer positive alternatives to the system.

The regime's primary concern is the attitude of its elite youth; writers, students, scientists, skilled workmen, party aspirants and others, who, by their backgrounds and talents, are destined someday to lead the country. Attitude samples among this stratum at first produced only wary repetitions of the party line or other mocking evasions. Objective results of the samples were laughably out of phase with observable behavior patterns and it was not until the researchers offered the cover of anonymity to the interviewees that a credible picture began to emerge.

The most outstanding superficial characteristic found was widespread malaise. Deeper investigation into this posture revealed definite disassociation with regime goals, individualism expressed both in cynical careerism and in a "without-me" attitude, and a significant amount of latent hostility. The latter factor was highlighted, in the extreme, by one survey which revealed that over half of the students in one faculty of Budapest University harbored attitudes hostile to socialism as a philosophy and as a system of government.

Youthful Aspirations

Shocked by these findings the party has begun to ask some penetrating questions about its failures and

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their impact on the whole of society. It is getting some answers from an unexpected source, self-appointed spokesmen for youth from outside the establishment. Despite attempts by the KISz leadership to suppress them, they are beginning to make telling criticisms. These unofficial spokesmen indicate that Hungarian youth feel they have no voice in the system, that their futures are being planned for them without considering their aspirations, and that their nation has no future in the age of forced violations of the rights of small nations by the great powers.

Furthermore, Hungarian society is rich in the same contrast between ideals and actions which Western youth roundly condemns as hypocritical. Adding to this the thorough suppression of individual initiative by the KISz bureaucracy and by the secret police--whose spy network on campuses has stamped out even the most innocuous "unofficial" political groups--the emergent picture is one of leaderless but generalized frustration. Although vigilance on the part of the security forces reduces the potential of the formation of a conscious pressure group, the future threat of spontaneous, uncontrolled outbursts of passionate frustration is inherently there. Without the unity of an ideology or leadership, the very formlessness of the disaffection makes it an insidious and unaccountable threat to orderly development.

Most of the concepts the young people identify with (adulation of the West, democracy, cultural freedom and nationalism) involve issues of high political sensitivity and, even though Kadar's willingness to experiment far exceeds other Warsaw Pact leaders, the slow evolution of his paternalistic liberalization has failed to ignite the imagination of Hungary's young people. There is evidence that the party leaders want to harness youthful energies and aspirations to their "social democratization" program but at the policy-making level, the lesson of the Czechoslovak students' democratic binge in 1968 and wariness of the unknown goals of their youth have so far effectively prevented a wedding of the two forces.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Positive Regime Responses

Some positive steps have been taken. The leadership of the KISz has been changed and that organization's monopoly on youth affairs has been broken. A painful dialogue has begun. The regime has permitted a public discussion of the Stalinist excesses of the early 1950's in order to impress the youth with its resolve never again to permit such illegalities. Carrying this spirit further, it announced last January that new restrictions on the secret polices' activities were being given serious consideration. Kadar probably hopes that such gestures, coupled with advances in his gradual democratization program will mitigate some of the most negative sentiment on the part of young Hungarians. On the other hand, there is a distinct danger that the increased attention the youth have received will raise their expectations beyond the limited concessions that Kadar believes advisable. Discussion of a proposed "uniform youth law" at the 10th party congress in late 1970 will provide some positive indications of the extent of the party's resolve to bring youth into the system.

Conclusions

Probably more so than any other Eastern European leader, Kadar has anticipated potential problems with his youth and taken some minor measures to improve the situation. More is promised. The fulfillment of these promises will be critical to Hungary's evolution. For the immediate future the youth question will play a larger role than heretofore in policy decisions. Some mitigation of the worst frustrations may result but whether it will be timely enough to satisfy the increasingly impatient young people is highly problematic. Any changes will be governed by the regime's political caution and its fear that the Soviets or other conservative allies would over-react. Any errors in Kadar's policy toward young people probably will be in the direction of over-caution and a tendency to try to muddle through.

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INDIA

Summary

Student disturbances during 1966-67 were the most widespread and disruptive since independence and were directed primarily at real or supposed abuses in the educational system or the lack of suitable employment after graduation. Since 1967, student violence has abated in most of India with the exception of West Bengal, where it has increased but has been directed primarily at political issues which have little connection with education.

Spontaneous student strikes, involving destruction of property and the intimidation of university officials, have always been a feature of independent India. "Student unrest" for many years merited inclusion in the agenda at most Indian educational meetings, and was often cited as the university system's foremost problem. The periodic disturbances prior to 1966, however, were incidental and attracted little attention, except among educators.

The Educational System

Wide educational opportunity, from the primary level to the university, was an important tenet of the nationalists during the struggle for independence. Mass education is one of the country's most impressive accomplishments. India has more than 70 universities and some 2,700 individual colleges imparting post-secondary education to almost 2 million students. This is an eight-fold increase in students since independence. Current projections are for close to four million students by sometime in the 1980's.

The availability of qualified academic personnel, classroom facilities, libraries, student housing, and other amenities, however, has failed to keep pace with the student population. Overcrowding is a serious problem. Academic standards have declined precipitously. Perhaps five percent of India's students now receive decent training by recognized

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world standards. Except for a few quality technical schools, university education appears to consist largely of desultory lectures by poorly paid instructors (who are often instructors because better jobs are not available) and cramming for the annual examinations from lecture notes and college outline books.

The problems of poor instruction and inadequate facilities are accentuated by a haphazard curriculum, especially in liberal arts, poised somewhere between the requirements of British India and those of today. As much attention is still given to the English poets, European wars, and European philosophy as is given to their Indian counterparts. Hegel, for example, is still a required subject while Gandhi is optional.

Many Indian students may be oblivious to the academic inadequacy of the universities, since the shift to mass primary and secondary education has also lowered the standard of education available at those levels. But the absence of challenging teaching and other facilities which might interest students in the academic side of the university experience are complemented by extraordinary pressure to succeed academically, i.e., to do well in examinations. A good undergraduate degree, permitting a student to go on to a M.A., is indispensable for reasonably prestigious and secure employment. Good jobs, especially for liberal arts graduates, are far fewer than the number of graduates turned out each year. The pressure on the Indian student, it has been said, results not only from the desire for security but the more unique need to obtain employment commensurate with one's caste status.

Government positions, with their status and their pensions, are avidly sought. Job security is also important: traditionally no one is fired from the civil service. One writer has suggested that the pressure for secure employment in a society where such opportunity remains scarce results in Indian students being oriented to becoming part of the system rather than to struggling against it.

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Student objectives during the 1966-67 disturbances, as well as in the unrest in years preceding, were largely matters related to postgraduation employment. The effort to change requirements for entering the bar, to lower the passing standard on examinations, the protests against unfair examinations and also the concern over national language policy are in this category. Students who speak Hindi have launched violent demonstrations demanding its use in universities and in qualifying for government positions, while non-Hindi-speaking students--especially in south India--have as violently opposed attempts to give that language special status and thereby afford Hindi-speakers an advantage in competing for government jobs.

Recent Events in West Bengal

Some of the student violence since 1967 has been directed at the same sort of issues, but politically inspired activity has grown--especially in West Bengal. In the 1967 elections, the more radical of India's Two Communist parties--the Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPM)--won enough votes to dominate a coalition government in West Bengal which lasted about a year. Collapse of the coalition government was followed by a year of direct rule from New Delhi and in 1969 the CPM emerged from mid-term elections as the largest single party in West Bengal. A new CPM-dominated coalition took office and lasted until March 1970 when direct rule from New Delhi was again imposed.

As part of its program while in power, the CPM attempted to take over the educational system of the state. While using its governmental powers to drive moderate officials and teachers out of the system, it also used the students to further its aim. The party encouraged pro-Communist violence by students, and financed Communist student activities. When the second CPM-dominated coalition government fell in March 1970, students played an important role in the riots protesting the reimposition of rule from the center and some student violence continued in the following months. As recently as early June 1970,

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a Congress Party student leader was murdered to prevent him from testifying against the CPM in an investigation of the deaths of other student leaders.

While the CPM was trying to establish its control over West Bengal students, the party itself lost a number of its most radical members. Called Naxalites, these militants have established some influence in student ranks. Although apparently few in number, they are among the most violent; they appear to have staged the raids in late May which disrupted most university examinations in Calcutta.

Political Party Involvement

Congress leaders, as well as vice-chancellors (who tend to be loyal Congress members), have attributed unrest to the machinations of minority party student groups operating under the influence or direction of opposition parties. Congressmen saw the persistent 1966 agitation as an effort to embarrass Congress on the eve of the 1967 election campaign and saw 1967 disturbances as an extension of the more broad-based campaigns of the nationalist and separatist political parties on the language issue.

Student sections of the political parties, including Congress, have existed at most of the major universities since before independence, when Student Congress played an important role in gaining support for the "Quit India" movement. In recent years, however, these student sections have had a modest importance. None of them, certainly, has captured the student movement on a national basis. Only the Jan Sangh, the Communists (Left and Right) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagan (DMK) seem to have sections with coherent programs in even a few universities, and these student sections, like their parent parties, have mainly regional appeal--the Jan Sangh on the Gangetic plain, the Communists in West Bengal and Kerala, the DMK in Madras. Congress has made halting efforts in recent years to revive Student Congress but with little success.

Minority political parties tried to exploit student unrest in 1966, but they do not appear to

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have provided leadership either through involvement or through the student sections. Their main contribution was in associating their local "mass" organizations with student demonstrations, in the process perhaps exacerbating disturbances.

Political parties may have been more intimately involved in 1967--especially the Jan Sangh and SSP in the north and the DMK in Madras--since the student concern--the language issue--coincided so closely with the policies of the parties. It is doubtful, however, that they or their student sections precipitated or controlled the agitation once it was in progress.

There is a tradition that local university student unions should be independent of political parties. Antipathy to political party involvement in student politics appears to be a clear strain. This may accrue from the proliferation of squabbles among political party student sections in the 1950's which were part of the student unrest of that era. The National Council of University Students, a loosely constructed federation of local student unions, was formed in the 1950's as an apolitical body in reaction to such political factionalization. This attitude was clearly manifested in 1966 disturbances when a proposed national student march on Delhi to protest student arrests and police brutality collapsed when it was learned that the SSP and the Communists were involved.

Conclusion

Little can be done in the immediate future to reform the universities academically or improve their facilities. Available resources will permit only slow improvement which may not keep up with increasing enrollment pressures. Moreover, the political priority given mass education inhibits any scheme to tighten admissions policies or provide a few quality universities. A recent proposal to establish five or six excellent schools, which would turn out quality professional graduates, has been quietly shelved by the government. At the same time, the employment prospects are tied to economic development and the rate of social change where progress is slow.

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Recent student unrest is probably also a symptom of the general national uncertainty which set in after Prime Minister Nehru's death. The lack of clear national leadership, already apparent by 1966, tended to be accentuated by the 1967 elections which showed the Congress hold on the country to be slipping. The period since has seemed even more disorganized. Across the north, minority party coalitions, necessary due to the 1967 election results, have been unable to govern effectively in the states. Communal rioting again appears on the increase. Various new groups have emerged, representing special interests among India's welter of centrifugal forces. This adds to the tone of uncertainty.

Student unrest, although not necessarily at the pitch of 1966 and 1967, is likely to remain with India for some time. Student-led strikes and demonstrations disrupted a few universities in north India in 1968, and there were isolated outbreaks elsewhere in the country. Although there continues to be evidence of exploitation by political parties of student unrest, the leadership of disturbances still devolves mainly on local student unions. Where political party student groups have become involved, conflict between the groups has usually resulted. There is no force, including the loosely structured national union of students, capable of welding student unrest into a coherent national movement. Nevertheless, in some areas--particularly West Bengal--radical politicians appear to have had success in using students for their own ends.

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INDONESIA

Introduction

Indonesia's youth and students traditionally have been active in times of political ferment and crisis. Their organizations usually are affiliates of political parties, and as such they reflect the three major orientations that are found in Indonesian political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism or Marxism. They played a significant role in the preindependence nationalist movement, the revolution against the Dutch following World War II, and in the post-coup period of 1965 and 1966. In March 1966 the students briefly emerged as a highly significant political force, having been a major factor in preparing the way for army demands to then President Sukarno which, in turn, resulted in a reorganization of the government.

Indonesian students are now in a period of semi-quiescence. Although they have long since returned to their classes, they continue to monitor government operations, paying close attention to economic stabilization, the five-year economic development program, and preparations for the 1971 elections. They operate their own press, and their representatives sit in parliament. They see no early or sensible alternative to the army's present predominant role in government but are ready to support efforts for a more modernized political system which eventually would permit a return to civilian government.

Education and Student Activity

The Indonesian educational system has undergone an extraordinary expansion since independence, but the concurrent population increase and a rising demand for education have outstripped available facilities. In 1968, 35% of Indonesia's 112 million population were of school age; less than half attended

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class. Enrollment in higher education has increased at a faster rate than in primary and secondary schools. The current enrollment of Indonesia's 40 state and 150 private universities is estimated at 278,000 with about 8,000 graduating annually. With 42% of the population under 15 years of age in 1961 and a current growth rate of 2.3%, severe pressures are certain to continue.

The major universities are government financed and located in urban areas of Java. They are composed of individual faculties which are geographically scattered and separatistic. The shortage of teachers and materials is acute. Salaries are low and most professors have other jobs, reducing their effectiveness in overcrowded classes. An official 1967 survey of 24 state universities reported a ratio of 1 faculty member to every 728 students. Textbooks are not available or are prohibitively expensive, while libraries and laboratories are totally inadequate.

Universities usually do not have residence facilities and students must rent rooms or live with relatives. Most come from the families of government officials, army officers, pensioners, and teachers, and are two to three years older than their Western counterparts when they enter college. Many attend part time, working to defray expenses. Because of this situation, the lack of a standardized curriculum and an arbitrary examination system, it is difficult to complete a degree in the scheduled time of 5 to 7 years, and attrition is high.

A university education traditionally has been the passport to a secure position in government and a means of ensuring social prestige. Students, therefore, tend to study law and the social sciences. While a medical degree is highly respected, most aspirants lack preparation to complete the difficult course of study.

Limited academic interests and the value placed on a degree rather than educational training have produced graduates who have little inclination to change

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the bureaucratic system. This has meant a bloated largely underemployed civil service.

The first Indonesian student associations, formed in the early Twentieth century, quickly evolved into nationalist pressure groups. Sometimes they provided the genesis of political parties; members of the Bandung Study Club, under the chairmanship of Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 1927. As the Dutch became aware of the political nature of these associations, student activities were curtailed and many leaders were exiled. The student associations were dormant throughout the 1930's until the arrival of the Japanese who sought to gain support for the war effort by creating numerous youth and student organizations which emphasized Asian nationalism and Indonesian culture. At the same time, anti-Japanese university students, while effectively penetrating the Japanese-sponsored organizations began overtly and clandestinely to advocate independence. At the end of the war opinion was heavily against any association with the Dutch, and Indonesian students enthusiastically fought in the revolution.

Independence and the departure of the Europeans left many vacancies to be filled by Indonesians in the universities and the government. The first students--a handful compared with today's enrollment--to enter the universities after independence were highly motivated by job prospects, the social value of a university degree previously reserved for an elite few, and personal identification with the spirit and goals of the revolution. Most students from 1949 to 1957 had full government scholarships and living costs were relatively low.

As this revolutionary generation graduated, however, it was replaced by another whose prospects were not as favorable. The rapidly growing student population increased the demand for government jobs, and political connections, always helpful, became even

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more important in obtaining civil service appointments. In addition, as the revolution faded and living costs rose more than wages, university students became frustrated and more opportunistic.

While the Communist student and youth organizations loudly touted membership figures other organizations were reluctant to do so. Membership requirements were and still are often ambiguous. The term "student" is rather loosely defined and Indonesia, too, has its share of students without universities. Both youth and student organizations have included members from 14 to 40 years of age, while student organizations count not only enrolled students, but also recent graduates or people who contribute time or money. Because of social taboos and the early marriage of girls, female participation has been minimal and usually confined to auxiliary groups.

Prior to October 1965, the major Indonesian parties were the Moslem Scholars Party (NU), the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), all of which had student adjuncts. Sukarno's gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth of Communist and leftist national groups, while moderate political and religious groups were increasingly on the defensive. In 1963 the leftward thrust greatly intensified, and by mid-1965 only the army offered even minimal resistance to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism.

Recent Past

In the aftermath of the attempted Communist coup of 1965, youth and students temporarily abandoned their role as political party affiliates, assumed the posture of an independent political force, and helped bring down the 20-year Sukarno regime. Non-Communist student sentiment had remained alive throughout the most extreme periods of the Sukarno

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era, and once the army took the lead in an anti-Communist student sentiment had remained alive throughout the most extreme periods of the Sukarno era, and once the army took the lead in an anti-Communist campaign the students were quick to give their support. Later in 1965, they began--sometimes spontaneously and sometimes with army encouragement--to take action on their own initiative with Moslem and Catholic student leaders in the forefront.

University student groups came together to form KAMI, the University Students Action Command, one of the most significant coalitions of this period. While KAMI drew its strength mainly from religious student organizations, it regarded itself as nationally rather than religiously motivated.

KAMI may have been largely the brainchild of its first secretary general, Kosmos Batabura, who was at that time also chairman of the Catholic University Students Association. It has now been generally accepted that KAMI had the early support and protection of the army.

A government assessment in early 1966, when KAMI's activities hit a high point, placed its hard-core membership at 7,500. However, the group was effective in rallying thousands of students and gaining the support of many labor and professional groups.

Not unnaturally, student groups proved most effective in Djakarta. In many areas beyond the capital they often collapsed in the face of opposition from leftist, pro-Sukarno students and elements of the military, especially the leftist-oriented Marines.

The post-coup youth campaign was a fluctuating thing, often reacting more to the mood of the time than to any preconceived plan. Student hostility focused on Communists, then on Sukarno and his ministers and close associates, economic deterioration and finally on the Chinese.

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The students' tactics during this period were those so familiar to the West. Beginning with street demonstrations, mass meetings, and roll-calls the students turned to more direct action.

In early January 1966, students had initiated the boycott tactic. All university activities were struck until the government retracted price boosts in gasoline, kerosene, postal rates and train fares. Sukarno's installation of a new cabinet in late February 1966 was protested by thousands of students jammed into the streets of Djakarta, overturning vehicles and blocking the streets to keep the newly appointed ministers from attending installation ceremonies at the palace. Traffic was brought to a standstill and Sukarno was forced to bring in his new ministers by helicopter. Pamphleteering, radio, newspapers, grafitti, rockthrowing, the "liberation" of official buildings, and student arrests of government officials became regular occurrences. Fights with rival student groups alternated with demonstrations either supporting or condemning the "old order."

Student efforts at organizing often took a military tone, with the formation of brigades, regiments, and squads usually named after compatriots wounded or even killed during confrontations with pro-Sukarno troops or youth groups. While all this points to a certain amount of guidance from the Army, an anonymous student leader has said: "We learned how to organize and demonstrate from the Communists. We have watched and studied their methods for ten years. Unfortunately, we are a nation trained in Marxism...We have also learned a lot from the Japanese Zengakuren movement."

Sukarno banned KAMI, a proscription that was only briefly and superficially effective. During this period, however, KAMI's high school counterpart, KAPPI (Secondary School Students Action Command), became politically active and thereafter continued to work closely with the university students. KAPPI, like KAMI, drew the bulk of its membership from Moslem and Catholic forces.

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The transfer of executive authority to General Suharto in March 1966 was preceded by three days of violence and demands that diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists be broken: from 9-11 March, students invaded the offices of NCNA, the Chinese Consul General, and the Chinese Trade Office. Foreign Minister Subandrio's offices were also sacked. In May the students finally breached the walls of the Chinese Embassy.

A feeling that they, perhaps, were the new protectors of the public welfare, took hold.

In 1967, in an effort to turn student efforts into traditional channels, the government appointed 18 student and youth leaders to parliament. This development, along with Sukarno's removal from office the same year and a trend toward disunity within the student movement itself, greatly reduced the tendency toward direct student action. Moreover, the army discourages protest demonstrations pointing out that a free press and the parliament are adequate forums for dissent.

The most recent student demonstrations occurred in January 1970. Directed against high prices and corruption in government, they were orderly and for the most part drew small numbers. The government's restrained treatment of the demonstrations and a gradual reduction in prices defused the activity within about two weeks.

Students in Djakarta publish their own newspaper, Harian Kami, which enjoys a circulation estimated at 9,000 and is no doubt read by many more people. Harian Kami is regarded as highly professional, and its editorial comment is among the best in Indonesia. Several student organizations publish weeklies.

Indonesian Students Abroad

During the early 1960s an increasing number of Indonesian students went abroad to study, predominantly in Communist countries.

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At the time of the attempted coup there were approximately 3,160 students and trainees overseas. About 1,000 were in Western Europe and some in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some 60 were in Communist China. There were about 800 graduate students in the United States. Japan and Australia accounted for the remainder.

Communist governments attempted to influence the students' political development and sought to dominate the local Indonesian Students' Association. Where an association's leadership might not be sympathetic, the host government would set up a rival leadership which could often count on substantial support from among association members.

The group most seriously affected was that in Communist China, most of whose members refused to return home after 1965. They remain in Peking, shrilly demanding armed revolution in Indonesia guided, naturally, by the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

Of the 400-500 Indonesian students in the Soviet Union, about 100 transferred their loyalty to the Suharto government and returned home. The remainder, staunchly leftist (either PKI or left-wing National Party sympathizers), had their passports revoked and either remained in the Soviet Union or drifted away to Peking and even to Albania. The Indonesian Government has reported the existence of 700 fugitives undergoing guerrilla training near Peking, although not all are former students.

It is difficult to tell, owing to Djakarta's inadequate screening techniques, how many anti-government students returned and are active against the Suharto government. There is very little opportunity for "underground" elements in Indonesia to employ propaganda tactics on anything but a limited regional scale.

Indonesian students and trainees abroad in 1969 totaled 2,304, most of them in Western Europe or the US.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Communist Youth and Student Groups

The Communist Party developed rapidly under Sukarno, and its youth organization, People's Youth (PR), was one of the party's most successful mass organizations. At the period of its peak strength, immediately before the 1965 coup attempt, it boasted a membership of three million.

What attracted members to the PR was not so much its political activity as what its then Secretary General called the fight for youth's "everyday interests" and the appeal to "the everyday needs of every section of youth, in workshops, factories, offices, harbors, urban quarters, villages, estates, schools, etc." Political activity meant little to the ordinary peasant or worker.

All of this did not diver the PR leadership from its political function. It sought to raise the "progressive" awareness of many Indonesian youth and students and passed on members to the PKI and its mass fronts.

The PR, along with SOBSI, the PKI's labor front, took the lead in mobilizing the September 1963 sackings of the British and Malayan embassies and the subsequent takeover of British enterprises in Indonesia.

Because of its long known affiliation with the PKI, and its direct involvement in the coup attempt, the PR was hit heavily in the anti-Communist purges after 1965. It was banned in March 1966 along with the PKI and other front organizations.

In the wake of the post-coup purges, the PKI's youth program remains weak and disorganized. The party has attempted to establish a covert recruiting program, mainly on East and Central Java, where leftist sentiment remains strong and where there is considerable animosity stemming from the purges.

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Elements of both People's Youth and of the Communist-controlled Concentration of Indonesian University Students Movement (CGMI), also banned, are believed to have joined affiliates of the Indonesian National Party. It must be presumed that infiltration of other organizations is one of the tactics of the severely weakened and currently ineffective post-coup Communist Party.

Situation Today

The youth movement today is fragmented and considerably less active than a few years ago; only from time to time is there any degree of concerted activity. Leadership, for the most part, is intelligent and responsible.

Indonesia has nine political parties, three of which are major ones, and almost all have their youth and student affiliates. The two student federations which developed after the abortive coup, KAMI and KAPPI, are still in existence and draw chiefly on these party affiliates for their member groups. They also include two major independent Moslem organizations which were formerly affiliated with a party banned by Sukarno in 1960. KAMI and KAPPI are considerably less vital organizations now than they once were, however, as the result of internal dissension, the lack of a unifying target, the government's discouragement of street action, and the realization of their own leadership that direct action can be counterproductive. In addition, many of their members find that they must make a choice between their studies and protest activity. The two organizations took the lead in the January 1970 demonstrations, but the bulk of these protests coincided with freshman orientation week when students were out in numbers anyway. The member groups of the two federations occasionally act independently or briefly develop alliances with non-federated organizations. KAMI and KAPPI, as well as several unfederated student groups, support the government, but they reserve the right to criticize it severely.

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Affiliates of the large National Party--which formerly strongly supported ex-president Sukarno and is divided into moderate and left-wing factions--and a smaller national party, the Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), are not members of KAMI or KAPPI. The PNI's affiliates are still chiefly involved in intra-party affairs, but they also indulge in anti-Moslem and sometimes borderline antigovernment activity. This latter is likely to be dropped temporarily now that the army is manipulating the party into a pro-government position. IPKI's affiliate has specialized in immoderate anti-PNI and anti-Chinese activities, and on occasion has had to be restrained by the army.

Youth and student groups will continue to resort to street action from time to time, but this is likely to be brief and ineffective. Their chief emphasis for the immediate future will be the press and parliament. They are skeptical and cynical about the 1971 elections which they expect, probably correctly, will be a government-controlled exercise, but they plan active participation.

The primary objective of those student organizations that support the administration--and these are in the majority; remains the modernization of Indonesia, a goal which includes economic development, a free, non-Communist society, and efficient, representative government free of corruption. Students and youth are not satisfied with the present government, but they are baffled by the complexity of Indonesia's political life as to how to proceed to change it. They see no early or sensible alternative to President Suharto's army-dominated government but they appreciate the stability and pragmatism which it offers and agree that the present political party system cannot be entrusted with government. Many youth and student leaders, both Moslem and non-Moslem, are modernizers, see the need to change the overall party system from its present ethnic and religious base to one directed toward programs and issues. They are aware, however, that such a major change requires time, perseverance, and good leadership.

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IRAN

Summary

Student discontent has been relatively quiescent in recent years. An outbreak of demonstrations in 1967-68, and a further incident in February 1970 appear to have been aimed at redressing localized educational or economic grievances and to have had few political overtones.

Background

Political activism among University of Tehran students was, until recent years, endemic; there were few years between the early 1950s and 1963 not marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations. Traditionally, the activists were nationalists, supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his National Front or one of the offshoots of the National Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party was also heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on the campus for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh Party leaders were university professors, who retain a shadow party-in-exile in Eastern Europe.

In the past, student demonstrations were almost all antigovernment. The Shah provided a natural target and the demonstrations were for the most part unabashedly political, with little attempt to use genuine student grievances as a pretext. The Shah's increasing confidence in the rightness of his domestic and foreign policies was accompanied--and perhaps made possible--by a strict suppression of political dissidence, including that at the university. Student leaders who promoted demonstrations were jailed, and officials of the National Security Office were openly ensconced on campus. Such measures, together with a generally more optimistic feeling in the country, have operated to produce a less openly militant student body.

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~~SECRET~~Present Student Attitudes

Many young Iranians apparently feel no sense of identification with the regime and its development efforts which are decided at the highest levels of government. Anti-establishment sentiment is probably intensified by the lack of an effective political opposition either in the universities or in the society at large. No political organizations are permitted on campus and the security organizations and their informers keep a close watch for potential troublemakers. Outspoken opponents of the regime have been expelled and drafted.

A university education is today probably the most important requirement for success in Iran. Despite their dissatisfaction with the political system, therefore, most of Iran's 40,000 students are unwilling to jeopardize future job security by a confrontation with the police over political ideology. In the past, many university graduates were unable to find jobs, and therefore had less to lose. Now, however, many of the brightest graduates are absorbed into a burgeoning bureaucracy as participants in the reform program, and the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled educated class is beginning to fade.

Recent Unrest

Student disorders broke out in Tehran in February 1970 apparently as a spontaneous protest against an increase in bus fares. Large-scale arrests were made, followed by further demonstrations protesting the arrests--most of the students arrested were subsequently released. Some antigovernment leaflets were distributed, but the disorders appear to have been apolitical in nature. In May, a small group of students in Tehran attacked the Iran-American Society student and academic centers, breaking windows. The group, which seemed to be protesting US involvement in Iran rather than the government of the Shah, was quickly dispersed.

The largest and most widespread disturbances in recent years broke out in May and June of 1967 and again in January and February of 1968, affecting eight of Iran's nine institutions of higher learning.

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These demonstrations were aimed primarily at pressing complaints about the educational system; the students demanded, among other things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees, upgrading of degrees, higher university budgets, and better facilities. Most of these demonstrations were followed by others protesting police and security forces' over-reaction and arrests.

Some government and security officials contended that Chinese Communist sympathizers were behind the activities, but this was not confirmed. A few Tudeh Party cells do continue to exist at the University of Tehran, but there is no overt manifestation of their presence, and their covert activities are directed mostly at staying alive.

Problems in Higher Education

The universities have had difficulty in attracting competent and dynamic faculties, despite government efforts to recruit better qualified teachers. At Tabriz, for example, until a reorganization in 1968, the university was dominated by conservative, long-entrenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable qualifications.

Although the apparent student-faculty ratios at Iranian universities are not too bad, these figures are deceptive. At Tehran University, for example, where the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members have been only part-time teachers--medical professors with private practices, economics professors with their own businesses, etc. Some top professors reportedly have not shown up for classes in years. There has been virtually no faculty-student relationship. Professors traditionally deliver lectures and depart with little or no exchange with their students. The government now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not known to what extent its ruling has been enforced.

Outside Influences

There is little evidence of off-campus influence on student activism. Security officials, and in some

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instances university officials, charged that Communists were active in the 1967-68 demonstrations; 20 of the 100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February 1968 were alleged to be pro-Chinese Communist. This was not confirmed. There is some Communist activity, consisting primarily of the circulation of a limited amount of Soviet and Chinese propaganda. Some students may be receptive to this propaganda, but generally its effectiveness has been undercut by rapid economic and social development.

[redacted] in universities such as Pahlavi, which are in less urban areas, Muslim religious leaders still have an influence over youth. About 50 religiously conservative Shirazi citizens were arrested following disturbances at Pahlavi in February 1968 on charges of fomenting the strikes.

There is no evidence that student revolts in the US, France, and other countries have influenced the Iranian students, or that Iranian dissidents abroad have had an impact on the local scene.

Government Approach to Student Problems

Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are aware that the regime has not been accepted by many intellectuals. They are anxious to keep youth satisfied and to encourage students to support and participate in the government. There is no visible effort to train youth for political responsibility, however; in fact, the government attempts to keep students from engaging in any political activity.

In the wake of the 1968 demonstrations, the Shah launched a program of reform for higher education. Subsequently, university chancellors were replaced wholesale; an awareness of the need for change was instilled in educators; plans were set forth for producing more graduates in development fields and for increasing technical training; and students were promised a greater voice "within reasonable limits" in university affairs. The government is also attempting to improve and enlarge enrollment, university facilities, and faculties, and to establish a

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more creative and relevant method of instruction. Progress is slow, however, particularly when change is still fought by conservative elements within the academic community.

Political and social pull--being a descendant of one of Iran's "1,000 families"--is still important in the rise to success, but less so than before. More middle-class youth are attending universities, and with the government's increasing emphasis on skill and technical competence, more of them are now able to get jobs without political connections. Of greatest impact, however, has been the increasing availability of government jobs. Both high school and university graduates are employed in large numbers in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps.

Although the widely publicized educational reform program demonstrates the government's willingness to use the carrot to quiet students, there is little doubt that the stick will be employed without hesitation should student unrest take political shape. There is some evidence, in fact, of a dispute over how to handle restive students between the soft-liners in the Education Ministry and hard-liners in the security forces.

Iranian Students Abroad

Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to 37,000 Iranians are studying abroad including 5,000 to 12,000 in the US. Surveys have shown that many of the best do not return home because of better opportunities abroad, while average students are likely to come back. Most of the sizable number of dropouts and failures (only 50 percent of the Iranian "students" in the US are thought to be actually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs with good pay abroad and do not return to Iran.

A degree from a US or European university is considered far more prestigious than one from an Iranian university, and many youths go to fantastic lengths to study abroad. For example, private enterprises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unaccredited universities in the US to students who are unable to gain admission to better US schools.

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Poorer students often seek education abroad because they are unable to gain entrance to Iran's universities.

A small but vocal segment of Iranian students abroad (an estimated 500 are in the US) engage in active anti-Shah activities. They hold meetings, issue sporadic publications, and make grandiose plans, but their major activity is to harass the Shah when he travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, joined by radical students in the US, Germany, Austria, and England, among other places, have been a major irritant to the Shah, have strained relations with host governments, and have often led to supersecrecy and extremely tight security measures during his journeys.

The largest organizations of Iranian students abroad--the Iranian Students Association in the US and the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe--appear to be a conglomeration of Communist sympathizers, National Front - oriented leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists. They have no ideological cohesiveness; only opposition to the Shah and the present regime unites them. The leftists, who tend to be more active, almost always assume control but do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the majority. Most of the funds apparently come from membership dues. Those who are in the forefront of anti-Shah activities are well known to Iranian authorities and most of them find it impossible to return to Iran.

The government is also concerned by the so-called "brain drain" problem. During the past few years, it has initiated a number of steps calculated to lure overseas residents back--draft exemptions, the promise of good jobs in government and private industry, and active recruiting for teaching jobs at Iranian Universities. The regime may also be making it more difficult for Iranians to go abroad in the first place.

The Long View

There will probably be no dramatic changes in student attitudes over the next ten years, assuming

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that the Shah's economic development programs continue to provide challenging employment to increasing numbers of university graduates. It is also unlikely that many Iranian students will risk political activism while economic and social advancement appears possible. Nevertheless, as long as political activity is proscribed--and it is likely to be for as long as the Shah is in power--the regime will probably not win wholehearted student support, and resentment of its authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade university life.

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work relevant to the present day. The Socialist Party directorate at the end of the first year of this wave of serious student demonstrations unanimously called for amnesty for students and workers under indictment for participating in demonstrations. Civiltà Cattolica, the influential Jesuit weekly, stated editorially that protesting students were substantially correct in their demands and new forms of democracy would have to be found to give everyone a meaningful role in society. By the end of 1969 some educational reforms were in effect on both the secondary school and university levels.

Student Agitation 1969-70

Student agitation was at a fairly low level during the fall and winter of the 1969-70 academic year, although some serious disturbances occurred. During the fall of 1969, the most important student activity was to foster student-worker cooperation in the widespread strikes that were in progress. Students of various political persuasions on the left visited factories and workers' housing and even traveled with the workers from their homes to the factories during rush hours in repeated but largely unsuccessful attempts to establish rapport. Some students also took part in worker protest marches. In late November, for example, student groups participated without incident in an orderly disciplined labor demonstration of some 50,000 metal and mechanical workers in Rome. Only a handful of students is reported to have taken part in the violent labor demonstration of 19 November, when one policeman was accidentally killed, and students appear to have played no role in the Rome and Milan bombings in December 1969.

In 1970 some students have been involved in demonstrations against the trials of workers for their activity during the 1969 strikes. The most violent of these incidents was a protest led by the *Movimento Studentesco* (student movement) in Milan last January. The demonstration was directed particularly at a trial of nine workers accused of violence during a demonstration in Milan the previous November. The protest took

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place despite the relatively mild outcome of the trial in which five workers were acquitted and four were given suspended sentences and freed. The three trade confederations, some journalists, some party youth groups and various Maoists participated in the protest. Twenty-three demonstrators, at least some of whom evidently were students, were arrested and charged with failure to heed police orders and with violence and resistance against public officials (throwing rocks and other dangerous objects), but were released pending trial.

Student agitation in the universities thus far during the 1969-70 academic year reached its high point in the period immediately preceding the Christmas holidays. The controversy concerned a law, published on 13 December, which liberalized the individual student's plan of studies. For the first time, the law allowed students to choose courses in other faculties, subject to the approval of their own faculty boards. Much of the controversy stemmed from the precipitate manner in which the law was made public. It was meant to enter into force on 29 December, just two days prior to the deadline for the individual submission of the plans of study established by the same law. Even with the direct intervention of the minister of education, who moved the publication date up to 17 December, the students had only two weeks to register their plans. A great many students were therefore confused about the procedures for liberalizing their study plans, or were unaware that such a possibility existed. At Rome University, a majority at a Movimento Studentesco council meeting on 19 December pronounced itself in opposition to the new law on the grounds that it would further delay a complete reform. Several students argued for an immediate and complete disruption of the university in the remaining days prior to the vacation. Another faction called for the creation of a rising climate of agitation during January, culminating in a total occupation of the university during the first few days of the February examination period. No decision was made,

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however, either at Rome or apparently at any of the 30-odd other universities and no extensive occupation has taken place.

Little subsequent agitation in the universities was reported until simultaneous student demonstrations took place on 18 April in Rome, Milan, and Trento. In these three cities the Movimento Studentesco had organized antifascist protests that resulted in clashes with police and neo-fascist groups. The demonstrations may have been prompted by the twenty-fifth anniversary of the assassination of Mussolini. On the other hand, they may foreshadow a new wave of student unrest. During a 24-hour general strike in Rome on 29 April, some 1,500 student extremists joined the principal labor rally, but no violence occurred.

Reasons for Reduced Agitation

A major cause of the relative lull in student agitation is probably the reforms enacted at both university and secondary school levels. The reforms at the university level have caused the majority of the student body to become preoccupied with their planning of individual programs. Figures on the degree of student participation are available for the University of Naples, one of the largest of Italy's state schools. Some 70 percent have presented the individual study plans required in order to participate in the new liberalization of the curriculum. This figure reflects the depth of student interest in organizing their own education and freeing themselves from regulations imposing a rigid course of study. According to their professors, a number of the liberal arts students have sought merely to avoid the more difficult courses, but students in law, economics, medicine, and architecture have gradually sought more coherence, dropping some of the subjects generally recognized as irrelevant.

At the secondary school level, the examination procedure has been revised to make pass-fail decisions less arbitrary. A substantially larger

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percentage of candidates are successful under the new procedure.

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The decline in student agitation abroad also plays its part in the lull on the Italian student front. Television coverage of student-police confrontations elsewhere in Europe had an influence both on the methods and on the rationale of student protest in Italy in 1967-69.

Student Organization

Any new wave of unrest is likely to be of larger dimensions because a number of new student organizations have developed since the period of 1967-69. The *Movimento Studentesco* (student movement) itself still appears to have neither headquarters nor

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national leaders. This designation now serves, however, to cover the action of any substantial number of left-wing students anywhere in the country.

Potere Operaio (Workers Power) is an important left-wing labor group that reportedly includes particularly militant elements from the general student movement.

A second group, including some students, *Lotta Continua* (Continuous Battle), is also on the far left, with adherents who claim to follow Chinese Communist principles. *Stella Rossa* (Red Star) is a third but very small Maoist student group.

Right-wing students are also organized in Italy and have a tradition of violence. The University Front of National Action (FUAN) is possibly the principal student organization of the extreme right. It is supported by the Youth Organization of the Italian Social Movement (MSI-Italy's neo-fascist party).

Giovane Italia (Youth of Italy) is an affiliate of FUAN. *Avanguardia Nazionale* (National Vanguard) advocates more violence than is employed by FUAN in battles against Communism. *Lotta di Popolo* (People's Battle) is a small revolutionary fascist organization that describes itself as Nazi-Maoist. The adherents of this group dislike Marxist-Lenist ideology but accept revolutionary and violent methods.

Prospects

Should the students surmount the difficulties of the threatened teacher strikes of June 1970, a period of calm on the school front is likely during the summer recess. Agitation may well resume next November

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when winter terms in all the universities are under way. The extent and seriousness of demonstrations probably will depend to a considerable extent on the general political climate and on the success of the newly strengthened center-left government in containing popular unrest, recently accentuated by a rising trend in consumer prices.

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JAPAN

Introduction

The expression of student disaffection with the Japanese conservative establishment in street demonstrations has been a problem since World War II. Student extremists have often provided the hard core of violence in demonstrations staged by labor and the "masses" as an extraparliamentary tactic against the conservative majority in the Diet. Because demonstrations have been chronic they have been accommodated in the existing social and political structure with both the police and demonstrators observing tacitly agreed rules of engagement, and public opinion has come to support these rules. As an effective part of the political process, demonstrations have acquired a role in the opposition portion of Japan's political establishment and secured a quasi-legitimate place in the legislative process.

The Higher Educational System

The Japanese place education high in their value system and regard it as one of the principal ways to enhance social and economic status. The importance of an academic degree as a vital key to employment and status has taxed the facilities of higher education. Competition in the entrance examinations for admission to the universities is intense, particularly at such prestige institutions as Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda and Keio Universities.

Extensive reorganization of Japanese education during the Occupation produced a system closely modeled after that of the United States. Some changes have been made since Japan recovered her sovereignty in 1952, but basically the educational structure still rests on the framework of the Occupation-sponsored reforms.

In the field of higher education the prestigious national universities survived the Occupation

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with the least amount of revision--complete re-organization of the universities was never quite accomplished. A structural alteration did change the old three-year universities to four-year institutions to accommodate the revised system of lower education. A more significant change in terms of its impact was the creation of new universities throughout the country to provide an outlet for the vastly increased numbers of new secondary school graduates. The expansion of higher education has continued and in the 1966-67 academic year 194,997 students were enrolled in 413 junior colleges and 1,044,296 students attended 346 universities.

After two decades of experience with this expanding system there exists considerable ferment and discontent with "mass education" in contrast with the elite education at the higher levels before 1945. Shortcomings more frequently cited include charges that academic standards remain low in many fields, that there is too much conformity in universities, that the level of specialized schools has declined, and that literary courses are too numerous. People outside the university community attribute these alleged deficiencies not only to impractical and unrealistic curriculums but to the excessive number of universities and their burgeoning student populations.

The educational system places extreme pressure on students prior to rather than after entrance into higher education. Fierce competition to gain admission to select institutions is credited with contributing to one of the highest suicide rates among adolescents in the world. The competition is fair, however, as the examinations do not discriminate between rich and poor.

The environment of the Japanese university is a significant factor in student political activity. Once entry to a university is assured, the student is relieved of the immediate urgency of competition and it is his presence in a particular school rather than his academic performance which enhances job prospects. A student is practically guaranteed graduation as it is considered a disgrace for a professor

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or a university to produce a student who earns poor marks or fails, because it reflects on the competence of his or its teaching. At most institutions no special honors are awarded for outstanding scholarship and consequently the students' motivation for study is minimal and a common complaint is that university students do not work. Classes are crowded and the lecture system prevails almost exclusively at the undergraduate level. Class attendance is not controlled. Students, left largely on their own, can use readily available inexpensive copies of lecture notes without attending class regularly.

Another factor is the lack of dialogue between professors and students, in class or outside, which stems from the impersonal method of teaching. Thus the politically interested student must look elsewhere, to either fellow students or professional activists which have infiltrated the campuses, for discussion of politics.

Japanese society throws the student out on his own at the university level, and unfortunately the overprotected, disciplined regimen of home and lower schooling inadequately prepares the student for this sudden independence. In this situation a variety of influences shape his thinking and action. At the outset the student comes in contact with a pure and thus not necessarily practical or responsible brand of idealism traditionally displayed by university students. Caught in a society still seeking new values to replace those destroyed by the humiliation of defeat and occupation, the destruction of older authority widens the generation gap between students and their elders. In addition, students are conscious of the class conflicts of modern industrial society and experience the typical modern discontent with mass society's aimlessness, vulgarity, commercialism and boredom. As a consequence students are especially intent on championing "intellectual integrity," largely in protest against prewar restrictions imposed on freedom of expression. Their thinking is also strongly influenced by their association with theoretically Marxist-oriented professors, who gained prestige and ascendency in the postwar

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academic community by virtue of their prewar suppression and the liberal emphasis in Occupation policy. Marxism's ready-made one package explanation of history and society fills a felt need of both professors and students.

Functional Value of Educational Training

Japan's educational system has functioned successfully as a channel for the indoctrination of Western technology and as an instrument for social modernization and economic development. The training provided in the past and that of today makes it possible for the Japanese to participate in a modern industrial society. In individual terms, however, formal education can be a limiting factor since job placement, income and prestige are largely determined by the amount of education a person possesses regardless of individual ability of skill.

At the university level, professional, scientific and technical training is certainly functional in preparing students for a place in society. Japan produces recognized scholars and scientists. The universities, however, are not training enough people to meet the demands of industry for technologists and there is a developing controversy over the issue of stressing such training at university levels.

On the other hand, the functional value of the training provided in literature and the social sciences and for students at women's colleges is questionable in terms of employment; the number of such graduates exceeds job openings. The overcrowding of educational facilities, the impersonal lecture methods, and the lax academic standards all contribute to a low functional value. The fact that students and society accord greater importance to attendance at particular universities than to academic achievement is another indication of low regard for the instruction received.

Functional training cannot be provided unless the society has clearly defined aims to which the purposes of education can be related. Japanese society has yet to define its aims. Direct on-the-job

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contact with the realities of the Japanese economy must raise questions about the credibility of Marxist economics expounded at the university level. A Japanese businessman has observed that it takes five or six years to reorient students who have been exposed to Marxist teaching.

Student Organizations

Zengakuren, the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations, is the only nationally significant student organization in Japan and practically the only vehicle available to the politically-minded student for expressing his views. It provides a comprehensive system of elections, a framework for campaigning and policy formulation, and a sense of involvement in adult affairs. In addition the campus student association offers its members such practical services as cooperative restaurants, bookshops, tailoring and other facilities.

Zengakuren is a federation of student self-government associations, primarily those of universities although high school associations are eligible for membership. Initially envisioned as nonpolitical bodies designed to promote student welfare, these associations were granted a large measure of autonomy in student affairs and were subject to little or no direct supervision from government officials, the police or university authorities. Every student body had one or more associations which elected officers and exercised self-government under a charter. Marxist-oriented social science departments of several Tokyo universities provided the impetus for the organization of a national federation in 1948. Students from these universities continue to provide much of Zengakuren leadership.

Soon after its formation, Zengakuren applied for membership in the Communist-dominated International Union of Students (IUS). Accepted as a member in 1949, Zengakuren or one of its competing factions has continued to be recognized as representing Japan. A Japanese has served as IUS vice-chairman and a Japanese student has been a member of the secretariat.

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Infiltrated and dominated at the outset by the JCP, the organization is characterized by a highly politically motivated leadership with a rather large but lethargic general membership. While most of the leadership is thoroughly Marxist, an estimated 40% of the rank and file membership does not support any political party. Only a small part of the membership actually identifies with the organization and it is believed that a cadre of about 2,000 students virtually controls the federation.

Zengakuren's power and influence have risen or fallen according to its leadership's success in promoting struggles widely popular among students. Consequently, the leadership is always striving to discover or create problems that will attract ordinary students. Each time a local issue arises, radical leaders endeavor to interpret it in a broader context and link it to a national or an international issue.

Factionalism has permeated Zengakuren from its start, and, despite JCP domination at the top levels, the desire for independence from established parties, and dissatisfaction with changes in the JCP line often caused student leaders to resist JCP orders. During 1958, the federation began to move away from JCP policies after the president and 70 executive committee members were expelled from the Party for "left adventurist" tendencies. Since that time Zengakuren has been split into pro- and anti-JCP splinter groups of varying ideologies.

Three principal student groups presently claim to be the legitimate heirs to Zengakuren, one pro- and two anti-JCP. The JCP-affiliated body is by far the most powerful, claiming to control two-thirds of the 426 student associations totaling an estimated 372,000 members. The two anti-JCP groups, the Sampa Rengo (Three Faction Alliance) and the Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction) claim the support of associations with approximately 290,000 members.

The pro-JCP Zengakuren has won its leading position by emphasizing the improvement of student living conditions and opposition to tuition increases.

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This faction at the moment is notable for its stable and moderate political tactics, while Sampa Rengo and Kakumaru-ha are distinguished for their militancy and violent clashes with the police.

Although the leftist have dominated the post-war student movement, there is a possibility that the slow resurgence of Japanese nationalism is beginning to manifest itself in the formation of nationalistic student organizations. Chapters of the Nihon Gakusei Domei (Nichigakudo), the Japan Student Federation, have been formed at a few universities in Kyushu to challenge Zengakuren for leadership of the student bodies. Nichigakudo is reported to have been offered support by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but the offers were declined because acceptance would restrict its activities. Nevertheless, these groups remain on good terms with the conservatives, and the chapters tend to cooperate with the authorities of their respective schools.

Political Party Activity in Student Affairs

The efforts, or lack thereof, of political parties to influence students stem from the attitude of Japanese society toward youth in general. Japanese youth is unique compared to less developed Asian nations, particularly with regard to age factors. Due not only to the stability of domestic political and economic conditions but also to the persistence in Japanese society of traditions attaching importance and respect to seniority, young men do not expect to plan an influential role in the direction of national affairs. Adults of demonstrated competence in the 30-40 year age bracket still have their future ahead of them.

With a generally stable "establishment" on both the conservative and renovationist sides, the routes of advancement to membership in it are rather clearly marked. Given the long time it takes for the slow climb up the ladder of seniority, the student period of a would-be leader is a brief span. In addition, the leftist influence to which students are exposed in the universities appears to have no lasting effect, since students in the Japanese view enjoy not only an ephemeral status of privileged political

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irresponsibility but also a transitory state of mind. As a consequence of these factors, the efforts of conservative political organizations among students are limited, and political party efforts to organize support among the younger generation have fallen short of their aims.

Communist involvement in student action, however, has been extensive prior to and continuing since the organization of Zengakuren. From the outset, the organization was infiltrated and dominated by elements of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Communists have held important offices and JCP agents under student cover have actively promoted and controlled Zengakuren campus activities. During a period when the organization was flourishing, the JCP was reported to have had about 100 students on its payroll as "career workers." Communist influence has continued to be readily apparent in the national issues espoused and the tactics adopted by Zengakuren.

There is evidence that funds have been provided by the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea to help finance some demonstrations. In the case of Communist China, Japanese companies engaged in the "friendly firm" trade with China are required to turn over a percentage of their profits from such trade to support the radical pro-Communist China factions of Zengakuren. Box office receipts from Chinese theatrical troupes touring Japan also are a source of funds. The protests of the extremist student groups against the January 1968 Enterprise visit were reported to have been financed in part by pro-Communist China organizations.

Extent of Unrest

The extent of unrest among Japanese students is difficult to estimate and their snake-dancing in street demonstrations is not necessarily a valid criterion of disaffection. Although most students avoid direct involvement in political action, they are passively sympathetic to leftist causes, and it is true that Marxist influence on the campus is well established. Moderate elements, even if motivated, are unable to activate their like-minded colleagues.

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Membership in Zengakuren, the all-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations, also is not a valid measure of unrest. A decision by a university student body to join Zengakuren technically compels all students to become members, but the affiliation can well be engineered by a small radical group which has seized control of the campus association. It has been estimated that in general about 10 percent of students participate in student politics.

Student participation in the anti-Security Treaty disturbances of 1960 gives some yardstick of active expression of disaffection. At that time Zengakuren membership was nominally 290,000 less than half of the total college enrollment of 675,000. Only 20 percent of Zengakuren members were estimated to have taken part in demonstrations throughout the country. In Tokyo, with a student population of 300,000 of which 100,000 were in Zengakuren, large student demonstrations drew from 10 to 15 thousand students with a high of 26 thousand on one day.

More recently, the extremist Zengakuren groups have been unable to mobilize large numbers of students for demonstrations, largely because of widespread popular disenchantment with the violent tactics employed by the radical student left in 1968 and 1969. The smallness of recent demonstrations suggests that the vast majority of students stay out of active involvement in political activity and that the violence of the radicals tends to isolate them from the main body of students. Some students admit that their status makes an ideal cover for political activities and are eager to use this freedom to express themselves. Nevertheless, practically all students realize their future employers are unsympathetic toward political activism and are unwilling to engage in activities that might jeopardize their future careers.

Issues

Issues which arouse student action fall into two broad categories: those affecting student life,

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usually involving campus conditions, and national or international questions involving government authoritarianism, war and peace, and relations with the US. Dissatisfaction with living conditions, and with over-crowded educational facilities, particularly at Tokyo universities, has led to student strikes and violent disputes with university authorities. Students on occasion have fought for control of their dormitories, and violently opposed increases in tuition fees. They are devoted to the accepted version of "academic freedom" which holds that the university is almost immune from police action. Police incursions quickly arouse student resistance, and clashes with the police tend to enlarge student engagement in any dispute. Recurrent struggles over these personal and educational issues often expose the impotence of university and government authorities, but generally do not attract sufficient public support to pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment.

Sensitivity to a resurgence of government authoritarianism is usually involved in any issue which excites nationwide reaction. Measures for imposing greater government control of universities and for an efficiency rating system for teachers have provoked national student opposition. The Police Duties Law of 1958 which raised the spectre of a return of wartime police repression incited violent demonstrations which forced the Kishi government to shelve the bill.

But the issues that have caused the most serious disturbances are those in which the Japanese government, the US and the possibilities of war involving Japan get linked together. It is in this context that US bases in Japan, the Japan-US Security Treaty and related military arrangements, the Vietnam War, nuclear weapons and rearmament evoke violent protests. Reviving nationalism with its resentment of alleged dependence on the US reinforces reaction on these issues. The issue that most stimulates public concern is the possibility of Japan being dragged into war on the US coattails.

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~~SECRET~~History of Student Involvement in Politics

Japanese students have attracted the most attention and exerted significant impact as an organized political force only since World War II. Student agitation and strikes occurred before 1945, but the government had little difficulty in controlling political activity. With the help of a highly centralized educational system, an elaborate police network, and an acquiescent public, officials were generally able to keep students politically passive or to enlist their support for government policies.

The situation changed abruptly after the war when students were freed from official repression and encouraged to participate freely in discussions of public affairs. Proposals for educational reform became political issues in which students became involved. Their interest in political matters was also stimulated by the desire to improve their own difficult living conditions and their general disillusionment with the old order.

In the first postwar years university students initially moved to oust teachers and professors who had cooperated in the prosecution of the war. A brief period of united action with the labor movement followed, after which the students again turned their attention to educational matters, specifically to opposing increases of tuition fees at national universities. The ensuing strikes and demonstrations by local student self-government associations led to the organization of Zengakuren in 1948. This organization has subsequently served as the prime vehicle for student political activity. In their political actions the students have been noteworthy for their turbulence in demonstrations, both in those they have unilaterally staged and in those held in conjunction with labor and the leftist political parties. Generally, student political demonstrations are merely a nuisance unless other groups such as leftist labor unions or Communist organizations, which can turn out large numbers of people, provide mass support. Often organized labor and the leftist parties shun student participation in their demonstrations, fearing that the students' proneness to violence might alienate public opinion.

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The US presence has provided a convenient focus for the polarization of discontent and a target for political action. Student antipathy toward this presence appeared during the last years of the Occupation in the form of protests against the "anti-Red" purges which excluded Communists from political and union activity. Students also participated in demonstrations against various Occupation policies which they considered as dictated by US interest. The stationing of US forces in Japan after the nation recovered its sovereignty in 1952 has continued to irritate sensitivities concerning national independence. Student actions against Japan's military ties with the US have been recurrent since 1952 and have ranged from street demonstrations to physical attempts to disrupt the operation of military bases or obstruct the transportation of US military supplies.

Zengakuren led a student movement opposing the 1952 Peace Treaty which was ineffective largely because of strife within the Japan Communist Party. Between 1956 and 1958 the federation joined other mass groups in advocating peace, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the defeat of such government measures as the efficiency rating system for teachers and the revision of the Police Duties Law. The high point of effective political action came in 1960 when Zengakuren spearheaded the opposition to the Japanese-US Security Treaty which toppled the cabinet of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and prevented the visit of President Eisenhower to Japan.

Subsequently, adverse public reaction to the violence of the anti-Security Treaty riots and the restrained "low key" posture the government adopted toward the opposition deprived student groups of excuses for demonstrating, and their political influence declined.

Despite the decline of Zengakuren influence, student protest in the 1960s reflected themes emphasized in leftist and Communist politics. Students resisted the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with South Korea, finally achieved in late 1965, and continued to oppose the US presence in

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Japan and to protest the expanding US role in Vietnam. Beginning with the first visit of a US nuclear-powered submarine in October 1964, students have sought to play upon Japanese fears associated with nuclear weapons. In January of 1968, student activists engaged in violent clashes with Japanese police at Sasebo during demonstrations against the visit of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise. For a brief period after the Enterprise incident, student demonstrations against various aspects of the US military presence and US control of Okinawa enjoyed a moderate degree of popular support. Increased use of violent, disruptive street tactics, however, soon began to alienate most Japanese from the students. This alienation was intensified by violent disorders, spearheaded by Zengakuren, which paralyzed the normal operations of Japan's top universities. The violent clashes resulted from disputes between competing radical student factions as well as protests against traditional university structures and policies. A bitter power struggle developed between the Zengakuren faction supporting the Japan Communist Party and those calling for extreme "Trotskyite" tactics. Firm government countermeasures, including passage of legislation broadening government power over universities, restored order by late 1969.

Loss of popular support and effective police action have reduced radical student enthusiasm and morale. Most student groups are now groping for more effective tactics, painfully aware that the guerrilla tactics which were in vogue in 1969 and early this year were counterproductive. A few extremist groups, however, like the ultraradical Sekigun Ha (Red Army faction), are still enamored of hit-and-run type violent tactics, and still claim that a "decisive battle" will take place in 1970 resulting in the abrogation of the US-Japan security treaty. Less radical leftist groups, however, recognize the futility of this assertion and are now talking of a "decisive decade" of the 1970's.

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Barring a severe economic crisis, there is little prospect that students will bring about fundamental changes in the government and political parties. The Japanese establishment, buttressed by still tight, disciplined and group-oriented social structure and operating well within the limits of consensus, seems a long way from coming unstuck. Most Japanese share the benefits of the nation's economic progress through improved living standards, and have some chance of rising into the establishment. There is also an almost universal desire to see Japan excel as a nation. Consequently, the majority of the population has little inclination for drastic changes in the social-political-economic structure. Even the majority of youth shows little willingness to engage in a serious, determined effort to change the social processes by which leadership is presently attained, to resist conformity to the system--whatever its deficiencies or frustrations--or to insist on early participation in leadership itself.

The accommodation of student demonstrations within the political structure tends to maintain stability. Student action has been influential in the past and will be so in the future whenever students are joined by organized labor in mounting mass demonstrations on issues which the public supports. Student action in conjunction with left-wing labor and political elements was able to topple the Kishi cabinet in 1960, but not to replace it with a leftist administration. The conservative establishment simply responded to the display of unrest by elevating another conservative to the prime ministership and soft pedalling controversial issues.

It is not clear just how enduring student allegiance to the leftist political cause really is. Polls indicate that a large segment of student support the "progressive" parties and candidates, but there is increasing evidence that a large number become more conservative as they grow older, and change their voting habits accordingly. Election results seem to confirm such a trend.

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Issues

Issues which arouse student action fall into two broad categories: those affecting student life, usually involving campus conditions, and national or international questions involving government authoritarianism, war and peace, and relations with the US. Dissatisfaction with living conditions, and with overcrowded educational facilities, particularly at Tokyo universities, has led to student strikes and violent disputes with university authorities. Students on occasion have fought for control of their dormitories, and violently opposed increases in tuition fees. They are devoted to the accepted version of "academic freedom" which holds that the university is almost immune from police action. Police incursions quickly arouse student resistance, and clashes with the police tend to enlarge student engagement in any dispute. Recurrent struggles over these personal and educational issues often expose the impotence of university and government authorities, but generally do not attract sufficient public support to pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment.

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Barring a severe economic crisis, there is little prospect that students will bring about fundamental changes in the government and political parties. The Japanese establishment, buttressed by still tight, disciplined and group-oriented social structure and operating well within the limits of concensus, seems a long way from coming unstuck. Most Japanese share the benefits of the nation's economic progress through improved living standards, and have some chance of rising into the establishment. There is also an almost universal desire to see Japan excel as a nation. Consequently, the majority of the population has little inclination for drastic changes in the social-political-economic structure. Even the majority of youth shows little willingness to engage in a serious, determined effort to change the social processes by which leadership is presently attained, to resist conformity to

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MEXICO

Summary

Since the tough government crackdown on student agitators in October 1968 before the Olympic games, the Diaz Ordaz administration has kept a tight rein on activities at the Mexico City universities. Student political activity over the past year and a half has been fitful and sporadic, showing the dual effect that the memory of the "massacre of Tlatelolco" exerts at the schools. On one hand, it provides a symbol and slogan to evoke antigovernment sentiment and to mobilize students if conditions permit. On the other hand, the fear generated by that incident still serves to discourage all but the most dedicated to join student demonstrations.

The presidential campaign for the July 1970 election has strengthened the desire for protest. The presidential succession epitomizes the undemocratic aspect of Mexico's political system against which students are wont to rail and the official party candidate (and therefore president-to-be in December 1970), Luis Echeverria, was a principal in the government's policymaking group during the 1968 disturbances and therefore is despised at the university. Echeverria has made some gestures to placate Mexico's disaffected youth, but he is likely to encounter problems with the political-minded student body during his six-year presidency.

Background

In the second half of the nineteenth century Mexican education was taken out of the hands of the church, but the concept of university autonomy, rooted in the concept that as part of the church universities were outside the jurisdiction of secular government, remained. Even though autonomy based on the rules of religious sanctuary did not survive intact the

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changes brought by independence, the historical precedent was a factor in the rebirth of autonomy in 1919, when the Council of Cordoba (Argentina) declared autonomy an integral part of a larger movement toward university reform for all of Latin America. The new ideal was that the university would be a haven in which persons from all social classes would work free from outside influence including that of government. The ancient tradition was thus made relevant to the contemporary era. The reform movement was successful as virtually all national universities achieved some degree of independence within the next 20 years and autonomy became a goal of students throughout the area.

The relationship of the university to the state became an issue in Mexico from the time of the establishment of the present National University in 1910. During the following years of the Mexican Revolution and political instability, university-government relations were characterized by constant and sometimes bitter friction because of alleged government interference in the internal affairs of the institution. The passage of the Organic Law of the Autonomous University in 1929 under President Portes Gil changed the nature of the controversy. Once achieved, the independence of the university was widely accepted as one of the fruits of the Revolution and therefore above criticism. The dialogue then turned to the question of how much independence the university should have from the state which created it and continued to finance it.

Today the most important point of contention is that of "territoriality." During the 1968 student uprising, the students wanted complete sanctuary for their activities. The government, preoccupied in particular by the possible misuse of the university facilities against the Olympics, demonstrated in July and again in September, when it seized the National University, that it drew the line at the use of the campus as anti-government havens, as had

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been foreshadowed by the entry of Mexican armed forces into the campuses of provincial universities several years earlier. In this, the Mexican government is in tune with other Latin American governments which have increasingly taken the view that autonomy does not mean extraterritoriality.

Universities Today

The majority of students in higher education are located in the Federal District; of these the vast majority are enrolled in the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) and the Instituto Politecnico Nacional (IPN). UNAM is an independent system with national preparatory schools associated with it. The IPN is not autonomous and is associated with the Secretariat of Education as are its vocational schools. There are some private universities, the most significant being located in Mexico City and Monterrey. In addition, each of the states has its own university, technical, and normal schools. Another part of the system is the Normal Schools, which resemble the US teachers college. They prepare primary school teachers, and Superior Normal Schools prepare secondary school teachers. Both types are found in Mexico City and the various states.

The Mexican educational system has many problems, some of which stem from the tremendous push of increasing numbers of students, and others from the neglect of long needed change. The dropout rates in all levels are high and the quality of academic work is low. The National University is running a deficit while professors' salaries are distressingly low. Library facilities are inadequate and money spent on research is niggardly. Despite these shortcomings, the amount of the Mexican GNP (3%) and annual budget (18%) spent on education is impressive by Latin American standards.

Mexico's 11 Year Plan for Education, which concludes this year, was designed principally to attack illiteracy and to provide room in the primary schools

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for all those wishing to attend. The plan has left in its wake problems at all levels. One of the main problems created is the large number of primary graduates who have begun to put pressure on the middle level institutions. In December 1968, about 20,000 students were turned down by the vocational schools for lack of space. Out of every 1,000 students who enter primary school in Mexico only seven go on to complete their middle level education. Even so, the surge of secondary graduates cannot be accommodated in the second cycle middle level nor in the universities.

The Mexican higher educational system presents three significant structural problems, one stemming from the highly centralized control exercised by the Secretariat of Education and the UNAM, a second from the top heavy concentration of higher education in Mexico City, a third from imbalances between Mexico's needs and the careers of Mexican university students.

Every school must be affiliated with the Secretariat or incorporado with UNAM in order to obtain official recognition for its degrees. Any school or faculty incorporado with UNAM has the curriculum established for it. The rigidity of control exercised by the central institution is determined by the person administering and supervising the affiliated schools and so may vary from the minor nuisance of having an imposed, standardized curriculum, to control of the exact content of what is being taught in a particular course. This system is based on the French model developed under Napoleon.

Almost 60% of all students in higher education are in the Federal District. Although there are 84 institutions of higher education, most of the students and most of the money spent are in the capital. In addition, training for certain careers and most post graduate work can be done only in Mexico City.

Despite Mexico's great needs there is no evidence of a big push in the technical careers although Mexico graduates only about 17% of the technicians it needs.

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A surplus of lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, etc., continues to be graduated every year. In addition to a shortage of good training facilities and qualified personnel, a sociological factor also plays a part in this lack of entry into the technical faculties. Among the Latin upper and upper-middle classes there still remains a bias against "working with one's hands" and the traditional careers still maintain prestige value above the technical careers. Even with the demand for technicians, some graduates from UNAM or IPN cannot obtain employment because the quality of graduates from these institutions is often so low that they are functionally unprepared for work in a modern business enterprise. A corollary is that people of ability, who have often studied abroad, end up emigrating because of low salaries and because of the lack of proper facilities with which to work.

Low tuition rates prevail, contributing to low motivation. The question of tuition is explosive politically and emotionally for the university students. They defend it on the basis of keeping the university democratic and open to the lower classes, but in 1964, of the over 60,000 students in the UNAM, only 12.8% were from working class homes and only 3% were children of campesinos. The vast majority of students from low income families drop out before they reach the university level.

The quality of instruction is not high and there is a large number of part time professors. It is considered prestigious to give classes at the university level and is very often done for just this reason. Consequently, professor absenteeism is high and preparation of course material is poor.

The student disturbances in the summer of 1968 brought a new wave of attention and the prospect of some action on educational reform. Numerous analyses of the problems have been offered and some remedies suggested. The educational establishment, however,

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had displayed neither the will nor the ability to reform the system, and the government has not shown itself to possess the necessary understanding or resolution to deal with the problem. The outlook for meaningful reform continues bleak.

The University Students

All those with university training in Mexico have generally been regarded as a superior class culturally and higher education is equated with intellectual status. In terms of subjective class identification, Mexican university students and graduates almost unanimously count themselves as professional and middle class.

There is no national student association, nor do many individual universities have student organizations that represent the entire student body. Typically each facultad or department has several groups vying for control. At important large universities, especially UNAM with its 90,000 enrollment, it is practically impossible to follow the sometimes real and sometimes phantom student organizations that come and go within the various schools.

Open friction between students and the government is almost continuous, at least at a low level. To some extent major waves of student disorder are cyclical in that they occur at a point when a cause celebre is presented to a student body recovered from its last confrontation with the authorities. A major characteristic in Mexico of open conflict between students and the government has been the serious weakening of the student groups by way of stern repression. The establishment in Mexico is not so readily threatened as in many Latin American countries where social and political institutions are weak. Students can hope to influence the government, but at present cannot seriously jeopardize its stability. The Mexican student has little organized voice in national affairs. The strength of the government,

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the ideological weight of the Revolution and the institutional expression of this ideology by the state, the single political party of consequence, and the intellectual community all combine to strip from the students much of their political potential.

Beginning in July 1968, university students projected themselves as a new force on the political scene. They were able to do so, however, largely because the XIX Olympiad in Mexico City provided a unique forum for protest. Student restlessness continues to be evident, even though attempts to revive a significant antigovernment movement have had no notable success since the harsh crackdown by the army in 1968. The potential for enlargement of the now small impact that students have on a national scale rests in the fact that dissidence generally is rising in all sectors of Mexican society. Student movements frequently have a strong impact on local and state politics.

The biggest issue with the students at present is the continued detention of their fellow students who were arrested in 1968.

Students and Organized Labor

Organized labor and peasant groups make up the major organizations of the ruling government party and are intimately tied to the official system. These groups are used by local and state governments to counter antigovernment student demonstrators. The student and labor groups are generally antagonistic. There are signs of serious discontent in the labor movement, however, and dissidence among the workers could at some point lead to some joint action with the students.

Prospects

The student community will probably continue agitation under the Echeverria government, which begins its term in December. There are deep divisions

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among the students, however, and the government has worked to block unification efforts. Echeverria promises to be a strong president who will be intolerant of violence and not hesitant to use force against dissidents. Urban middle-class society harbors strong sympathy for the students, however, and shares many of the student resentments against the government. This adds to the possibility that student political activity will grow along with the rising protest against the bossist nature of the political system.

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PAKISTAN

Summary

Localized student unrest has periodically disrupted the universities in Pakistan but did not become an actual threat to the government until late 1968. Violent student-led riots in both sectors of Pakistan in the waning days of the Ayub Khan regime were an expression of frustration and dissatisfaction with the status quo--political, economic, and educational. Yahya Khan's martial law government, which has administered the country since Ayub fell in March 1969, has begun trying to satisfy legitimate student demands through educational and political reforms. For a variety of reasons, student anti-government disorders have been practically nonexistent in West Pakistan and only infrequent in East Pakistan in the past year. Nevertheless, there is evidence that student leaders remain capable of initiating mass action and that they will not be mollified until drastic changes are made in the political system.

Background on the University Set-Up

Pakistan has 12 universities, each with a broad network of affiliated colleges. Theoretically autonomous, the universities receive official funds and are more directly influenced by central and provincial governments than any other part of the educational system. The total university and college enrollment is well over 300,000.

Pakistani universities are organized on the British model. The titular head is the chancellor, usually an important dignitary and most often the governor of the province where the university is located, i.e. East or West Pakistan. The vice chancellor is the actual administrator, and overall control is exercised by a Senate made up of university and non-university personnel. Since the Senate meets only occasionally, the immediate working body is the Executive Council--senior

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university staff members, representatives of the affiliated colleges, and representatives of government.

The Student Community

The Pakistani student community is as diverse and regionally varied as other sectors of the society. Although students are generally more leftist than the rest of the population, there are pockets of intense conservatism, such as in Peshawar. Across the country, students seem to have a parochial outlook and a simplistic and emotional view of the outside world. The causes that have stirred them to action in recent years have been political, regional, personal, or religious rather than social. The dissidents have always represented a small percentage of the enrollment, but support for their opposition views has increased as disenchantment with the establishment has grown within the student community.

Many serious students in the late 1960s became frustrated with the third-rate curriculum and instruction in Pakistan's pseudo-British educational system, which is designed to educate a small ruling elite. They recognized that the system was inadequate for educating large numbers of people in many different fields and that it did not provide the skills needed by a modernizing society. A very basic grievance underlying the general student dissatisfaction with the status quo is uncertainty about jobs after graduation. Students somewhat unrealistically expect that a college degree guarantees prestigious and remunerative employment. They inevitably run up against the hard reality that most jobs in government, as well as in business, are awarded on the basis of family connections rather than merit. All examinations are considered to be subject to manipulation and favoritism, and cheating has assumed the proportions of a national scandal.

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Disenchantment with the entire corrupt establishment has made some students receptive to the appeal of a radical solution--Islamic "socialism" or even a Chinese-style "socialist" experiment--on the assumption that it would be more equitable. (Although Communism per se has made few converts among Pakistani students, Communist countries, particularly Communist China, exercise a considerable attraction.) The students' desire to change the system sets them apart from many of the older opposition leaders who want to "throw the rascals out" and take their places in a substantially unchanged social order. This accounts for the appeal of younger, more radical opposition leaders such as Bhutto, the former foreign minister, who became one of Ayub Khan's sharpest critics. Bhutto has continued to be a favorite among college students during the Yahya Khan regime.

Student Organizations

Student organizations have existed in Pakistan since partition. Established to pursue both political and educational goals, the organizations have lacked full-fledged programs and generally accepted goals. They have tended to lie dormant until stirred by major emotional issues. They have found effective allies hard to come by, with the exception of a student-labor opposition tie of some significance in East Pakistan. Most of the effective student groups are subsidized by particular political parties--or the regime.

Pakistani student organization is fragmented and varies widely among regions. The arrangements are most coherent in East Pakistan where student political involvement is much greater than in the West and where violence among student groups is a routine occurrence. Province-wide student organizations serve as campus arms of adult political groups. The largest and oldest of these is affiliated with an opposition party preoccupied with provincial autonomy. The second significant organization is affiliated with the Communists, but is split between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions. The

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remnants of a group sponsored by and almost entirely dependent upon the Ayub Khan government continue to exist but can claim only a tiny following.

In Karachi, the two largest student groups are influenced by factions of a leftist party that has been heavily infiltrated by the Communists. Other Karachi student unions of individual colleges typically go their own way, although the fundamental Muslim parties exercise some influence. Karachi students are given to intermittent activity, but they can generate considerable pressures on issues to which they are committed. In Lahore, there are numerous opposition- and government-sponsored youth movements. Lahore students have been militant on issues which have engaged their emotions, such as the 1966 antigovernment demonstrations following the Tashkent Declaration. Elsewhere in West Pakistan, student organizations are usually organized as college or department unions and are generally inactive. Weak and transitory student groups come and go with little fanfare, typically being sparked by a few activists with an apathetic following.

Students Move Against the Establishment

The antigovernment unrest, which terminated Ayub Khan's increasingly stultifying decade of rule, was initiated by West Pakistani students in November 1968. Their demonstrations, initially based chiefly on legitimate academic grievances, took on a growing political and antigovernment flavor. Rioting broke out in West Pakistan's urban areas and spread to East Pakistan as other disaffected elements joined the students. Although attention shifted to dissident adult politicians, the most active, unpredictable, and volatile element in the protests continued to be the students, whose leaders became increasingly competent with experience. The activists remained only a small percentage of the student community, but their colleagues joined increasingly in the agitation, especially in East Pakistan.

Ayub's response was indecisive and ineffective. He used both carrot and stick tactics, offering

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the greatest number of concessions to the students in hopes that education reforms would make them forget political demands. The concessions, however, were too little and too late. In mid-January 1969, the students stepped up the protests, and the government reacted with repressive measures. The army had to be called into most major cities to restore order. When it became clear in March that a negotiated settlement between dissidents and the government was virtually impossible, Ayub Khan resigned, relinquishing power to army commander Yahya Khan, who immediately declared martial law.

Under Yahya Khan

The past year has seen almost no student anti-government activity in West Pakistan and only a few sporadic outbreaks in the eastern province. The removal of Ayub left students without a focus for their agitation. Martial law limitations on public meetings also put an effective damper on student activities. Furthermore, Yahya Khan, recognizing that student unrest was a basic factor in Ayub's downfall, has tried to satisfy legitimate student demands through educational and political reforms. Although his proposals have been somewhat controversial, they are evidence of good faith. Yahya's announced decision to hold elections for a civilian constituent assembly in October 1970 has added further balm, encouraging student leaders to continue the wait-and-see attitude that they have adopted toward the new regime.

Student violence since March 1969 has resulted primarily from clashes between competing student groups. The emotional rhetoric and activities of the 1970 electoral campaign have polarized student forces--particularly in West Pakistan--into Islamic (rightist) and socialist camps, reflecting similar developments in the political parties. This polarization has exacerbated the inherent disparate nature of student forces in Pakistan and has probably reduced somewhat their capacity for effective mass action, while increasing the possibility of futile and violent factional clashes.

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In East Pakistan, where most student groups are united in the cause of provincial autonomy, mass student activity has been more effective. In several confrontations with the authorities, however, both student and government leaders have been conciliatory, indicating a mutual desire to avoid a showdown.

Prospects

A new group of student leaders emerged from the antigovernment turmoil--leaders who command the respect of fellow students and are apparently able to exert a degree of control over demonstrators. Despite the over-all inactivity of the past year, they have indicated their continuing ability to initiate mass action, when united in disenchantment with the authorities, by successfully carrying out several general strikes against alleged police repression in Dacca, East Pakistan.

The generation gap, however, continues to be an acute problem in Pakistan. Although adult opposition leaders happily rode the wave of student discontent and espoused student demands against Ayub, there is little evidence of student admiration for many of these politicians. The students have proved to themselves that, on their own, they are a viable and effective political force. What this realization will mean for future student activities is as yet uncertain. Pakistani students have never been able to establish a lasting nation-wide organization, and fragmentation among student groups appears to have become the dominant feature again, at least in West Pakistan. It seems likely, however, that unless the constitution drawn up by the prospective constituent assembly results in some drastic change in the political system, Pakistani students will again be prepared to take to the streets in anger and protest.

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PHILIPPINES

Introduction

The sudden and sharp student challenge to Philippine President Marcos that erupted in early 1970 marked a sharp departure from the students' previous acceptance of what they recognized as the inequities of the Philippine politico-economic system. Filipino students have long been content to prepare themselves for earning a livelihood within the Philippine system despite its imperfections. In the past several years, however, they have gradually come to share some of the preoccupations that agitate students in other countries of the non-Communist world. Despite student factionalism and lack of direction, their demonstrations and demands represent the first significant challenge to traditional Philippine society since the Huk insurrection of the early 1950's.

Although some Philippine student leftists profess an attraction for Communist China, student activism in the Philippines is a homegrown movement. Peking has expressed approval in its propaganda of student agitation against the Philippine establishment, but it is not believed to have any channels of influence into the student movement.

Evolution of Student Activism

The vast majority of Philippine students have traditionally concerned themselves merely with finding their niche in the system. Their tractability was the product of a complex society that emphasized respect for elders and that was based on a tightly interwoven and extended family system which looked first to the needs of its members. These concerns usually were at the expense of national and other interests.

The growth and impact of student activism throughout the world in recent years, however, has prompted Filipino students to begin to question conditions at home. Student activism is greatest

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in Manila, where 33 colleges and universities account for about half of the 600,000 enrolled in higher educational institutions in the country. In 1969, persistent agitation against paternalistic college and university administrations by students forced some attention to their wishes from school administrators. Several successful confrontations with Marcos over government funds for state-supported schools, which had been promised periodically and then withheld, encouraged students in their new assertiveness. Also, long-festered resentment over the dim prospects for remunerative employment under a system in which advancement has been determined more by family ties than by ability has come to a head and has expanded into contempt for the venalities of the system.

Philippine Educational Emphasis

Student frustration over their unpromising career prospects can be blamed only in part on the government's resistance to reform and the prevalence of nepotism in both government and private employment. Much of the difficulty stems from the Philippine sense of values. The Filipinos set great store on the prestige of a higher education, and the ratio of college and university students to the total population is exceeded only by that of the US. Social norms, however, have fostered a misdirected focus on "prestige" fields, with the result that there is a surfeit of graduates in certain disciplines. The Filipinos' ideas of prestigious employment is partly a reflection of the country's Spanish heritage. Education, commerce, and liberal arts account for some 75 percent of total enrollment, and a disproportionately large percentage of students is also enrolled in law and medicine. The less respected engineering, science, and technical fields attract fewer than six percent of college and university students.

As a result of the top heavy concentration in sought after but overcrowded lines of work, fewer than one in five graduates is able to find employment commensurate with his educational training.

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There are approximately six applicants for each elementary teaching job opening; yet vacancies in the more remunerative science and technical fields go unfilled. The necessity for most degree holders to take on menial work leads to a constantly increasing body of underemployed and disgruntled. An acute shortage of skilled labor would ensure employment, but the ingrained low esteem for blue-collar work deters students from pursuing the less ambitious but more practical goal of vocational training.

A continuing exodus abroad to greener employment pastures is a mark of the despair of highly trained individuals over the poor prospects of suitable employment at home. An estimated half of the 20,000 annual emigrants to the US are young professionals and their families. Many are doctors, whom Philippine medical schools turn out in such substantial numbers that they cannot find enough paying patients among the thin layer of society that can afford medical care. The government and the press lament the brain drain, but dismay has not become strong enough to spur a redirection of educational priorities.

Student Organizations

Student organizations in the Philippines have traditionally been, and still remain, very unstable. Organizations have sprung up only to be shattered as leadership feuds caused breakaway factions to go their own ways and add to the plethora of groups competing for student allegiance. Even a focus on Marcos as the *bete noire* of the students has not been sufficient to overcome the tendency toward many competing student organizations.

The moderate National Union of Students Philippines (NUSP) claims now to represent about half of the country's college and university students, but it is loosely structured and has had little sense of direction. It is affiliated with the smaller and also moderate National Students League, which draws its membership from state-operated institutions. The NUSP has been consistently outflanked

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by the militant though much smaller student left and as a result has felt compelled to become more militant and aggressive itself.

The student left is dominated by the Kabataang Makabayan (KM-Nationalist Youth). The KM, founded in 1964, is extremist, militant, professedly pro-Maoist, and disposed to violence. The focal point of its activities is the University of the Philippines, although it has also set up chapters at other universities in Manila and the provinces. It claims a membership of 12,000, but its actual strength is probably less than 5,000, with only about 500 committed members in the Manila area. The organization's real strength lies in the abilities of its hard core to agitate and manipulate. Although the KM lacks the numbers for impressive mass action of its own, it has often succeeded in infiltrating and directing toward more violent ends the rallies and demonstrations of moderate youth and student groups. It is afflicted by the squabbling and infighting that characterize the Philippine left, however, and it lacks leadership in depth. Even though it dominated student agitation through the spring of 1970, the KM has not produced an individual with the charisma to develop a nationwide student following.

The Samahang Demokratikong Kabataang (SDK-Union of Democratic Youth) was formed in 1968 by KM leaders who had become dissatisfied with the leadership of the group's founder--subsequently eased out--and with the KM's increasingly strident advocacy of violence. This small splinter group probably basically agrees with the KM's leftist, anti-US stance, but it rejects the KM's commitment to violence. Although the SDK's leadership is considered realistic and moderate, the organization has never jelled into a disciplined group.

The Malayang Pagkakaisang Kabataang Pilipino (MPKP-Union of Free Filipino Youth), which was organized in 1967 as the youth arm of the Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, hoped to appeal to youth and student elements in both urban and rural areas. Apparently it has had

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little success, partly because of a rumor spread by rival leftist groups that it is a front of the Philippine security services.

These student organizations are of some substance and permanence. Scores of others have surfaced, often over a specific issue, and then disappeared as emotions cooled or as their leadership broke into factions. One ad hoc organization that has shown some staying power is the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP), a grouping of leftist student and labor organizations that was formed after the initial student demonstrations in January 1970 to coordinate efforts against Marcos. The MDP was weakened from the beginning, however, by the refusal of moderate student groups to participate, illustrating once again the gulf between student moderates and radicals. The MDP's ability to give a unified push to student demonstrations was further enfeebled by disagreements over the advisability of violent tactics that underscored the fluid nature of the alliance of formerly rival leftist groups.

Student Protests

The upsurge in student agitation was spawned by revulsion over the excesses of the presidential election in November 1969 which resulted in Marcos' becoming the Philippines' first two-term president. Students responded more sharply than the general populace as a national awareness developed of the extreme lengths to which Marcos went to widen the margin of his landslide victory. Marcos became in the students' eyes the embodiment of the ills of the Philippines.

The students were spurred to act by a growing suspicion that Marcos intended to perpetuate himself in office. He might select as his vehicle for doing so the constitutional convention scheduled for 1971 which could repeal a constitutional provision limiting presidents to two terms. Marcos' annual state of the nation address to the Philippine Congress on 26 January 1970 provided the occasion for the first student protest. In an unprecedented

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show of disrespect for a chief executive, stones and bottles were thrown at the President and Mrs. Marcos as they left the Congress building. Heavy-handed police suppression of the melee strengthened the students' determination to stage more protests, and radicals turned a demonstration outside the presidential palace four days later into a bloody battle with police and armed forces that resulted in five student deaths and injuries to over 100. Marcos was stung by the unparalleled degree to which the students' ire was directed against him personally, and he labeled the demonstration a part of a Communist plot against his government. This testy reaction solidified student opposition to him.

Realizing that he had to make an early show of meeting student demands, Marcos sacked the chief of the constabulary--whose involvement in election irregularities had established him as the specific target of the students--agreed to curb other unsavory political cronies, promised to investigate several specific cases of corruption raised by the students, and made several laudable cabinet changes. Suspicions that Marcos was only resorting to his traditional technique of making concessions to ease immediate political pressures were borne out in the absence of follow-up action to most of his promises. It soon became evident that he did not intend to follow up the elevation of competent young technocrats and other remedial gestures with any meaningful moves toward social and economic reforms.

Although unwilling to advocate reforms that would take the steam out of student protests, Marcos realized that efforts needed to be made to deflect student disaffection from himself and his administration. During the time he gained by his concessions, Marcos turned to his habitual technique: attempting to divide the opposition. He tried to buy off and redirect the students rather than acknowledge and deal with their grievances. His failure to come forth with real initiatives, however, stemmed only partly from his faltering leadership. It also was a result of his excessive reliance on the counsel of close advisers in the presidential palace who tended to see student agitation as the beginning of

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a Maoist insurrection. Marcos' fearful concern for his personal safety, reinforced by the influence of soothsayers who predicted his assassination, caused him virtually to barricade himself in the presidential palace. This self-imposed isolation contributed to the picture of a beleaguered antagonist. He suffered irreparable damage to his reputation and will be hard-put to regain his aura as a national hero.

As part of his efforts to regain control of the situation, Marcos seized on the US as a time-tested target. The work of his aides in bribing and persuading students to concentrate on anti-US grievances created the atmosphere that led to rowdy disturbances outside the US embassy in February 1970. Marcos was deterred from further efforts to set the US up as an alternate target by the forcefulness of US representations over demonstrations at the embassy.

Future student agitation may continue to have strong anti-US overtones, because anti-Americanism is a cause eagerly embraced by the KM and its leftist associates. Continuation of this thrust, however, might further fragment the student movement--moderates remain more interested in airing national issues than in baiting the Americans. It could also reduce the likelihood of a persistent student push against national ills. Marcos would see both eventualities as playing into his hands.

Lack of Public Support

Although the students' condemnation of the deepset ills of Philippine society met with an initially favorable public reaction, their agitation has not received significant support. The emergence of violence in the protest movement caused many sympathizers to back off and was generally censured by the press.

Most politicians have been chary of identification with the students. As members of the oligarchy, or pawns of it, they realized that the major reforms asked for by the students would adversely affect

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their own interests. The few opposition party politicians expressing support for the students did so only in order to increase Marcos' isolation. Despite self-serving statements of support from a few opposition Liberal Party congressmen, the party caucus voted overwhelmingly to condemn the drift toward violence in student demonstrations. A congressional investigation into student unrest, undertaken immediately after the outbreak of student disorders, developed more the earmarks of a witchhunt than a concerned inquiry and reflected the disinclination of the establishment to address itself to the deficiencies in national life. The negative attitudes shown in Congress heightened cynicism among the students toward the current system and probably breathed new life into the student movement, which had shown signs of slowing down from intense factionalism.

The Philippines lacks the strong and unified labor movement that has given muscle to student protests in other countries. Elements of the labor left wing joined Philippine students after the initial demonstrations, but student suspicion over the degree of their commitment--and the limited number of the labor supporters--kept their role minor. The small and diverse group that considers itself the intelligentsia probably finds student activities compatible with its own attraction to leftist and social causes, but its support has been subdued. The ideologically motivated wing of the Huk dissidents in central Luzon has not been involved in student agitation. It has, in fact, been warned by its mentors in the underground Philippine Communist Party to stay out of Manila, where the risk of police interception is great. There is, moreover, no large middle class clamoring for reform. Its members realize that the present system is stacked against them, but the prevalent mood is one of resignation to a system regarded as too entrenched to be successfully attacked. The inconveniences from the disruption of public transportation and business caused by student riots appeared to make a stronger impression on the Manila public than did the students' professed commitment to expose and attack national ills.

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Almost the only vocal support for the students has come from Jesuit priests, some of them quite prominent, who have broken with the standpat church hierarchy to assist in the activities of student moderates. Although it is unlikely that their guidance will counterbalance the agitation of the left, Marcos was sufficiently incensed by their entering the picture to order an investigation into religious personalities involved in the student movement. The Jesuits' activities reflected a growing social conscience among progressive church elements disturbed over the church's close identification with the oligarchy. The stirrings within the church already disturb the establishment, but the development of a reformist-minded church will have to await the passing of its present hierarchy.

The students are acutely conscious of the general lack of sympathy for themselves among the public. The size of antigovernment demonstrations dropped off markedly following the closing of Philippine colleges and universities in April 1970 for the annual three-month vacation. With many students returning to their homes in the provinces for the holidays, both moderate and leftist organizations found it impossible to attract large crowds for street action from a public that had been alienated by the violence of earlier demonstrations.

Student activists are using the summer holidays for conducting teach-ins among the populace to win support for their movement. They claim to have evoked a greater measure of public understanding. They will in any case probably return to class in July exhilarated from their vacation-time political activities and disposed toward a more forceful confrontation with Marcos. Even though both moderate and leftist student groups have used the hiatus in student demonstrations to try to tighten their organization and to more sharply delineate their aims, it is doubtful that they will work in any greater concert than they did during the student agitation earlier in the year. Throughout their proselytizing efforts during the vacation period, moderate and leftist students appeared to be vying

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for public support. This competition will probably be reflected in continuing divisiveness in the student movement during the new school year.

Although students have found themselves in the forefront of the long-smoldering sentiment for social change, they remain divided on the means to pursue their common goal. Differences were patched up in the heat of the initial confrontation with Marcos, but the student alliance proved tenuous. Filipino students are prone to the divisiveness that afflicts other groups in the national scene--the political left, the labor movement, and even the two national political parties. Cracks that developed over the issue of violence resulted in moderate elements shying away from demonstrations in which it was suspected the KM would provoke incidents with government security forces. A majority of students still appear disposed to reasonable and controlled protest, but their restraint can be negated by the work of radicals and administration-hired provocateurs. The proliferation of new groups since the start of concerted agitation in early 1970 reflects the fluidity and lack of cohesion of the movement, characteristics that will strengthen Marcos' conviction that he can undercut the students without significantly altering his government's course.

Unlikelihood of Reforms

Marcos' unconvincing show of determination to undertake reform reflects his assessment that he can ride out any renewed storm of student protest just as he did the initial student confrontation in the first months of 1970. Marcos' ties to the oligarchy, into whose ranks he has lifted himself in his single-minded rise to prominence, make unlikely his seriously applying himself toward reform. Although he has vowed to bring a revolution from above that would eliminate the need for a rebellion from below, his failure over the past several months to mention any specific programs prompted more than the usual skepticism with which the Philippine populace greets his remarks. His condescending attitude toward the students has intensified student disenchantment with him.

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In view of the fragmentation of the student movement and its lack of significant support from other sectors of society, the political establishment probably believes it does not have to bestir itself toward instituting social and economic reform. It may be underestimating the students' determination, however. The students, emboldened by their initial successes in extracting concessions from Marcos and increasingly annoyed over his failure to follow through on his promises, appear intent on pushing their demands. Although the cleavage between moderate and leftist students is still much in evidence, a growing awareness of and resentment over Marcos' efforts to split their ranks and discredit their movement could spur students to hold their divisive tendencies in check and to strive for more responsible protests that would attract public approval and support. In any case, Marcos will be under persistent pressure for the remainder of his second term, and he will probably from time to time take calculated steps toward correcting some of the more blatant injustices of the Philippine system. He and his allies in the oligarchy will probably be successful in the near term, however, in holding any reform measures short of a restructuring of Philippine society.

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POLAND

Summary

Polish youth has shunned open conflict with the regime since the ill-fated, idealistically motivated student demonstrations of March 1968 and the minor and sporadic protests against the invasion of Czechoslovakia later that year. Nevertheless, the youth is as determined as ever to press for recognition, responsibility, and a role in shaping the country's future. It is doing so against the wishes of a regime which, despite a more pragmatic post-1968 posture, is still regarded by the young as opposed to change, jealous of past achievements, and repressive of the popular will.

The resurgence of the general political indifference among youth after the events of 1968 stems not from a lack of alternatives but from a rejection of the idea of a frontal attack against a regime which they regard as curator of an anachronistic set of ideological precepts. These precepts, the young believe, will eventually wither in competition with the practical needs of a developing, technological society. They are eager to hasten this evolutionary process, but neither they nor their anti-Communist elders are currently willing to make tangible sacrifices to do so.

Since 1968, the country's Communist leaders have shown signs of becoming increasingly aware that the traditional palliatives of increased repression and ideological indoctrination alone have failed to eliminate the spiritual vacuum among the youth. Although still relying on these means, they have also made faltering steps to bridge the generation gap by permitting some gradual increase in the influence of selected members of the younger generation in policymaking. Whether this signifies a genuine commitment in this direction or merely a tactical effort to deflate pressures from below will become increasingly critical to the prospects of evolutionary, in contrast to revolutionary, change during the coming period when the new generation fully assumes positions of national leadership in Poland.

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In the short run, the gap between generations may grow worse. Fifty percent of the population is under the age of 25 and sixty percent under the age of 30. Polish youth do not oppose the basic economic or social tenets of East European Communism as such. They do not, for example, favor a return to private ownership, nor the reintroduction of the pre-war social system based on wealth and semi-feudal influence. They do, however, want far-reaching changes in direction of a more democratic model of "socialism," and the fulfillment of some of the promises originally held out by the country's leaders.

The youth appear most to oppose the exclusiveness and the corruption of the establishment. The Communist framework within which these features emerge, with its totalitarianism, significantly reinforces these attitudes, but does not appear to be a root cause of them. This is particularly true of the ideologically unmotivated members of the younger generation who have left school. Most appear to regard Communist ideology as irrelevant to the issues facing the country--a dead letter with only its institutional forms still prevailing.

Apathy Versus Commitment

Faced with the coercive power of the establishment, youth have become apathetic to the regime's goals and to Communism as an ideology promising consistent development. They view the established Communist regime in Poland today as a negation of the very ideas on which it theoretically rests. More than other segments of the population, youth have long been aware that the Polish party, like other Communist parties in power, has become the core of a stagnant society rather than a dynamic stimulant to change. This was made clear by the party itself, when politburo member Kliszko warned in 1968 that "anarchist-leftist" youth leaders in the "contemporary world" only fulfill a "diversionary role" on behalf of conservative elements against the "real" revolutionary forces of the left. In the eyes of Polish youth, the party's fear of "anarchism" neatly underscores its total identification with an intolerable status quo.

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Generally, educated Polish youth tend toward a form of Western European social democracy as a political and social order, nonsectarianism in religion, and experimental freedom in art. They favor individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and their nationalism is tempered by vague feelings of supranationalism and a strong allegiance to Europe as an entity.

In terms of specific domestic policies, they make it clear that they want a free interplay of ideas, and above all, a regime responsive to public opinion.

This whole range of demands was clearly embodied in a declaration passed by dissident Warsaw University students in March 1968, in the wake of the first major student disturbances since 1957. The most succinct of numerous such resolutions passed by various student bodies that month, the Warsaw University thesis called for freedom of assembly and expression, freedom of political association, legal and institutional guarantees for such freedoms, true rule of law in the judicial system, the repudiation of and guarantees against abuse of governmental power, the abolition of censorship, and the repeal of repressive legal codes. It also called for popular representation in parliament, although it stopped short of calling for free elections. Finally, the students demanded an overhaul of the economic system and a thorough shakeup of the bureaucratic establishment.

Although student demands during the initial stages of the unrest were limited to issues of academic freedom, the 28 March declaration illustrates the degree to which these demands were widened under the stimulus of stern repression by the regime. The government and the party were faced with no less than a demand that they divest themselves of a monopoly of power.

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The student disorders and the violence from 8 through 23 March 1968 gave climactic impetus to a political struggle already under way within the regime and paved the way for a slow but irreversible infusion of new blood into the Polish party leadership by year's end. The demonstrations began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberties, but the students clearly were also aware of the almost simultaneous political events in Czechoslovakia.

The relative uninvolvement of Polish students in previous regime crises stemmed from the wish not to be sucked into intricate power rivalries within the party. Most of the party's factions before 1968, from Gomulka's old guard to more hard-line elements, appeared aware of the "mischief" potential of youth and the uses to which dissident youth could be employed to advance a partisan cause in any factional infighting. Some party groups courted youth's favor, even to the extent of placing themselves at the head of the party's critics. Others, correctly, saw youth as the spearhead of a movement which could threaten the bureaucracy and as the driving wedge of "ideological subversion."

Thus, until March 1968, the youth tended to avoid actions that would have been exploitable by the party factions just as they had rejected occasional courtship. In fact, the inability and unwillingness of the youth to view any party faction as a true champion of their interests was the fundamental reason that student disorders in March lost momentum, rather than the clearly excessive police force which was used against them.

Another major factor in ending overt student action was the failure to secure worker support. The regime's propaganda blaming the riots on Jews and revisionist intellectuals skillfully played to

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the residual anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual bias of the average Polish worker. The absence of an immediate economic issue around which worker discontent could coalesce also dampened labor support. In addition, many of the students--mainly those who did not take part in the disturbances--were working-class children whose parents evidently were fearful of jeopardizing their educations. These developments illustrated that the generation gap was not drawn solely along political lines between an idealistic and anti-Communist youth and the Communist old guard. They showed that significant elements of the working class, albeit anti-Communist, tended to close ranks with the "establishment" in defense of an economically tolerable status quo against the politically attractive but socially destabilizing notions of the students and intellectuals.

Party boss Gomulka revealed in mid-March 1968, in the midst of the student disturbances, that a total of 1,208 persons had been arrested up to that time. Only 367 of these reportedly were students. The remainder, according to the regime, were "hooligans" and other "misguided elements." Over half of the students arrested reportedly were released within two days. Those remaining were dealt with piecemeal by government authorities throughout the summer of 1968, with the majority gradually released. Most of those released, however, were expelled from their schools, many conscripted into the armed forces, and others required to take up blue collar jobs in areas of the regime's choosing.

A minority of this group, apparently including those considered the most active of the student ringleaders, were dealt with in a series of relatively unpublicized trials ending in early 1970. This course of action apparently suited the government's intentions to keep individual trials inconspicuous enough to prevent a potential revival of those issues which sparked the student riots, while at the same time driving home the point that no repetition of the 1968 events will be tolerated. The trials resulted in relatively light sentences of 18 months to three years, with parole provisions after half the sentence was served.

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The trials and other restrictive measures against student activities within universities did not generate meaningful new unrest among the students. The majority of the students appears to have understood the message and, with most of their leaders incarcerated or otherwise out of circulation, appear demoralized and apathetic toward any renewed anti-regime activity.

Despite this revival of apathy in the short term, there is considerable evidence that Polish youth remain on the watch for another chance to lend impetus to change within the system. In this sense, they are both evolutionary and revolutionary in their thinking. For the time being they appear to view open rebellion as counterproductive, given the repressive tools and determination of the "establishment." They are convinced, however, that the government has neither the desire nor the capacity to evolve without carefully channelled external pressure. Polish youth appears anxious to provide such pressure at the appropriate time.

Student Coordination and Foreign Contacts

There is no hard evidence that prior domestic planning or contact with students in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere played a major role in sparking unrest in Poland, although during the initial stages of the student demonstrations in Warsaw slogans of "Greetings to our Czech brothers" and "We need a Dubcek too," were heard. Nor is there convincing evidence that Polish students sought or that Czechoslovak students were anxious to provide any "export" of their experience to Poland. Indeed, by March 1968, Czechoslovak students were caught up in supporting and consolidating the new regime in Prague, having little in common with the problems faced by their Polish counterparts.

There is little information to suggest that exchanges among Polish and Western European students

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influenced the ferment. Although Polish universities maintain lively exchange programs with several European countries, Polish students have remained relatively uninfluenced by the various student movements in the West. They are well aware of the writings of Marcuse and the ideas which motivate student syndicalist groups, but there is very little evidence to show that these have taken hold in Poland. Many students contend that the daily reality of "alienation" in Poland and specific indigenous issues facing Polish youth dictate goals, strategy, and tactics which can borrow from Western student experience only in the broadest possible terms.

The reaction of Polish youth, as that of intellectuals in general, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia--and more specifically to Poland's role in the venture--was one of shame, disgust, and in some cases frustration. As positive and strong as these emotional reactions were, however, they appear to have been superseded in most cases by fears of cumulative violence in the Eastern European area perhaps leading to a world conflict. Later, these fears, in turn were displaced by a shame-laden but apathetic reaction to the event, especially when it became evident that both Washington and Moscow were intent on preventing the Czechoslovak issue from seriously affecting their long-term relations.

In some cases, the reaction of Polish youth to the invasion was similar to the more simplistic view of average Polish workers and peasants. The lingering bias of these groups against the Czechoslovaks, whom they tend to view as "Teutonic Slavs" facilitated an attitude that the Czechoslovaks had never really appreciated the voracious side of Communism, and that for the first time in August 1968 they were forced to face a reality much more familiar to, say, the Poles.

Students and the Educational System

Despite the rapid growth and democratization of the educational system in interwar Poland, schools of higher learning before World War II were still characterized by exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies. Interwar Poland,

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therefore, had its problems with a qualified, unemployed, and "alienated" intelligentsia long before the term became popular elsewhere.

One of the few real achievements of the postwar Communist regime was the rapid expansion of mass education. Universities and other schools of higher learning increased in number from 32 in 1938 to 76 in 1969 and the student body from under 50,000 to more than 305,000 over the same period. This virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a system unable and unwilling to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands is central to the regime's current problems.

Children of the workers and the peasantry have made significant gains in higher education, although the party continues to decry their relatively low percentage in the total student body. Only 28 percent of the students are children of workers, and less than 17 percent are children of peasants. Since students from these backgrounds apparently were the least involved in the March disturbances, one of the regime's current goals is to increase their number, at the expense of the sons and daughters of the "affluent" or of middle-class background, who have been singled out as the ringleaders of the unrest.

Rumors that children of prominent party and government personnel played key roles in the March disturbances were plentiful, although evident bias on the part of many of the sources of these rumors casts some doubt on their reliability. The children of influential Jews, for example, were singled out for condemnation by the hardline party elements for clear political reasons. It is true, however, that students of middle class and intellectual backgrounds did, in fact, play a central role in the unrest, and that they formed the majority of those who were penalized by the regime.

Repercussions on the educational system of the student riots and the almost year-long intra-party crisis that followed were quick in coming in some

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areas and laggard in others. Influential liberal professors, other academicians, and scores of graduate assistants were purged during April 1968, with less publicized purges continuing for another year. Many of those dismissed were Jews. Institutional changes have been slower in coming, but significant piecemeal legislation affecting higher education was passed by early 1969. Its main impact has been to increase party control over the internal organization of universities, in most cases by abolishing the autonomy of institutional subunits in many university faculties. For instance, the virtual elimination of the traditional system of chairs, which permitted professors holding these positions significant independence, has been coupled to other measures that tend to centralize control over both faculty, staff and curricula.

Other important measures include a newly revitalized point system for university entrance favoring children of worker/peasant and other "socially desirable" backgrounds; a redesigned civics curriculum for elementary and secondary schools; a strengthened and--at least on paper--onerous system of mandatory Marxist philosophy classes in the higher schools; and a compulsory manual labor program during summer vacations for students in higher education. Unlike, the administrative and organizational changes, however, these measures have been vitiated in practice by various factors, chiefly the opposition of the students and faculty, shortages of qualified instructors, and the reluctance of the state's economic bureaucracy to assume the burden of frequently malingering students performing involuntary labor.

Organized Student Activity

The regime's main effort to prevent a repetition of the March 1968 disturbances had centered on propaganda activity by the mass youth organizations. The largest of these, the 900,000-member Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), and the 850,000-member Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), have long been under the regime's direct control, but their effectiveness has

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been hampered by bureaucratic bungling and the unresponsiveness of the youth. The ZMW caters mainly to peasant youth in rural areas; while the ZMS has "academic" branches, its main appeal is to working youth for whom membership is a means of job advancement. Although the regime is once again trying to use both organizations as instruments of indoctrination, internal stresses and strains continue to polarize their memberships into a handful of Communist zealots on the one hand and a mass of apathetic opportunists on the other.

Most university students belong to the 145,000-member Polish Students Association (ZSP), which has concentrated on catering to their material and recreational needs and, until 1968, succeeded in functioning without undue regime interference. The ZSP appears to be divided into an officially approved leadership and a rank-and-file membership which strives to pay as little heed as possible to directives issued from above.

The ZSP's leadership prides itself on its "cosmopolitanism," reflected mainly in the organization's membership in the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS). A ZSP member receives an IUS identification card when travelling abroad. More importantly, there appears to be some interchange between ZSP and IUS leaderships. The present ZSP chairman, Jerzy Piatkowski--not a student, but a regime-installed leader--previously held the post of secretary in the IUS. He was replaced in this post early in 1966 by another ZSP functionary, Wladzimierz Konarski.

Most students consider the ZSP, and to a lesser degree the ZMS, as useful vehicles for contacts among universities both within Poland and in foreign countries. Much of the students' more significant political activity prior to 1968, however, took place on the periphery of the ZSP--in various "discussion clubs," only a few of which were sanctioned. The small minority of students taking active part in these clubs nevertheless proved infectious sources of dissent for the rest of the student body.

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The most active student political groups are thought to have existed at the University of Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, and Lodz. Although the political views of student members ranged from "democratic" through "revisionist" to various shades of unorthodox Communism--including idealistic Trotskyism--they shared opposition to various aspects of the regime, and concerned themselves mainly with discussion and promotion of political, social, economic, and philosophical alternatives to the system. During the student unrest in March 1968 the regime charged that students belonging to a "Zionist" group at Warsaw University, the "Babel" discussion club, were the ringleaders of the unrest there. It is these leaders who were prominent among those singled out for subsequent trials.

The heavy hand of the regime has descended on all of these groups, perhaps forcing some of them to go underground. The regime has also sought to expand its previously sporadic and generally unsuccessful use of officially sponsored "political discussion clubs" loosely sponsored by both the ZSP and the ZMS. These clubs were generally regarded by students either as safety valves approved by the regime or as centers where students' political opinions could be monitored by the security apparatus.

Despite political apathy toward the present system and a rejection of regime-sponsored, organized student activity, there are tentative signs that significant elements of the politically aware and socially restive Polish youth are attempting to focus on longer range goals and to change the system from within. This is facilitated by their gradual but numerically significant absorption into the lower levels of the rising managerial and technocratic component of the ruling elite, which often cuts across political lines. These younger professionals have given signs of developing into a new class based on administrative and technical competence rather than on ideological considerations. Tending to give priority to national self-interest and public welfare to the detriment of Communist orthodoxy and institutional

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forms, they have earned the respect of students and intellectuals, as well as the increasing allegiance of the younger generation within other classes, including the workers. They apparently hope that, with the passage of time, they can become the main moving force for evolutionary change toward a new, albeit still "socialist," political and social system. Periods of renewed conflict loom ahead, however, if the present Communist leadership fails to accept, and to make genuine provisions for, this process.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Summary

Vietnamese students have no long-standing tradition of political action even though various governments and political groups, especially the Communists, have made important use of youth organizations to serve their own purposes. In South Vietnam, a break in the normal apathy and docility of university students began with the overthrow of the Diem regime in 1963, and sporadic student agitation has persisted ever since. Most of this agitation has been targeted against real or fancied repressions on the part of government authorities. In some cases, it has taken on strong anti-American or xenophobic overtones or elements of war weariness; often, it has been inspired by one or another religious faction, particularly the militant Buddhists. It has frequently been possible to see the hand of one or another political figure or of the Communists, but there is no instance in which the Communists are known to have directly instigated or controlled any significant student protest movement.

The most recent student agitation has been largely confined to Saigon, but some activity has been reported in other cities. Although nourished by a climate of inflation and political unrest elsewhere in the community, its primary grievances have once again been those of civil liberties tempered by some specific student interests.

Recent Student Activities

South Vietnamese students generally had remained politically quiet for three or four years before the recent wave of protest demonstrations against the government broke out last March. The majority of college and high school students appeared to be genuinely disinterested in domestic politics. Those who were politically active were almost always opposed to the government; they conducted brief, small-scale protest activities from time to

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time, but failed to make much of an impact on the country's political scene. Many other students were probably sympathetic toward the activists but were intimidated by heavy-handed tactics used by the government in breaking up protests and arresting student leaders.

The relative calm among the student community was abruptly broken last spring, at a time when the government was facing protests from a number of quarters. Student leaders probably saw an opportunity to exploit rising discontent with the Thieu government and were emboldened in launching their own protest movement by the ability of other groups to stage antigovernment activities with relative impunity.

The protests were touched off by the arrest of a group of Saigon University students on charges that they were Viet Cong agents. Student leaders at the university reacted by forming protest committees and calling for a boycott of classes. The student strike began in late March and gradually spread during the next month to a private Buddhist university in Saigon, to the universities in Hue and Can Tho, and to several Saigon high schools. In addition, some high schools outside of Saigon were affected to a lesser degree. Many students, however, refused to participate in class boycotts while others merely took advantage of the situation to cut classes so that they could study for upcoming exams.

The protests remained centered in Saigon, where they gradually grew larger and more disruptive. By late April the students had moved beyond class boycotts to street demonstrations and minor clashes with police. The students may have been encouraged to continue their protests by the relatively conciliatory attitude adopted by the government during this period.

By May, serious differences had developed among the leaders of various student groups, with the militants opting for more disruptive tactics.

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A few college students succeeded in instigating a series of brief demonstrations in Saigon by high school students riding Hondas. The moderates, meanwhile, privately acknowledged that they had lost control of the protests.

At this point, the government began to crack down on the demonstrators, temporarily closing all schools and universities in the Saigon area, extending the curfew in the capital, and arresting a number of the militant leaders. These tactics, as well as the fact that many students appeared to be tiring of protest activities, succeeded in reducing the scale of the protests. Although militants kept up their disruptive demonstrations throughout May, much of the steam appeared to have gone out of the movement by early June.

Issues

Initially, this spring's student activities were largely confined to demanding release or early trial of their arrested colleagues. Success in mobilizing support behind these demands, however, was due in part to student discontent over a government decision, announced shortly beforehand, to increase the price of textbooks and to charge a tuition fee for public schools. As the protests continued, student leaders gradually broadened their demands until they included a whole series of issues unrelated to the student arrests. Moreover, the various student factions had differing goals and some of them frequently changed their demands.

Among the major issues raised by the students have been charges of repression by police and a demand for "university autonomy," meaning freedom from government interference in the affairs of Saigon University. Since the arrested student leaders were originally scheduled to be tried by a military field court, protesters have also challenged the constitutionality of that body--an issue which had been raised previously by other antigovernment groups.

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Later on, the students also took up the cudgels against the new Cambodian Government for its mistreatment of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. This denunciation soon took on anti-American overtones, with some students demonstrating at the US Embassy against American support of the Lon Nol regime. Other students have tried to exploit war-weariness by calling for an early end to the war.

Student Organizations

Only one student organization--The Saigon Union (SSU)--has been active politically in recent years, and even it had been relatively quiet prior to this spring. The SSU, which has a long history of engaging in antigovernment activity purports to represent the entire student body of Saigon University, but only a small percentage of the students are active members. Moreover, the ranks of the organization have been depleted in recent years by arrests and by members going into hiding.

SSU leaders have been involved in directing some of the recent protest activities, but many of the demonstrations have been led by other students representing small factions which have sprung up since March. There is little evidence of any central direction of the protest movement by the SSU or any other group. As in Saigon, informal committees appear to have directed the protests in Hue and Can Tho. Students from Saigon apparently consulted with students from other universities, but there appears to have been little real coordination of their activities.

Each of the other four South Vietnamese universities has its own student union, but they have been inactive politically. In the past, there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to create a national student union, but the students themselves have shown little interest in this idea.

Higher Education in South Vietnam

Higher education in South Vietnam has been compared to the narrow tip of a steep pyramid,

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available only to a small educational and social elite. Most children attend only the first three years of elementary school, relatively few make it through primary school, and fewer still through the first and second cycles of the lycee to attain the rough equivalent of a high school education.

Total enrollment at the five universities in South Vietnam is estimated at about 40,000. Some three-quarters of these students were reported in 1969 to be attending the University of Saigon. The oldest in the South, it was established in 1955 after partition by combining several local branches of Hanoi University--the country's only major university under French rule--and was staffed by refugee teachers from the Communist North and by some foreign professors. The remaining universities are at Hue with about 3,000 students, Can Tho with some 2,000, Dalat (a Catholic university) with 2,500, and Saigon (Buddhist Van Hanh University) with 2,500. The latter two are private rather than government-operated schools, but enjoy considerable outside support.

By Western standards, including French tradition after which Vietnam's educational system is patterned, South Vietnam's schools are poor and the universities are no exception. Advancement is generally based on passing examinations by rote. Admission to a university in most cases depends upon graduating from a lycee with a Baccalaureate II degree won by such examination. Only a few university faculties require entrance exams or other testing and, at least in several faculties of Saigon University, the percentage of students registered who actually succeed in graduating is less than ten percent. This system tends to encourage bribery by well-to-do families to ensure their children get through.

Teaching at the universities is largely by lecture; class attendance is not required but a professor's lecture notes are usually published. Few professors require independent research papers by their students, and in any event, with a few exceptions such as Van Hanh, library facilities are

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reported to be extremely limited. Moreover, although most university teaching is now done in Vietnamese, there are few up-to-date textbooks available in that language. Saigon University in particular is greatly overcrowded in terms of classroom and library facilities as well as in dormitory and recreational facilities, although a new campus is eventually planned.

Besides the five universities, a number of specialized schools offer some higher instruction. There are five normal schools offering teacher training, an agricultural school, an engineering school, a school of fine arts, and an oceanographic institute. These are in addition to the National Institute of Administration which trains government administrators and to the military's officer training and psychological warfare schools. These specialized schools have remained largely aloof from general student agitation.

Considering the generally poor quality of teaching and education in South Vietnam, it is perhaps significant that there has been relatively little student protest activity directed at the educational system itself. In the few cases where university grievances have been at issue, these have also had nationalist or parochial overtones such as demands for autonomy, for vernacular instruction, or for the dismissal of particular school officials identified with unpopular political causes.

Seeming student apathy toward the character of the schools themselves is probably a reflection of narrow social patterns in South Vietnam. The universities draw from and contribute to a small urban or landed elite, principally centered around the medical, legal, teaching and engineering professions. With an underdeveloped economy and with the war favoring a military rather than a civil career as the path to power, the quality of university preparation probably has not been an issue in Vietnamese life. This could change as class origins of the students begin to broaden in such places as Hue and Can Tho, or as students become more politically active in general.

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Both the Catholic church and the Buddhists have their own student organizations, but they too normally exert only a limited influence on students in general. Buddhist students have played an important role in nearly every significant protest movement, but in the latest phase some of them proved more militant than the leading An Quang monks, and resented attempts by the monks to restrain them.

Other non-Communist politicians and parties have at times circulated among student groups in an effort to line up some key leaders and to channel student activities and energies behind their own political objectives. In the recent past, no non-student leader or group other than the main religious sects has been successful in gaining more than temporary popularity among student circles or in setting up a student chapter of a national political organization. Even the Diem government, with its relatively effective pro-government Republican Youth Movement, lacked any organized following in the universities.

In the past Vietnamese students have not had close ties or even much contact with student organizations in other countries. During the recent protests, some student leaders were in contact with student organizations in the US, but there is little evidence that there was much coordination of their activities.

The Communists see in the South Vietnamese student community a fertile field for recruiting activities but they probably have consistently achieved less than they have hoped for. The Viet Cong tout the existence of a Liberation Students Union and a Liberation Youth Association, but these seem to be little more than paper organizations. There have been indications of Communist penetration and influence, however, in student movements over the years. The strongest evidence of this occurred during the 1966 Buddhist "struggle" when a number of student leaders were tagged as Communist agents and when student and Buddhist communiqueés often took on a distinctly Communist cast. Some of these leaders

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later "defected" to the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, a Communist urban front group which surfaced during the 1968 Tet offensive.

Several of the students whose arrests last March set off the latest wave of student protests are alleged to be Communist agents, but the evidence still appears inconclusive. The most prominent among them is Huynh Tan Mam who was serving at the time as acting president of the SSU.

Finally, for most of the past decade the universities have served upper class youths as a refuge from military conscription. Few of them are apparently eager to get too far out of line or to allow their studies to lapse to the extent that they risk loss of deferments.

Past Student Protest Activity

Student protest activity has usually erupted only in periods when discontent was widespread elsewhere in the society and students have yet to act as a vanguard for drawing attention to inequities or the need for change. This is partly because the bulk of university students in South Vietnam tend to be conservative and, while antiwar, are reluctant to serve Communist purposes. Like most Vietnamese intellectuals, however, they tend to be antigovernment.

In their first major venture into the political arena in 1963, students from Saigon and Hue Universities joined in an already burgeoning campaign spearheaded by Buddhist monks against the Diem government. The ostensible issue was religious discrimination, but the actual issue was political repression. Eventually widespread resentment by the military against the regime and its tactics led to its overthrow.

After their first taste of street agitation against authority, students were quick to sense and protest dictatorial tendencies in the government run by General Nguyen Khanh which ousted the military

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junta that had replaced Diem. Many students were again susceptible to the influence of the Buddhists, who saw in Khanh a Thermidorian reaction that would unleash Catholic revenge. Throughout 1964, there was repeated violence in Saigon between Buddhist and Catholic youth and strident radicalism in Hue and other northern cities. Buddhist-oriented students and professors purged Hue University of residual Catholic influence, denounced military rule in Saigon, and attempted to set up semiautonomous local civilian councils which quickly lent themselves to Communist exploitation. This movement, with its anti-war and anti-American overtones, sputtered out largely because the Buddhists were forced to repudiate it.

Student political involvement quieted down early in 1965 when a new military directorate, with Thieu as chief of state and Ky as premier, took control in Saigon. The calm was due not only to the new regime's initial efforts to cultivate students, which included breaking relations with France after several days of student anti-French depredations, but to the beginnings of massive US military intervention which stabilized the deteriorating military situation.

Antigovernment student protest activity probably reached its height of national organization during the 1966 Buddhist "struggle movement," a campaign which in fact merged a variety of deep-seated political tendencies--regional separatism, desires for more representative government, peace sentiment and anti-Americanism. Organizers of the campaign relied heavily on students from Hue University and local high schools, and gradually on students from Dalat, Saigon and elsewhere. Students demonstrated, propagandized, served as couriers, underwent paramilitary training, and even became "struggle" leaders. Some of the bitterness of present university and high school students against the government in Saigon probably stems from the Ky government's forcible suppression of the 1966 "struggle," especially in I Corps.

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From 1966 until early 1970, government crackdowns as well as government programs to engage student energies in more constructive channels, such as social welfare and rural development, generally kept student discontent under control. A contributing factor, however, almost certainly was the Communist Tet offensive against the cities in 1968 and its aftermath, which tended to solidify students for a time behind the government's programs.

Non-student elements in South Vietnam have frequently attempted to use students for their own political purposes, but their efforts have, for the most part, fallen short of what they had hoped to accomplish. During the most recent protests this spring, several significant groups supported the students, but the major decisions appear to have been made by student leaders themselves. Students have been clearly encouraged, however, by the support they received from opposition legislators, the militant An Quang Buddhists, and a major segment of the Saigon press.

Outlook

Student protest demonstrations in Saigon have abated for the time being and the great majority of high school and college students appear to have little appetite for engaging in further antigovernment activities. Nevertheless, leaders of some student factions have switched to longer-term objectives in the hope of perpetuating the movement. The leader of one small group, for example, reportedly hopes to gain popular sympathy for student protest activities by sending teams of students out to explain their objectives to the people. He and a few other leaders hope to turn the protests into a peace movement and to adopt a position of general opposition to the Thieu government for its alleged inability to solve political, social, or economic problems.

The success of such efforts will probably be closely tied to the performance of the Thieu government in the coming months. If the government is able to keep the lid on protests in general and to

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make some headway in dealing with pressing economic problems, students are likely to remain relatively quiet. If, on the other hand, the economic situation worsens and the government is faced with rising popular discontent and continued protests from a number of quarters, renewed mass student protests would appear quite likely.

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SOVIET UNION

Summary

Soviet officials express less concern over political dissent among youth than over youth's "apolitical attitudes. This "political apathy" contravenes the ideology of the Soviet regime, which defines every aspect of life in political terms and demands the active political support of all members of society. Moreover, the leadership seems to realize that what they choose to call "apathy" often represents absorption in less approved concerns, even with political questions of an unofficial nature.

As best it can be generalized, the attitude of Soviet youth is expressive of two aspects of its psychological condition, a mood of political pessimism and a preoccupation with personal discovery. The young suffer from disillusion with the political regime, despair over the possibility of working effectively through the political system, and lack of belief in any alternative to the system and its demands. At the same time, the young have been launched into a realm of individual discovery of personal values long repressed and of material comforts and pleasures long denied. While speaking with a Western journalist in Moscow, a young Soviet intellectual observed that for the past century in Russia every new generation has interested itself in something outside of itself: either revolution, or religion, or some special purity in relationships. Now, he said, for the first time members of the new generation, born about 1945, are interested above all in themselves.

The young in this regard, and also by their general acceptance of the basic elements of the social order, represent a force for stability. Interest in themselves, however, may grow into a desire to have the concerns of the young recognized within political councils. In early 1968 some young people joined a petition drive--the first organized, broadly based

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attempt at political action. There is little doubt that the young generation would make itself felt politically if controls were relaxed. How long the regime persists in its harsh enforcement of controls will in large measure determine whether the future holds evolutionary change or repression and violence.

For most of the young generation of the Soviet Union today, those roughly between the ages of 15 and 30, politics is keyed to the revelations of Stalin's crimes in 1956. The message of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress affected no group of Soviet people more than the young. It is the central cause of their disillusion with the Soviet regime, their alienation from the generation of their fathers, and their loss of purpose in national and world affairs.

Stalin's mystical and terrible image commanded the allegiance of the people more than could any ideology or principle itself. Then, in 1956, those who had written verses in grade school dedicated to Stalin's "glory" were told at Komsomol and party meetings that they had been duped. The desanctification of Stalin caused an emotional and political trauma. A God had slipped out of their universe, and the question remained: what can be believed?

The question went to the very heart of the regime's legitimacy. Young people wanted to know how the Communist Party had permitted the sway of such a tyrant for so many years, whether his tyranny was not the product of the system rather than of particular circumstances and an aberrant personality, and what guarantees there were against a repetition of such tyranny. Acknowledgement that these doubts persist twelve years after the "Secret Speech" can be found in the report of First Secretary I.I. Bodyul to the Plenum of the Moldavian Republic Party's Central Committee in May 1968. Among a catalogue of problems concerning ideological work with youth, Bodyul noted that an improper attitude of the young toward authority is compounded by a treatment of the Stalin question that does not adequately instill respect for "revolutionary veterans and leaders of our Party and

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State." The problem was not helped by the public disgrace, including charges of administrative misrule subjectivism, and "hare-brained schemes," heaped upon Khrushchev after his fall. According to its own history, the Party has been dominated during most of its years in power by a cunning demon and a willful bumpkin.

The doubts extend beyond the regime to the ideological foundations on which it rests. The revelations of evil have undermined the Russians' conception of themselves as the elect and their belief that they have a unique mission to remake the world that derive from the Revolution and their Communist scriptures, as well as from their earlier Slavophile traditions. Soviet intellectuals under Khrushchev were like missionaries without a mission. Furthermore, it will be difficult for them, and more so for the younger generation of intellectuals on whom the main burden will fall, to re-establish that mission.

The moral problems of guilt and sacrifices without justification have turned the young away from their elders and in upon themselves. "The campaign against the cult of personality," said one student, "did more than just unmask a dictator, it unmasked a whole generation." The only heroes that remain for the young are the survivors of the Siberian prison camps and a few writers of their grandfathers' generation. The camps are an obsession with the young. They collect the songs that have come out of the camps and their own poetry returns constantly to the subject. They respect writers such as Boris Pasternak, Ilya Ehrenburg, and A.T. Tvardovsky, who have dealt with the moral problems posed by the camps and questions of individual values and personal responsibility.

While de-Stalinization has been central to the disillusion of the young generation, other developments have aided the process. In general, the trend has been to discredit the official ideology and the policies that go with it by revealing the enormous gulf between theory and reality. The young generation has the advantage of a better education and a growing sophistication. In 1962 only 29 percent of the

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population in the appropriate age group was enrolled in general secondary schools. This percentage rose to 36 percent in 1964, and to an estimated 45 percent in 1966. Eight years of schooling are now compulsory, and the regime has the goal of universal 10-year education by 1970. In 1967-68, the total enrollment in higher educational institutions was 4,311,000--1,887,000 fulltime students, 654,000 in night schools, and 1,700,000 in correspondent courses.

The awareness of the young has also been expanded by increased contact with the West through the medium of Eastern Europe and directly through tourists, students and cultural exchanges, and foreign radio broadcasts. According to figures, the Soviet Union was visited in 1967 by 1.5 million tourists and 189 youth delegations. Student travelers to the USSR number 180,000 yearly, and 24,000 foreigners are enrolled in Soviet schools and colleges. The Soviets claim that 200,000 young Russians travel abroad every year, presumably for the most part to Eastern Europe on vacations, in delegations, or with the armed services. Delegation travel between the Soviet Union and East European countries, although based on careful selection and a programmed itinerary, can involve large groups. A Czechoslovak Cultural Festival traveled to the USSR in the spring of 1968 reportedly with 500 performers, and appeared in several important cities; 800 Soviet students went to Czechoslovakia in June for the Second Festival of Czech-Soviet Friendship.

Western literary works are translated (in 1966 Ionesco's *Rhinoceros* and Capote's *In Cold Blood*, for example) and reviewed in *Innostrannaya Literaturnaya* (Foreign Literature), a popular publication among students. *Za Rubezhom* (Abroad) is a Soviet magazine that reprints a broad range of articles from the Western press. The choice of Western newspapers on Moscow newsstands is limited to those published by Communist parties, and many of these disappeared after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Students seize what is available. An American exchange student remarks how students at Moscow State University used to rush down in the morning to get the British Communist Party's

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The Morning Star, the French Party's *L'Humanite*, and the Italian Party's *L'Unita*. They also bought papers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. *The Morning Star* was the first paper to inform Soviet students that Western Communists had condemned the trial of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. During the trial, copies of *The Star* and *L'Humanite* were snatched up immediately. The US exchange magazine, *Amerika*, is popular with students, but the number of copies put on sale does not meet the demand.

Most other information from abroad comes by foreign radiobroadcasts. Jamming of Radio Liberty was extended to other stations, including the VOA and the BBC, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the stations still appear to have an influence throughout the territories and among all the age groups of the Soviet Union. Nowhere is their influence greater than among students and intellectuals. Radio Liberty estimated that in 1967 40 percent of its audience in Communist countries was 30 years old or under and that another 28 percent was 31 to 40 years of age. The intelligentsia, including members of technical, scientific, or cultural professions and university students, comprised 58 percent of its audience. Soviet students report that foreign stations provide a chief source of information on events such as the defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, the trial of underground writers Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov, and unrest in Eastern Europe.

Attempts to ensure the ideological purity and zeal of this new generation have failed woefully, a fact attested to by the constant laments of officials. Some students in secondary schools and universities are plainly bored with the compulsory courses in ideology and party history, and with the study sessions on the same subjects conducted by the student youth organization, the Komsomol. There are reports that they converse, write letters, or sleep during classes, if they go at all. Excitement comes only when the students take to baiting the lecturer and to displaying what officials call their "snorting skepticism." At one institute, this note was handed to the propagandist

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presiding over a dispute on the theme "Communism and I": "I want to interrupt you. Who needs your primitive philosophy interlaced with little quotations--your examples so distant from real life?" Complained one party secretary: "Today's youth is certainly different from those...of ten or fifteen years back. They have a different level of knowledge, a different view of the world. They don't like trite and outdated forms of political work."

The lack of relevancy to their own lives is the primary cause of the indifference of youth, whether workers in factories with incomplete educations or graduate students at universities, to the doctrinal lessons of the Party. Belief in the party line is eroded by its own flip-flops and by a knowledge of alternative interpretations gained through studies or contact with the outside world. Finally, for the more sophisticated, it is increasingly clear that Marxism-Leninism simply cannot answer the changing and complex problems that challenge society in such fields as economics, science, and sociology.

The political pessimism of the young generation is fostered also by its exclusion from political processes. To some extent this is an exclusion traditional to the authoritarian government that Russia has always known. Many, however, had been able to experience in the early years after the Revolution a sense of being part of the great enterprises of the time; such feeling of participation has since been largely lost.

An American who spent most of the 1930s working in the Soviet Union at a mill in Magnitogorsk notes that his fellow workers used to talk of *our* mill, *our* government, and *our* Party, but now speak only of *the* mill, *the* government, and *the* Party. In the thirties, young people could plausibly identify plants as "theirs" because of the good chance of becoming executives while still very young. Now the plants are more complicated and more highly "organized"; controls are more pervasive. The same is true of the political institutions, including the Komsomol. An American describes the

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Komsomol of the 1930s as a vigorous organization with a largely voluntary membership whose activities, particularly at the factory level, were supported by large numbers of young people. There was an *esprit de corps*, a feeling of belonging to the elite. There was some spontaneity and not a little enthusiasm in the organization and its activities, even though everyone knew that the Komsomol was run by the Party.

Mass membership and stultifying bureaucratic control have killed off these feelings, and the enthusiasm of the few has been replaced by the apathy of the many. The Komsomol has some 27 million members, including most urban youths between the ages of 14 and 25, all those enrolled in school at those ages, and 80% of the army conscripts. In official eyes the purposes of the Komsomol are to monopolize the field and prevent any other spontaneous youth organizations from springing up, to organize youth for "voluntary" participation in construction jobs in remote areas of the country as well as production campaigns nearer home, and to cajole, inspire, persuade, or force Soviet youth into absorbing Marxism-Leninism and becoming loyal servants of the Party. A huge bureaucracy, including many paid functionaries, has grown up to enforce the Komsomol's program. Leadership in the Komsomol appeals mostly to the very naive or to the would-be party careerists. Most young people keep their distance from those who take these positions, and they especially despise the *druzhinniki*, the volunteer auxiliary police, whose duty is to maintain a "revolutionary" discipline among the young and to fight against Western cultural influences.

Soviet leaders in recent years have brought the Komsomol under even stricter party control. The present head of the Komsomol, Yevgeny Tyazhelnikov, is 43 years old. As a provincial party functionary, he was imposed upon the Komsomol in June 1968 in violation of its statutes requiring election of its first secretary from among members of its Central Committee. A party decree the month before had demanded that party organizations exercise greater control over Komsomol activities and that party membership in the Komsomol be strengthened. At the Komsomol Congress

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in May 1970 Tyazhelnikov was able to report that since 1966 the number of secretaries of primary Komsomol organizations who are also party members had risen from 14.7% to 32.5%.

The young fully understand the power of the authorities and their own helplessness. Innocent attempts to form groups outside the control of the party as well as more purposeful attempts to demonstrate or petition authorities are quickly suppressed and have disastrous results for those involved. Simple dismissal from a university, for example, can mean banishment from cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, and the loss of any chance for more than a work-a-day career. Outward conformity is thus the rule. Moreover, it is the response encouraged by the entire educational system, which is based on theories that stress the importance of the conscious in human control and the ability to manipulate it while scoffing at the subjective aspects of human behavior.

In short, it is precisely this emphasis on the political (and political sanctions) and the state's monopoly on the exercise of political power that has caused the young to turn their backs on official politics. Common responses by young people to questions of national or foreign policy are, "That's a political question," and "They will decide it." Most of all they wish to be left alone, free to occupy themselves in activities of personal interest and to have politics intrude as little as possible. Finally, the political pessimism of youth is induced by the absence, in their opinion, of any attractive alternative to the present social order. If the regime has not been able to rear a generation full of ideological fervor and the conviction that they live in the best of all possible worlds, it has accomplished something equally, if not more, important to the stability of society--the rearing of a generation that does not seriously question the basic elements of the social system. There seems to be no significant body of opinion among the young that would favor scrapping collectivized farming, the de-nationalization of industry, alteration of the welfare state, political independence for the nationalities, or, even, an end to generally centralized

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and authoritarian government.

There is a relationship between boredom and acceptance in the attitudes of youth toward the government and its policies. When an American exchange student remarked to a Soviet friend how little *Pravda* was read by students at Moscow University, he was warned not to leap to the wrong conclusions. "*Pravda* is a dull, pompous paper full of propaganda," said his friend, "and you must read our more serious journals to get a more objective view. But that doesn't mean that Soviet people don't believe a lot of what's printed in *Pravda*. They simply don't like to wade through all of it every day. It's as if you had to read a Fourth of July oration every morning. You'd be bored, but you'd accept most of it."

The young do not want to have anything to do with capitalism, despite all that attracts them about the West. Although well aware of the high standard of living of the American worker, they are convinced that Soviet workers enjoy, for example, better and fairer medical care through their state health service. Although they will admit that full employment in the Soviet Union is achieved in many instances by underemployment, they believe that this is better than no employment at all for a segment of the population. Students cannot conceive of the private or otherwise haphazard means that an American must employ to finance his college education.

In thinking about an alternative to basic elements of the social order, the Soviet youth is hampered, of course, by inhibitions in his mental process, by unfamiliarity with modern developments in the disciplines of political, social, and economic sciences, and by ignorance of real conditions in the rest of the world. The catechism taught in the school does not encourage creative thinking along political lines, the social science disciplines remain at a woefully primitive level by Western standards, and the many barriers maintained against the flow of information from the West obscure a person's vision. Thus, a student may mock his "choice" when it comes time to vote in an

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election. But when he replies to a question by an American about the two-party system with the observation that the system is meaningless in the US because both parties represent the ruling class and that it would be purposeless in the USSR because one party already stands for all that could be desired, he is, in addition to repeating the party line, probably also presenting the only understanding that he has of the subject.

Whether it derives from indoctrination, moderate satisfaction, or ignorance, the acceptance by the current youthful generation of the basic elements of Soviet society has profound implications for the future, far more so than the generation's present disaffection from political processes. It indicates that whatever political turmoil arises from this generation will be directed at modifying the system and will not be an attack on its essential features.

Awakening Interests

In frustration over political issues, the young have tended to withdraw into more personal worlds. This flight has been encouraged by the lifting of Stalinism and the consequent awakening of concerns long repressed in Soviet life. The "socialist morality" of their parents discredited, the students have undertaken a search for more personal, humanistic ethics. The fact that their parents made enormous sacrifices, often to no good end, has engendered among youth no gratefulness or desire of imitation, but, rather, an insistence that a better and more just life must be had in the here and now even at the cost of ignoring ideology and distant goals.

Rare is a young Soviet who accepts his low position in society, who is not trying his desperate best to struggle up the stairs. There is often acute embarrassment among the lower classes over their humble status. The young display an aversion to physical labor and have a clear idea of what constitutes "dirty work." A 25-year-old worker, in his fifth year of correspondence courses at a technical institute, bluntly admitted: "I am studying only because I don't

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want to be walking around in dirt and swinging a sledge hammer forever.... I am tired of being shoved around, of being assigned dirty work. So much easier to command others." "To know how to live" (*umet' zhit'* , a favorite expression of Soviet citizens "on the make") means to achieve status, a comfortable home, a car, and other tangible symbols.

The results of this attitude are the flight of young people from the farms; conniving to be allowed to live in the major urban centers, especially Moscow; fierce competition for admission to universities, especially those of great prestige; and widespread study in technical schools, by correspondence or on a part-time basis if necessary. These efforts, whether undertaken by workers in the factory or graduate students at the university, are directed toward achieving competence in science or engineering, fields that offer the greatest prestige, remuneration, and freedom from politics on the job. To the extent that mobility remains possible, the competition is open and just, and talent and work receive their reward, this "rat race" effectively channels the energies of the young and, to a considerable extent, satisfies their ambitions.

Frustrations arise, however, because of several flaws in the system. Entrance into institutions of higher education is a highly competitive process. In 1965 there were vacancies in higher educational institutions for 20 percent of the appropriate age group in the Soviet Union (39 percent in the US, 14 percent in France, 7 percent in Denmark, and 7 percent in West Germany). For some of the more prestigious Soviet institutions there were as many as 26 applicants for one vacancy. The competition is intensified by the popularity of certain courses, and many applicants have to accept positions in the social sciences, or, worst of all, in agricultural sciences. In addition, the fairness of the competition is undermined by the influence the party, government, and intellectual elite are able to wield on behalf of their children. The situation is the subject of many complaints and the cause of much bitterness.

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Even for those who are admitted to the university and are awarded a diploma, happiness does not necessarily follow. There is a general dislike of the three years compulsory service that awaits every graduate of an institute of higher education. Often the assignments take students out into the provinces and involve work which they feel is inappropriate to their training. There is universal conniving by students and their parents to avoid the worst hazards of the system. Those who graduate in the less favored fields find that their pay is low and prospects for raises unpromising. Even engineers complain that their superiors assign them to dirty work in the plant instead of the administrative or research work in clean offices they think they deserve.

Many, of course, are excluded from higher education by their lack of talents, ambition, or "pull." Those who must work find themselves bored with dull jobs in the factories without recreational facilities and amusements after work. These young people soon begin to contribute to the drunkenness and hooliganism that plagues the regime. A growing number of youths from better families do not have to work and can live off the affluence of their parents. These the regime rails against as "idlers," and they are apparently another source of crime and unapproved behavior.

Beyond their preoccupation with material wants and career advancement, Soviet youth are involved with the rediscovery of themselves as individuals. Throughout society, but most strongly among the youth, there is a growing and self-conscious return of the repressed--a rediscovery of the personality denied during the long night of Stalinism. The values of individualism of questioning, of the religious spirit, of the ethical personality, of human relationships transcending party comradeship are returning to the Soviet psyche.

Youth's fascination with things Western--clothes, gadgets, music, slang--and their attempts to imitate Western styles are apparent efforts to break out of

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the impersonal mold decreed by the authorities and to assert their individuality. They appear to be trying to create something of a youth culture similar to those that adorn Western societies, but which has been long impeded in the USSR by the Party's control over youth organizations and dictation of behavior. Similar urgings probably account for the popularity of the poll or questionnaire which has enjoyed great vogue in the pages of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. The polls offer anonymity and an opportunity to speak one's mind not available at official gatherings, where conformity is the rule.

The concerns of youth are reflected by their cultural tastes. Two of the most talked about recent films at the universities were *Twelve Angry Men* and *Inherit the Wind*, in which the individual was shown in conflict with the collectivity, and in which the collectivity turned out to have been wrong. "Surprisingly, the most popular and respected writer among the general public is Somerset Maugham," notes the radical Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov. Above all, the Soviet reader finds himself fascinated by such of Maugham's heroes as Strickland in *The Moon and Sixpence*, who forsakes bourgeois society for the "heavenly beauty" of Tahiti, "still yet untrampled by the iron heel of civilization." An American professor who spent some time at a leading Soviet university noted that Salinger was popular and that in the fall of 1964 everybody suddenly discovered Kafka, whose works had been banned until the early 1960's. It was too early, however, for students to grasp all the implications of the worlds of Salinger and Kafka in terms of their own society. Nikolai Berdyaev and Mikhail Bulgakov (*Master and Margarita*) are the most popular Russian authors. Bulgakov, a brilliant playwright and novelist of the 20's and 30's, died in disgrace in 1940. Some of his works were finally revived in 1966. There is a crush to get into lectures on Bulgakov, whose biting satire, flights of the absurd, and Stalin parodies are widely appreciated. The popularity of Berdyaev (1874-1948), one of the foremost representatives of "Christian existentialism," and of his message concerning the world of the spirit

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and the creativity of the individual indicates the survival of religious values.

One of the most striking failures of the regime has been its inability to instill a fighting atheism among youth. Atheism is a satisfying creed so long as one fights *l'infame*, an oppressive clerical organization. But when *l'infame* is gone, and one simply has one's irreligion to live by, a certain disaffection arises with atheism, along with a distaste for its dogmatism. The result is an evolution toward a kind of religious agnosticism. There are reports of growing numbers of young people attending religious services, apparently more out of curiosity and for the atmosphere than out of belief. At the same time students do admit to their own or their friends' religious beliefs. Religious urgings are felt perhaps more strongly among the working class. The Baptists have gained since the end of the Second World War.

Much of the interest in religion stems from a potent nationalism not connected with the Soviet experience. Among Russian youths such nationalism expresses itself in a fascination with prerevolutionary Russian history and culture. A citizens' group devoted to restoring architectural monuments of Old Russia received publicity in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* during 1965. Youths from all over the Russian Republic, in a rare example of voluntary endeavor, enlisted in projects to restore and preserve old churches. The Party seems to have been taken aback by the mass appeal of the movement, for it quickly subsided, suggesting official displeasure.

Perhaps as a by-product of the movement, a band of conservative writers undertook in the late 1960's to propagate an anti-modern, anti-urban nationalism that seemed to draw upon 19th century Slavophilism. Arguing that the Russian spirit was vanishing from the cities due to modernism and foreign influences, they extolled the Russian village and peasant as the still valid source of Russian national character.

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Such a philosophy is, of course, un-Marxist, and it has evoked criticism from orthodox writers and ideologists. How great a response it finds among the young is not known. Its champions, however, are grouped around the Komsomol monthly Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guards).

Nationalistic feelings are evident among most of the minority groups of the USSR. Here, however, they take on a more serious anti-Russian character. Non-Russian youths, like their Russian counterparts, are annoyed by the bureaucratic control imposed on every aspect of their lives. But precisely because this control comes from Moscow, they resent it all the more and speak of it as Russian-made. In Georgia a graduate student and a young playwright, angered by their inability to obtain Moscow's approval for a subscription to the London Times, complained: "Why should Moscow decide everything?" and "These Russians are impossible. They want everybody to be like them and what Georgian wants to be like a Russian?" Greater bitterness is engendered by Moscow's official policy of Russification. Pamphlets and leaflets circulate in the Ukraine filled with hostility over the educational and job favoritism shown Russians and the discrimination against the Ukrainian language enforced in the fields of education, publication, and official usage.

Among the cultural intelligentsia of the nationalities, the struggle to transcend the confines of "socialist realism" dictated by the Party is combined with an effort to play up the national heritage and patriotic feelings, which results in both an anti-Soviet and an anti-Russian literature. Champions of this cause in the Ukraine during the early 1960's were a group of young poets, prose writers, and literary critics who became well known as the *shestidesyatnyky*, The Men of the Sixties. The mood of protest is also apparent in demonstrations that frequently occur on the birthday of Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth century national hero in the Ukraine.

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Soviet youth have elaborated no well-defined philosophy behind which they can rally a majority of their number. Their opinions, however, contain common elements which suggest a basic similarity of outlook. An American exchange student came to the conclusion that the majority wanted "a more humane, more democratic, more efficient Communism, which would live up to its own promises, obey its own strictures, and abide by its own constitution." The suggestion that there should be more than one party, made to a Communist official at a Moscow University meeting, startled students in the audience who replied: "Don't ask ridiculous questions. Don't be naive." The American student found that Kosygin is particularly respected because of his frankness in admitting the need for economic reforms and his caution in predicting future achievements--in contrast to Khrushchev.

The outlook of students varies, of course, most generally in accordance with field of study and geographic location. Progressives are more prevalent in the physical and mathematical sciences, which admit the brighter individuals and offer greater freedom of inquiry. Progressives may also be found in some of the humanities and in recently rejuvenated sciences, such as sociology, cybernetics, mathematical logic, and genetics. In general, the youth one meets in the provinces are more conservative and cautious than those in Moscow and Leningrad, while the Komsomol activists are more strident and dogmatic. Scientific universities and institutes at such provincial cities as Novosibirsk and Dubna, however, are centers of more liberal thinking. Radicalism at Kiev, Lvov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Yerevan is linked to nationalism.

Any attempts by the young to influence government policy are hampered not only by the vagueness of their political concepts, but also by their lack of organization, leadership, and plan of action. Reports of clandestine organizations, whether devoted to the study of Berdyaev or to terrorist activity, indicate that they are easily broken up by authorities

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before they can achieve much even organizationally.

Perhaps the most successful sustained activity conducted without official sanction has been the underground circulation of unpublished literary works and political tracts. For years such materials, written by prominent intellectual figures as well as by budding artists, have been passed around and recopied individually or gathered together and printed in various underground magazines. The magazines appear to be the product of loosely knit groups of young nonconformist intellectuals such as the well publicized SMOG group in Moscow. (The initials in Russian stand for "courage, youth, form, depth.") Official crackdowns on traffickers in this trade have failed to stop it. The American exchange student said "everybody" at Moscow University reads the underground literature, although he knew of no one who would acknowledge membership in any underground group such as SMOG. It may be assumed that this traffic, by providing a means of communication and a common enterprise, helps to foster a feeling of community among the young of nonconformist leanings.

In some ways it was out of this situation that an open and, by Soviet standards, widely supported confrontation between young people and the authorities developed in 1968. The widely reported trials of the past four years have been conducted against writers connected with the literary underground who sent materials abroad for publication: Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 and Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov in 1968. The first trial aroused general disapproval among the young, but no unified response. By the time of the second trial in January 1968, however, a form of protest was being elaborated and was gaining wide support. Its substance was a protest against the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the proceedings and a warning of the dangers of a return to Stalinism. Petitions were sent to government and party officials and passed to the West for publicity. The movement seems to have developed out of the trial in

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August 1967 of a demonstration leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, who pleaded the constitutional right to demonstrate and to criticize the government. Before the trial in January, some prominent intellectuals circulated a petition calling for open and legal proceedings, and at the trial a few perennial agitators audaciously distributed ringing declarations to the Western newsmen.

Within two months after the trial at least 17 documents had reached the West containing the names of over 300 signers. At least 10 of the signers were intellectuals of national stature whose names would be recognized at once by the man in the street. Another twenty or more would probably be recognized by other intellectuals. Otherwise, large numbers of the signers were students and young teachers, researchers, and engineers. The majority were from Moscow, but Leningrad, Magadan, Kharkov, Dubna, and Novosibirsk were also represented. An appeal on behalf of the rights of man was presented to the Budapest consultative conference of Communist parties in February.

The petition episode indicated the willingness of youth to enter political battle. For the first time an open, spontaneous movement was able to attract support among various elements of youth and the intelligentsia and to gain a life and momentum of its own. Motivation came not so much out of sympathy for the accused as out of an emotional reaction to the repressive turn of government policy and to the specter of Stalinism reborn. Demands and tactics were elaborated that could unite many groups and that seemed to have some chance of success in influencing the political powers.

Regime's Response

By Western standards, it is difficult to explain the regime's anxiety over the condition of Soviet youth. The distress is apparently a measure of what the regime thinks it owes to ideology as a justification of its rule. Implicit in the indifference and personal preoccupations of youth

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is a protest against the official order. The regime seems to fear that even the small demands for change that may arise out of such attitudes will work in the long run to undermine the fundamentals of the system and the prophecy of its doctrine. A totalitarian system regards any erosion, however small, as being of cosmic significance. Furthermore, Communists, always future-minded, are determined not to leave the development of their doctrine either to chance or to objective laws. Important, finally, is the character of the collective leadership that now rules in the Kremlin and the conservative bent of their personalities.

A small but positive demonstration of official concern was the creation in December 1968 of standing commissions on youth affairs in both houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They were commissioned to draft legislation on the education, vocational training, work, and recreation of young people. Nevertheless, the more characteristic response of the regime to the defects it detects among the young generation has been heavier doses of ideological indoctrination and more police control.

One official explanation for the shortcomings of youth argues that, because they have not suffered the hardships and struggles of past generations, they are not sufficiently appreciative of past achievements of the Soviet Union and have unwarranted expectations for the present and future. This official analysis lies behind the patriotic campaign launched in 1965 and directed specifically to the Soviet period of history. During the year 10 million youngsters allegedly visited battlefields, talked with old Bolsheviks and war heroes, and gathered materials for local patriotic museums. In August 1966, thousands of youngsters marched in Moscow with World War II weapons to climax the affair. The theme was, nevertheless, continued in saturation portions during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Revolution in 1967 and of the Komsomol in 1968.

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A series of measures has been taken since 1965 to improve the ideological training of the young. The role of the Komsomol has been expanded and repeatedly underlined in official pronouncements. In 1966 the entire system of ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism was revised to put more stress on reading the "classics" rather than secondary sources. There is growing emphasis in military training on improving political discipline and attitudes. A new military law that went into effect in January 1968 makes premilitary training compulsory for all Soviet males under the age of 18 and, by shortening the length of military service, assures that nearly all young men will experience the ideological benefits of service in the armed forces.

Most recently, apparently under the influence of events in Eastern Europe, the role of the West in subverting Soviet youths has received special attention. Official pronouncements have named the young and politically immature as the special target of Western propaganda and have complained of Western attempts to split the generations by theories that replace the class struggle with the struggle between generations. The efforts to promote ideological purity and to root out any bourgeois tendencies were focused on the young in a series of nationwide youth and teachers' meetings during the spring of 1968, after the Central Committee plenum decreed an ideological crackdown in April.

Where preaching has not been successful, the regime has not hesitated to employ the police. In July 1966 the internal police administration was re-centralized in a new national Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP) to deal *inter alia* with the problem of hooliganism. The same decree also strengthened the hand of the police in dealing with youthful criminals and specified harsher penalties for common crimes such as disturbing the peace and assault. Simultaneously, pressure was brought to bear through the press against those factories, farms, and other institutions which seek to protect members of their collectives who have fallen afoul

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of the law, and judges were urged to levy sterner sentences in cases of hooliganism. In November 1968, MOOP was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a title that recalls Stalinist repression, and additional measures were announced to strengthen the police forces.

Dissidents of a more intellectual cast have suffered a series of trials and sentences to prison camps. Over twenty Ukrainian intellectuals were tried in various cities beginning in 1965. Their activities apparently involved the circulation of underground literature and materials that branded them as nationalists in the eyes of the authorities. Censorship has been applied with an increasingly heavy hand since the ouster of Khrushchev and has been backed up by prosecution of writers who circulated materials surreptitiously or passed them to the West. Protests over these proceedings have been met by official demands for recantations, denial of privileges such as trips to the US and showings of modern art, and dismissal from professional and Party positions.

Authorities, finally, have sought to limit contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The vigilance campaign has stressed that all visitors from the West are potential spies and subversives. Newsmen from Communist and non-Communist countries were warned in early 1968 against unauthorized contacts with Soviet citizens. Similar warnings to Soviet citizens have practically dried up the American Embassy's contacts with young intellectuals. A Polish cultural counselor in Moscow complained that relations between Poland and the USSR in the fields of music, sculpture, and the theater had dwindled to almost nothing.

Two things may be noted concerning the tactics of repression: they are aimed across the board at intelligentsia, young and old, and they are designed to keep the symbols involved smaller than the message conveyed. These characteristics are well illustrated by the case of Ginsburg and Galanskov. The regime chose to move against younger dissidents, of little prominence, involved in the not entirely honorable

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business of smuggling written material to the West, on charges of subversive activities in collusion with an "enemy" emigre organization. All these factors limited the appeal of their case among the population at large. Protests were nevertheless heard, but they were confined to questions of legal procedures. The trial, however, was understood by all segments of the intelligentsia as a signal to maintain strict discipline in their own profession or activity. The regime reacted to the protestors most often, but not exclusively, with administrative measures and penalties. It is evident that students are the target, not of a particular policy of repression, but of a general policy. While this fact works to unite the generations of intellectuals and youths, so far this has been a unity in weakness. There has been no repetition of students assaulting authority in the streets while professors in the conference room stay the hand of authorities, such as occurs in other countries, both Communist and non-Communist. The authorities' hand will not be stayed.

By April 1968 the petition offensive had halted. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the completeness of the rout of the dissenters became more clear. In a sense the invasion was the sort of ultimate consequence that the narrower and legalistic protests had been designed to forestall. In the face of this actuality, the majority have stuck to silence. Two of the best known leaders of previous protests, Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Stalin's foreign minister, and Larisa Daniel, former wife of Yuly Daniel, organized a small demonstration against the invasion on Red Square on 25 August. They were promptly arrested and in October sentenced to exile. While the trial was occasioned by outspoken denunciations and political arguments on the street outside the court, little attempt was made to put objections on paper for the record. At this point the dissaffected young seem to be overcome by the realization of the futility of their efforts and fear of the penalties that their continuation will likely provoke. As they have fallen into muteness the regime also since 1968 seems to have relaxed its attention to the problem.

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Prospects

As a whole, the young generation in the Soviet Union is not out to force sweeping changes in the Soviet system. This does not mean that they are pillars of the status quo or that the modifications they may encourage will not in the long run produce some fundamental changes. But their role will likely be an evolutionary one--one of reform, rather than revolution.

Pressure exists, however, to carry this role onto the political stage. This is a natural consequence of the conditions, the disillusionment with the political regime and its ideology and the development of personal ethics and concerns, that led originally to a withdrawal to the wings. Organized political activity on the part of the young showed its first stirrings in the petition drive of 1928. Its realization if obstructed now only by the repressive power of the regime. Political action by the young, therefore, will have to wait until there is either a change in regime policies, the appearance of a faction within the leadership willing to champion the cause of the young, or a weakening of governmental authority until it can no longer hold off the young.

The likelihood of such transformations occurring behind the Kremlin Wall is a matter of speculation. The regime, however, is running some definite risks by its current heavy-handed exercise of power. Compromise with the young generation and their assimilation into the power structure becomes more difficult. There is the danger than under present conditions pressures may build and antagonisms may fester to the point where they may carry the ranks of youth to extremes of action far beyond their essentially conservative concepts. The current leadership's policy of retrenchment, following a period of compromise and hope, has already sharpened the urgency felt by many for guarantees and reforms.

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SPAIN

Summary

Student demonstrations began over a decade ago in an effort to gain recognition for autonomous student organizations to replace the government-controlled student syndicate and to promote university reforms. During the 1967-1968 academic year, the demonstrations took a political turn when protests against the Franco regime itself were added. The government reacted by closing the universities involved for varying periods, arresting students, and using the police to put down the demonstrations. Police violence, however, only led to usually apathetic students joining the demonstrations. The threat of loss of academic credits if the university remained closed temporarily cooled the students' enthusiasm, but after new demonstrations in January 1969, the government closed indefinitely the universities of Madrid and Barcelona and declared a state of emergency to give police added power to head off rising student and political unrest. After arrests of some students, professors, and others, the situation quieted, and the government reopened the universities of Madrid and Barcelona and lifted the state of emergency. Warnings that the universities would be closed again and the presence of police agents on the campus have reduced protests during the past year. More protests are likely if the educational reforms which the government has announced are delayed too long in being implemented.

Background

The current unrest in Spanish universities goes back more than a decade when students began to agitate for reforms in the official student organization and then for organizations of their own. By 1963 the movement to break away from the constraints of the official student syndicate was well under way. Illegal student organizations of various political colorations were formed, and student demonstrations and strikes were conducted. The regime

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responded by imposing academic sanctions and by some use of the armed police.

In 1965 the government transferred disciplinary control of the University of Madrid from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of the Interior. The expulsion of four professors for taking part in a student demonstration, the closing of some schools, the occasional use of military courts to try arrested students, generally stiff civil penalties, and the regime's obvious unwillingness to meet all but minimal student requests slowly opened the way for the student protests to take on political ramifications. Antiregime attacks, especially in the more important universities in Madrid and Barcelona, followed.

In 1967-1968, demonstrations, now supported by growing numbers of students, perhaps sometimes as many as one thousand, were prolonged and intensified by the brutal tactics of the police, especially in Madrid and Barcelona. The students shouted anti-Franco slogans, and a bust of Franco was defiled. The demonstrations became so violent that the government closed the University of Madrid several times, and various university officials resigned in protest over police tactics. Barcelona had similar demonstrations, and the eleven other major universities had protests also, although on a lesser scale.

A new minister of education was appointed in April 1968, and an agreement was worked out to keep the police off the campus unless summoned. These reforms, however, were not enough. Student demonstrations began again in December over dissatisfaction with the university authorities, the government, and the police. Fearing an increase in violence, in January 1969 the authorities closed indefinitely the universities of Madrid and Barcelona. The government also proclaimed a state of emergency, suspending certain civil rights in order to permit the police more easily to control student and political discontent. Some students were among the approximately 1,000 persons arrested, and many were later released. But about 35 individuals, including at least 17 intellectuals and professors, were deported to remote

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Spanish provinces for the duration of the state of emergency.

Government sources said that the authorities wanted to avoid a crisis such as occurred in France in May 1968. The arrest of a number of students and young professors--most of whom were later released--brought a halt to disruptive student agitation so that in early March the universities of Madrid and Barcelona were reopened and the state of emergency was lifted one month earlier than decreed. Taking a hard line against dissenters, the government placed police and security agents in the universities and announced that the universities would be closed again if disturbances were resumed. This policy has been effective in reducing protests, and for the past year there have been only occasional protests, largely in the form of boycotting classes in support of university reform. Further protests are likely if the government moves too slowly in getting under way with a sweeping reform of the educational system, which is now before the Spanish parliament.

Objectives

In addition to free student associations, the students want university reforms to correct the problems of overcrowded classrooms, the system of life-tenure chairs filled by professors who are rarely seen by their students, lack of a student voice in university councils, and too little student-professor contact. On the international level, students have protested the presence of US military bases in Spain and the US role in the Vietnam war. The students are not seeking power for themselves, but do hope to help bring about radical change and, in some instances, the destruction of existing practices.

Groups Involved

The old picture of the average university student as an apathetic individual who takes to the streets only when urged on by a tiny minority of activists is being modified. The regime's recalcitr-

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trance and repression have brought a growing realization that a considerable number of students are demanding reforms. In the last few years, activists have appeared from extreme right-wing groups, moderate, democratically oriented groups, Social Christian groups, Social Democrats, Socialists, Marxists, Communists of all persuasions, and anarchists. Although official Spanish sources maintain that at the University of Madrid, for example, only about 200 students form the nucleus of the troublemakers, many more students have appeared willing to join the demonstrations.

International organization does not play an active part in Spanish student outbursts, but a sense of fraternity with rebellious students elsewhere in Europe is growing and contacts with French students have been made. These links are giving concern to the Spanish Government, which has taken steps to monitor and limit contacts. So far there has been very little cooperation between student and labor organizations. The fact that most university students are from the upper classes has made difficult the establishment of close relations with the workers.

Government Reforms

In May 1968, the government approved a decree aimed at urgent reform of the university structure. Key measures include the creation of new universities in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, new polytechnic centers in Barcelona and Valencia, and new schools in several other universities. New facilities, additional professors, and scholarships were announced, and limited student associations are to be permitted.

These immediate measures were followed in February 1969 by a comprehensive plan for a complete reorganization of Spain's educational system, which was presented for consideration by the parliament. The provisions for new facilities and modernization of the system using innovations generally modelled on practices in the United States are so sweeping and expensive that the proposals are likely to be considerably watered down by the parliament.

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Given the rapid politicization of students, the moves toward university reform may have come too late to prevent further trouble. Several years may well elapse before any meaningful progress toward meeting the problems of students can be made. Thus the chances of renewed student unrest are high. But the regime's readiness to use extreme measures to control the situation may reduce the level of overt student demonstrations.

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TURKEY

Summary

Youth became a potent force in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and reached their zenith during April 1960 in the antigovernment demonstrations that opened the way for the military revolution the next month. Turkish youth are well-organized, although not united, and have a high degree of political awareness. They have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to take their cause--whether local, national, or international--into the streets.

In general, the young intellectual elite is sanctioned through government subsidization and is consequently subject to a degree of government control. Politicians of both the left and right, of both government and opposition, and incipient subversive elements all make overtures to the "Young Turks" in the hope of attracting their support.

Nature and Scope of Youth Activism in Turkey

For nearly four decades--1923 to 1960--the Republic of Turkey maintained its independence under relatively stable civilian government and also moved constructively, if somewhat sporadically, in the direction of economic, social, and political modernization. There were no coups and only one major domestic eruption--the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in 1955, which were apparently government inspired. Students per se were not a major factor, although youth certainly played an important role before the rabble took over, and virtually all Turks now regard this event as a blemish on Turkish history.

Nonetheless, Turkish youth frequently have been an element of dissidence. They have used public rallies--usually in Istanbul or in Ankara--and fiery speeches, followed by attempted marches on the centers of government or to embassies and consulates, to make known their grievances.

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Student dissidence in Turkey, as in many countries, was first focused primarily on the deficiencies of the educational system itself. Many of their criticisms and demands are justified and have been acknowledged by the government, which has launched a long-range program to bring about needed reforms.

In 1969 and early 1970, student activism--largely under leftist influence--turned to political and ideological goals, including a major campaign against Turkey's membership in NATO and the US presence in Turkey. Much of this appeared as an indirect assault on the Justice Party regime headed by Prime Minister Demirel, inasmuch as direct political action would have invited a legal response against the leaders of the movement. First the left-of-center, and more recently the radical left, gained predominance in the student movement, or at least the highly vocal segment of it. With the approach of national elections in October 1969, there were reports that the radical student left planned to launch a campaign designed to disrupt the country and prevent the elections, with the ultimate goal of provoking a military take-over. This plan reportedly was later abandoned or at least postponed.

Meanwhile, student activism not only moved further left but also became more violent. Leftist students were believed to be under the influence of ultranationalists such as the National Movement Party (NMP) leader, ex-Colonel Alpaslan Turkes.

The national elections in October 1969 took place with no known student interference and returned the Justice Party to office. Afterward, the tempo of clashes between left and right extremists increased and were marked by greater violence, which gave the radical left their martyrs. This trend led to more boycotts on the campuses and eventually closed down practically every school of higher learning in Turkey. Student forums and conferences were organized against foreign investment in Turkey, primarily US, which in turn led to demonstrations and attacks on American property until the security forces took a firmer hand in the late Spring of 1970.

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A new and dangerous factor entered the equation in early 1970 when a dozen or more young extremists were arrested in southern Turkey and admitted to having been trained and armed for sabotage by Arab guerrillas, their targets being US and Israeli installations. The full extent of recruitment and training is not known, but other groups are alleged to be training in nearby Syria for later assignment to targets in Turkey.

Student activism has become increasingly militant in 1970, with numerous clashes between various groups, often armed with a variety of weapons including clubs, hand guns, and fire bombs. Several students have been killed and numerous others have been wounded. Property damage has not been excessive, but there have been some near misses.

The increased violence and political overtones of student radicals prompted the Turkish National Security Council--comprised of the chief of staff, some of the top military leaders, and several cabinet ministers--to publish a strong warning in late March 1970, in effect warning university students to "cool it" or face strict security measures. To back up the warning, the government has instructed the gendarmerie and the army to be ready to play a stronger role in controlling unruly student demonstrations. In April 1970, right- and left-wing students fought a pitched battle with guns, knives, and fire bombs on the campus of Istanbul University. The fighting was contained on the campus, and the university was closed indefinitely.

University Conditions

The quality and, indeed, the quantity of institutions of higher learning, especially the universities, have failed to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing society, particularly since the end of World War II. These changes have included rapid population growth, increasing contacts with foreign countries, extensive foreign economic input which has brought the economy almost to the "take-off point," the spread of literacy

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and urbanization, and the growth of the middle and working classes. A social-cultural lag has led to tensions among all elements of society but especially among the youth. These tensions are aggravated by the growing disparity between the need of a rapidly developing society for highly trained manpower, and the limited number of qualified graduates from schools, colleges, and universities. Another source of tension is the limited number of universities and technical colleges available to the swelling ranks of lycee graduates.

In recent years, only about one third of the qualified lycee graduates have been able to enter college or the universities. Other student grievances, some of which surfaced in the June 1966 student boycott and sit-in, have been the badly overweighted pupil-teacher ratio (many university lecture classes have over 1,000 students, many regular classes have 50 students, some laboratory classes have as many as six working together on the same experiment); overcrowded classrooms; lack of text books, stereo-typed lectures, poor testing programs, virtually no chance for personal attention by members of the faculty, accompanied by a serious "brain-drain" of those students who graduate.

It is difficult to gain admission to a Turkish university because of space, quotas, entrance examinations, and lack of housing. Once admitted, the chances of graduating are slim. While the students, and would-be students, contend that reforms are necessary, university professors and administrators insist that the institutions long-standing ills can only be cured by cutting down on the number of students, and by insisting on higher levels of performance.

Educational deficiencies are equally bad at the secondary level, where there is also a serious shortage of teachers. Basically, the problem is one of tradition and cultural lag. The Ottoman heritage of rote learning pervades contemporary Turkish education, as does the authoritarian role of the teacher. Little value is placed on discussion and deductive reasoning. Program content,

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especially in the social sciences, is the product of Turkish ethnocentrism and the deliberate effort of the government to instill a sense of nationalism.

The Turkish National Commission on Education has underscored the major deficiencies in the educational system. These include: imbalance of male and female students; need for program diversification; almost total lack of extracurricular activities; failure to encourage individual initiative; unsatisfactory teaching methods due in part to poor training; overemphasis on factual memorization at the expense of personality and character development; and the rigid examination system. The Commission expressed the fear that frustration and discontent, resulting from an inability to continue their education, might render some students "dangerous to society."

Turkey's System of Higher Education

The fundamental distinction between peasant and elite in Turkey is one of education. Traditionally speaking, few doors were ever closed to the Moslem youth of whatever origin who could write and speak properly--and few were opened to those who could not. To a large extent this same division is present today, although there is greater opportunity to attain an education.

The history of Westernization or modernization in Turkey is largely the history of the development of secular education. It wasn't until 1900 that a civilian university was opened to train students for other than official careers. The French Lycee became the model for educational institutions at the secondary level, and French culture soon became the dominant influence. In the universities, however, German concepts prevailed, with each subject within a faculty being grouped around a chair held by a professor, who in turn is supported by a cadre of junior faculty members. This method of organization, combined with the absence of a mandatory retirement age, severely limits promotion possibilities and lowers morale. Now, however, after more than a decade of US assistance, including the establishment of a new university in the northeastern city

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of Erzurum, American educational concepts have become competitive.

By the end of World War I, and the ensuing Turkish War for Independence, the Turkish educational system contained, at least in rudimentary forms, all the basic components of the educational systems in what were then regarded as the "advanced nations." Ataturk closed the religious schools in 1924 and a national Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for all levels of public education. Today most of the universities are autonomous.

The largest university, the University of Istanbul, was established in 1933, and Ankara University, a consolidation of several previously unrelated faculties, was chartered in 1946. The growth of the university system has been accelerated as demands increased for university training. Teachers and bona fide students constitute two of the highest status groups in Turkish society, but the lycee degree has become the dividing line between the upper and lower ranks of Turkish society. By Turkish standards, the graduate of the academic high school is an intellectual.

There are over 125,000 students, out of a total population estimated to be about 35,000,000, pursuing higher education. There are over 63,000 students enrolled in eight state universities, and about 62,000 others attend other higher education institutions.

While autonomous, Turkish universities are chartered by the Grand National Assembly, and receive the bulk of their financial support from supplemental appropriations attached to the budget of the Ministry of Education. Only a nominal fee is charged, but the cost of books and room and board must be borne by the student. These are not too onerous for those who can live at home but clearly are beyond the resources of the youth whose family does not live near a university.

Enrollment is determined by each university faculty, which administers its own placement tests.

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A candidate often registers for several separate examinations. Students with lycee diplomas contend they are automatically entitled to admission, and the resulting clamor often forces university officials to allow still more students to enter already congested faculties. Over-enrollment is probably the most serious problem. Existing resources such as libraries are often underused because of the emphasis on lectures. Except for a small core of able teachers, the bulk are mediocre and underpaid.

Istanbul University is the largest and most influential educational institution in Turkey. Built to accommodate 12,000 it has an enrollment of more than 30,000. According to the rector of the university, there are only 14,000 "real" students at the university; most of the others enjoy the fringe benefits of student status.

An estimated 3,000 Turkish students attend foreign universities each year, with US schools attracting a number second only to West Germany. Since World War II, Turkish students abroad have concentrated on science and engineering courses. None are officially enrolled in schools in Communist countries, although there are probably some in Eastern Europe. The government has discouraged students from traveling in Communist countries but concedes that a few probably go via indirect routes. Student exchange may become an area of Communist exploitation now that relations with Turkey have become somewhat more amenable in the new age of detente. Underlying Turkish suspicions of the Russians, however, will probably hold down the number of students studying in the USSR.

National Youth Organizations in Turkey

There are three major youth and student organizations. While most youth are affiliated with one or more of the national organizations, there is no acknowledged central leadership among the nation's youth. In addition to the student unions, there are also youth branches of many of the national political parties, especially the ruling Justice Party (JP), the major opposition Republican People's

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Party (RPP), and the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP). There are also smaller, somewhat less organized groups, possibly cutting across party lines, drawn to individual political leaders.

The three national organizations are the National Youth Organization of Turkey (*Turkiye Milli Genclik Teskilati*--TMGT), the National Student Federation of Turkey (*Turkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*--TMTF), and the National Turkish Student Union (*Milli Turk Talebe Birligi*--MTTB).

The TMGT, officially recognized in 1960, includes both student and other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts Union and the Women's Union of Turkey. It has nine member bodies, of which the TMTF is the most important, and is government subsidized. In 1964, the last year for which we have statistics, the TMGT claimed a membership of some 274,000. It is leftist dominated, despite persistent government efforts to gain control. Most of its present leadership is said to be friendly to the opposition, hostile to the Demirel government, and, although basically pro-West, critical of the terms of Turkey's relationship with NATO and the US.

With a membership of at least 100,000, and chapters on all college and university campuses, the National Student Federation (TMTF) is the larger and more politically active student organization. The TMTF was founded in 1946, has its national headquarters and over half of its members in Istanbul, where the Istanbul University Student Union (IUTB) with 21,000 members often is able to play a dominant role.

Leftist control of the TMTF was temporarily ended in January 1967 by a court order, later reversed, which the leftists defied. Although they were arrested, they nevertheless established a rival headquarters in Ankara and probably have the larger national following. The Istanbul leadership reportedly continued to control the organization's teletype system, bank accounts, and the bulk of its files.

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The government has announced that it will seek legislation to end control of student organizations by "professional student" politicians. A similar attempt to tighten control of the student organization leadership in 1964 failed. The youth struggle now appears to be polarizing between the far left and far right groups represented by the leftist Federation of Idea Clubs--sponsored by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP)--and the young "commandos" being trained by the rightist Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) led by neo-fascist, retired Colonel Alpaslan Turkes.

The National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), founded in 1916, is the oldest student organization. With some 60,000 members in 27 separate affiliated organizations, it is more conservative than the TMTF and is comparatively free from government control. Whereas the TMTF is more interested in student problems, the MTTB is oriented toward such political questions as Cyprus, East Turkestan, and the Orthodox Patriarcate. It tends to be strongly nationalistic and has tried to maintain close bonds with the military hierarchy.

Both the TMTF and the MTTB utilize press conferences to proclaim how the "Young Turks," in the sense of the Youth of Turkey, feel about hot issues of the day. Both publish periodicals and both, on occasion, send deputations to government officials in an attempt to make the influence of youth felt. Talks regarding the merger of the two national student organizations have been going on intermittently since 1963 with the conflicting ambitions of the various leaders apparently constituting the chief obstacle. The development of a strong leftist movement in the TMTF would seem to preclude any serious hope of merging the two organizations in the near future.

It has been suggested that leftist influence among the teaching staff at Istanbul University has grown in recent years and that newcomers have been variously identified with the left wing. It has also been alleged that these leftists have sought, with some success, to take over the leadership of

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the students as one element of the so-called "alert" or "standing forces," which include the intellectuals, the press, and the military.

Little factual information is available on suspected Communist groups although they probably exist and are probably concentrating on recruitment, infiltration of existing groups, and exploitation of student interest in left-wing ideas.

In October 1969, an Ankara court announced that the TMTF and five other major student organizations had been closed for "political activities." This court action, which has been appealed, left the pro-right MTTB and the radical left Idea Clubs Federation, which has been renamed the Revolutionary Youth Federation, the only major national organizations still legally functioning.

Prospects

Turkish youth have the incentive, the political awareness, and the organization to play an increasing role. They lack only a full sense of direction and a full awareness of their capability.

In contrast to many countries, Turkish youth generally appear to be little affected by cynicism or alienation; nevertheless, they do seem to be experiencing a growing uneasiness--probably due in large part to the frustrations inherent in an outdated educational system, which are enhanced by leftist propaganda.

Widespread fear of serious trouble at the Turkish universities has not materialized. Some students apparently were satisfied with the conciliatory attitude shown by school authorities; others were probably impressed by the firm public warnings by both government and the opposition leaders. Nevertheless, the student activist movement has taken on a distinct political coloration. Furthermore, student leadership appears to be better coordinated, targets have been broadened to include "economic imperialism" and "foreign investment," and there are increasing indications that leftist

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leaders intend to try to exploit any student demonstration into anti-regime and anti-US affairs.

Student leftists, almost certainly under the general guidance and direction of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and with at least token financial support from Soviet representatives in Ankara, have tried to mount several major anti-American demonstrations. These efforts have been largely frustrated by government restrictions, by close police surveillance, and by the lack of popular interest.

Not to be outdone by the leftist students, rightist youth groups, such as the National Turkish Student Union (MTTB) and the Struggle Against Communism Society, are trying to organize for more effective counteraction. Rightist "commando" groups reportedly are being trained. This polarization of leftist and rightist youth groups increases the danger of serious incidents growing out of any demonstration. Some political observers believe the leftists are purposely promoting such a polarization in order to increase the political tension within the country.

Some observers see the real objective of the leftists as the creation of sufficient dissension within the country to fragment the government. They further theorize that a weak coalition would become a necessity, which in turn would foster further polarization beneficial to the extreme left. There also seems to be a general consensus that the leftists intend to attack the Demirel regime by undermining US-Turkish relations, that Turkish officials generally are not yet fully aware of the inherent dangers in the situation, and that Ankara's handling of the leftist problem thus far has been inept.

The apparent shift in focus from purely academic grievances to political targets points to the probable manipulation of the students by elements outside the universities. The presence of outside influences is further indicated by the increasing

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polarization among the students. This growing trend almost certainly will lead to a marked increase in the number and intensity of student clashes and isolated acts of terrorism. An added danger is that religious fanaticism among some of the supporters of the right may spill over into the streets, thus heightening the atmosphere of unrest.

The degree to which the leadership of the student movement has been taken over by militants is disturbing. Leftist radical leaders have warned of further attacks on US facilities in Turkey. Having failed to publicize their cause through property damage alone, there is the added danger that the radicals may resort to violence against US personnel. A news editor wrote recently that the most vital problem faced by the Turkey of 1970 is the state of anarchy created by the students.

The outlook appears to be for increased court action and military control in an attempt to curtail the militant students of both the left and the right before conditions require strong military measures that could include even martial law in the urban areas. The government is preparing legislation designed to help control the spread of extremism within the country. University and security authorities are studying the problem, and provincial governors have been ordered to tighten law enforcement within their jurisdictions. With memories of the student demonstrations that preceded the 1960 revolution firmly in mind, however, Turkish officials probably will be somewhat less than enthusiastic in any action that they may feel forced to take against the student left.

The current mood of a major segment of the Turkish youth, and of leftist-inclined students in particular, is anti-American. In the absence of firm action by the government, demonstrations of anti-Americanism probably will increase both in number and intensity.

Forty-two percent of the population of Turkey is under the age of fifteen; and the youth are, and will continue to be, a major factor in the country's

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political life. The youth of Turkey have been given a heady assignment--to be the ultimate "guardians of the Revolution." Where this leads to responsible political activity, it is an asset. Where it leads to narrow, chauvinistic nationalism or leftist adventurism, as in the near catastrophe over Cyprus, it remains potentially dangerous.

If the radical left has succeeded in gaining control of the bulk of the student movement as alleged, strong military involvement may indeed be part of their "grand design." Last September, there were reports that militant students planned to provoke confrontations with the police in order to raise the level of violence, on the assumption that when the government and police were unable to maintain order, the army would be forced to intervene. The militant Marxists, who want to establish a socialist order, are convinced that they cannot gain power through normal democratic procedures, but only through revolution. It is perhaps noteworthy that student leftists at the funeral of one of their fallen "martyrs" in late May 1970 stood with the clenched fist raised in salute. In Turkey, as in other countries, the militant student left appears to be using, and willing to destroy if necessary, the nation's universities for its own revolutionary goals.

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WEST GERMANY

Summary

On the whole, the West German student scene has been relatively calm and untroubled during the past year. The frenetic activity of previous years, particularly 1967 and 1968, has subsided. Nevertheless, it is important to note that student activists are still capable of capitalizing on new occurrences. They and their leftist allies seized on the American advance into Cambodia to mount demonstrations in West Berlin and many West German cities.

Street demonstrations still occur, but are fewer in number and less likely to culminate in violence. American diplomatic installations remain favorite targets of placard wavers, slogan chanters, and vandalism. To a greater extent than before, however, students have restricted themselves to campus politics. Some radicals have chosen to pursue their goals within the confines of established political institutions, particularly the Social Democratic Party of Chancellor Brandt.

Some observers believe that youth radicalism in West Germany has peaked and is now receding. Others feel that a new and more violent blowup could take place.

[redacted] a "landscape of smoking but presently inactive volcanoes." It is too early to decide whether there will be further eruptions or whether student radicalism, as a force disruptive of German society, is on the way out.

In brief, the signs are mixed. The most striking development is the visible breakdown in the organizational structure of the movement. The national board of the Socialist German Students Federation (Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund--SDS), meeting in Frankfurt on 21 March, dissolved itself following months of factional rivalry and a gradual breakdown of cohesiveness and momentum. Nevertheless, the SDS, long the dominant factor in the student revolutionary movement, is not dead. Local chapters, which traditionally have wielded more influence than the national

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headquarters, continue to function. Despite internal differences over philosophy and tactics, they still have the potential for creating major trouble. It is even possible that without national coordination, competing groups might provoke greater outbursts than have yet been witnessed. So long as the hard-core activist student element remains, the potential for trouble will remain.

The Radicals

As in other countries, the actively protesting students are only a small minority of the total university population, which now is approximately 300,000. They have been found at all important universities, with strong contingents at Frankfurt, Munich, and Cologne. Their largest and most determined concentration, however, is at the Free University of West Berlin, which has become a kind of magnet for student radicals because--among other reasons--the military conscription laws of the Federal Republic are not applicable in West Berlin. The radicals are not a group entirely apart, scorned and ridiculed--as they once would have been--by their contemporaries; they represent one end of a spectrum that includes many other dissenters who on occasion join in demonstrations.

Because of the freedom of movement now enjoyed by most West Europeans, German radical students have some ties with radical students in other countries. For example, at the time of the May 1968 riots in Paris, German texts relative to agitation were translated in Paris for French student use. After being expelled from France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the Paris riots, became active on the student scene in West Germany. In both France and Germany, the radical students form a loose conglomeration, with anarchist, Trotskyite, Maoist, and Castroite ideologies all represented.

The SDS has been the most important of the Germany radical student organizations. Sometimes discounted in the past as a force of little consequence, it has consistently surprised its

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detractors. It originated in the post - World War II era as an affiliate of the Social Democratic Party at West Germany's universities and other higher educational institutions. Over the years it moved leftward, while the Party was shedding the vestiges of Marxism and adopting the image of a mass party, slightly left-of-center. In 1961 the SPD disaffiliated the SDS and stopped party subsidies to the organization.

Other student political organizations have been influenced by the SDS, while remaining affiliated with Germany's major political parties. Present affiliations include the Liberal Student League of Germany (LSD) with the Free Democrats; Circle of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) with the Christian Democrats; and the Social Democratic University League (SHB) with the Social Democrats. Both the LSD and SHB stand to the left of their parent parties, and there have been signs that ties between the SHB and the SPD may be severed, as happened with the SDS. The RCDS has been less active and far less radical than the others. In several universities, leftist students have gained added influence through their control of the official student government organizations (ASTA). The national association of ASTAs is under radical control.

The Movement in the 1960s

When placed on its own, the SDS did not languish, but rather found a new prosperity. Infusing with a revolutionary philosophy and aping the style of American counterpart groups, it became the spearhead of radical crusades and the single most important component of the Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO), as the whole radical left came to be called. In Rudi Dutschke, the SDS found a colorful and talented leader, and in such issues as Vietnam, the West German "establishment" as represented by the Grand Coalition, the Emergency Laws (designed to give federal authorities extraordinary powers in a crisis), the military dictatorship in Greece the Springer press empire and above all the sad state of higher education, the SDS found ready-made causes.

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By the early 1960s, a burgeoning student population was increasingly distressed by the antiquated, overcrowded, and largely authoritarian university system. Capitalizing on this sentiment, the SDS engineered student demonstrations, strikes, and violence that swept up many not previously inclined toward a revolutionary approach. Through it all, however, the actual numbers of SDS members comprised no more than one percent of all West German university students. At no time have the student activists significantly realized their hopes of enlisting West German workers to the cause.

West Berlin, particularly its Free University, was from the start the focal point of the student agitation, and when a student onlooker, Benno Ohnesorg, was mortally wounded by a policeman's bullet in June 1967, during a protest demonstration against the visiting Shah of Iran, the movement had its martyr. Following the attempt on Rudi Dutschke's life in April 1968 by a youthful rightist fanatic, riots erupted in virtually every West German university city.

Decline of Radicalism

In retrospect, the Dutschke affair may have been both the high point and the start of the downward slide for the radical student movement. As violence mounted and extremism became rampant, sympathy and support from moderate elements ebbed. Issues became scarcer, and without the magnetic Dutschke--robbed of his demagogic talent and fighting zeal by a head wound--the remaining far leftists began to vent their aggressions increasingly on each other and less on society as a whole. Liberal opinion has been outraged by bombings and by such incidents as a May 1970 shoot-out in which a radical charged with arson was helped to escape from prison.

Many who had been caught up in the excitement of the moment apparently have lost their appetite for revolution, particularly as it has become evident that the revolution is not at hand, and have lapsed

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back into the role of bona fide students. Further, police tactics in handling disturbances have improved to the point where authorities more frequently are able to prevent the demonstrators either from perpetrating violence or from appearing to be victims of police retaliation.

Another factor in the apparent decline of the radical student movement has been the change in the general political climate in West Germany as a result of the national election of 28 September 1969. The big party coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, which student radicals had vilified for protecting the Establishment and subverting democratic practice, went out of existence. The new government under Willy Brandt laid down a program of domestic reform, including sweeping changes in the educational sphere and in voting rights for 18-year-olds. It also signaled its intention to do everything possible to seek a reconciliation with Eastern Europe. When the government began to make good on its promises, it stole some of the thunder from the youth organizations, or at least deprived them of their more rational appeals. The Brandt style has also had its impact. There seems little doubt that the image of a lenient father with radical sons of his own is more appealing than that of ex-Chancellor Kiesinger, the aloof patriarch, inclined to condemn youthful excesses.

As some of the issues have receded, so has the acceptability of the old student leftist leadership. Rudi Dutschke, now living in London and reportedly unable to speak coherently, could return to Berlin as some rumors have suggested. There is no clear sign that he intends to do so, however, or that today's student would welcome yesterday's hero. Daniel Cohn-Bendit is widely regarded by radical students as a traitor, having reportedly become wealthy from his writing and films and then having reneged on promises to turn his money over to "the cause." SDS ideologue Hans-Juergen Krahl was killed recently in an auto accident. Karl-Dietrich Wolff, former chairman of the now defunct national SDS, was caught in a crossfire of criticism from his contentious comrades and was finally discredited by the charge that

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he had indulged in "mistaken tactics." No outstanding new personalities have emerged to replace these former stars, and there is reason to doubt that any leadership today would have much success in reuniting the warring factions of Maoists, Stalinists, anarchists, and other ideologists.

Possibly in recognition of the low estate to which the entire movement has fallen, a number of radical leftists have opted for political action within the confines of established political institutions. In turn, the major party non-student youth organizations--the Young Socialists (Jungsozialisten or "Jusos") of the SPD, the Youth Union (Junge Union) of the CDU and the Young Democrats (Jungdemokraten) of the FDP--have displayed a willingness to consider radical arguments. All of these organizations today are open and attractive to politically oriented youth and probably have siphoned off some of the exuberant spirits which earlier found expression in the streets.

In the instance of the SPD, the infusion of radicalism has at best been a mixed blessing. Horst Ehmke, Minister in the Chancellery and Brandt's chief aide, has laid down the dictum that it is better to have a more broadly based party with arguments taking place within its confines. SPD conservatives have cause to wonder, however, especially since the Young Socialist convention of December when a moderate was overthrown as chairman and an antiestablishment leader, Karsten Voigt, was named to replace him. Since then, the Jusos have been in a state of near-rebellion, demanding that the national party leadership give up moderation in favor of left radicalism. At the SPD convention in May 1970, the party organization managed to contain the Jusos without great difficulty. It may be significant, however, that the radical vote increased from less than 5 percent in 1969 to 20-25 percent at this convention.

Background Factors in Student Unrest

Although there are hopeful signs, the potential for student unrest remains in West Germany. Aside from the currents which seem to be affecting youth the

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world around, there have been particular sources of youth and student dissatisfaction in West Germany. These sources are to be found in West Germany's history, in the German social structure and cultural tradition, and in the specific area of education.

The alienation of one generation from the other has been particularly marked in West Germany where the elder generation is more discredited than perhaps in any other country. Most over 40 are more or less tarnished by their association with Nazism, whose ugly history is increasingly well known to German youth. Those in their thirties are still likely to be dismissed as mere hedonists, wallowers in the "economic miracle." Germany's recent history, which is probably more thoroughly known than is the case in other countries, serves as a lesson in what to reject. Aside from the resistance conspirators against Hitler, there are almost no heroes.

German society was formerly the authoritarian society par excellence, and the habit of obedience is still deeply ingrained in many citizens. They find anarchic behavior deeply disturbing. On the other hand, the radicals and dissenters often have no conception of reasoned, responsible criticism, having little tradition of this kind to draw upon. The wide disparity in attitudes toward authority further aggravates the conflict of generations.

For some years past, West German youth have shown a distaste for the traditional manifestations of nationalistic feeling. In the '50s the prospect of military service evoked the slogan "Ohne mich" (Count me out). The sense of loyalty among Germans has seemed to be lying idle, awaiting a claimant. Concern for German reunification has found no practical expression, and the feeling which once ran strongly against the East German regime has ebbed. Generally, the old orientations have come into question, and the students now find substitutes outside the traditional framework.

Though conventional Marxist-Leninists have had little success in influencing the students, unorthodox varieties of Marxism have become at-

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tractive to some. Marxist ways of thinking do not seem foreign to a German. The idea of bitter class hostility, the belief that one is either master or servant, the conviction that general concepts have a sort of reality and force of their own--these have all been part of the German tradition, too. Probably the discrediting of other traditions makes German youth more susceptible than it might otherwise be to Marxist-Leninist arguments.

The susceptibility of university students to Marxist thinking may be further increased by the nature of their secondary education, which stresses verbal facility and not self-government. In any event, there are many varieties of Marxism to be found among the West German students--orthodox East German-style Communism being far from the most popular.

Of course, West German students are also affected by currents from abroad. Much of the German radical student outlook has derived either from the practical experience of American students or from German professors who have lived in the United States and who have written in English. These include Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Ossip K. Flechtheim, who were all associated with the Frankfurt Institut fuer Sozialforschung in Weimar Republic days or during its exile in New York, and who have transmitted and fused the ideas of Freud, Hegel, and especially Marx, adapting them to the problems of the affluent society. If Marcuse, who still lives and teaches in the United States, has been highly influential among German students, this may be largely because Horkheimer, Adorno, Flechtheim, and other like-minded social scientists have been expressing similar ideas in West Germany since 1950-1952. These ideas are shared by a proportion of younger faculty members, who often sympathize with the students.

Dissatisfaction with the Educational System

A very important cause of unrest has been frustration with the limitations of the educational system and career prospects. Education is still a

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privilege, and the system is highly selective. In 1968, only 5 percent of the 19-27 age group were studying in higher schools. A rapidly increasing number of secondary school graduates are pressing for admission to the universities. Since faculties and facilities are limited, universities have had to restrict admissions. This has caused wide resentment in the country, as traditionally anyone passing the demanding requirements for a secondary graduation certificate (Abitur) has been entitled to go to a university.

The conditions of study have probably contributed to student turmoil. Crowded conditions and lack of direct contact with the faculty weaken the student's faith in and commitment to conventional education. The aloofness and even arrogance which have often characterized German professors have encouraged many students to think of themselves as a sort of proletariat.

It is pertinent to note that university students are enrolled for longer periods than in most countries: an average of 6 to 8 semesters is required for a Diplom, equivalent to a masters degree, and 8 to 14 semesters for a doctorate. West German universities encourage students to stay on, instead of weeding out the least promising. A larger amount of self-discipline is called for than many students command. The beginning student thinks that all doors are wide open. After years of study and expense--perhaps accompanied by intense political activity--he begins to discover that he may never obtain his degree or a prestigious position. Efforts to force old students to leave aroused widespread student protest in Berlin in June 1966, enabling the SDS to conduct its first large-scale demonstration. Prospective failure and radicalization may form a sort of syndrome.

For the student in the humanities or social sciences career prospects are usually not bright. The demand for historians, philologists, sociologists, and political scientists is slight, except for such openings as are available in secondary school teaching. In the natural sciences, the students' opportunities generally are much greater--which may be

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one reason for the lack of interest of most such students in radical activity. As the advertisements in the daily press demonstrate, there are plenty of good openings for engineers and natural scientists. Even so, many scientists have chosen to emigrate, in large part to escape the hierarchical or bureaucratic organization of German universities and research institutions.

The Future of Radicalism and Educational Reform

The fate of student radicalism may be decided in the area of educational reform. It was on educational questions that trouble really began, and it is in the universities that trouble could again mount.

In recognition of the potential explosiveness of the education issue, Chancellor Brandt has given it high priority. In his initial government declaration of 28 October, in fact, Brandt put education and training at the top of his list of domestic reforms. He further signified his interest by transferring scattered responsibilities for higher education to a newly enlarged Ministry for Education and Science (formerly Ministry for Scientific Research). Subsequently, newly appointed Minister Hans Leussink, himself a professional educator and advocate of educational reform, presented a plan designed to move West Germany away from an elite and toward a mass higher education system. Legislative progress thus far has been slow, and a crucial question remains the availability of necessary financing. In addition, there is likely to be considerable rear-guard action against curriculum revisions and abolition of the hierarchical teaching structure on the part of older professors.

Another problem for federal authorities derives from the fact that education is a responsibility shared with the West German states, which are charged with the updating of universities and tend to be jealous of their prerogatives. New universities have been founded in recent years, more are under construction, and others are being actively considered. Still, with federal-state coordination in such matters frequently a hindrance, work tends to fall behind schedule.

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Of the established schools, West Berlin's Free University stands out as one that appears to have made progress, for better or worse, in meeting student demands. The old rector system, in which a leading professor holds the helm for a year or two, has been replaced by a presidential system, in which persons presumed to have executive talent manage school affairs. In Berlin the changeover has led to an administration that is dominated by the left. The outcome of this sharp departure from tradition is unclear, but thus far the near-anarchic condition of previous years seems to be lacking at the Free University. It is possible that critics and reformers, having arrived at the seat of power and responsibility, have lost their fervor or are too busy with administrative details to foment trouble.

To what extent the reforms proposed and enacted by governmental and university authorities damp down student discontent will be tested over the long run. As noted, many would-be students cannot now get into crowded universities and many of those who do feel they are still being subjected to a less than sympathetic professorial regime that offers an inferior product. As the younger generation grows, the problem is likely to become more critical. One expert predicts that if progress is not made by 1972, there will be not several thousand students in the street, as was the case in 1967-68, but tens of thousands of high school graduates protesting vehemently their lack of opportunity to study further. If, however, the voting age limit has been lowered on the federal level from 21 to 18 by then, as the Brandt government has promised, then the young could vent their frustrations at the polls.

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YUGOSLAVIA

Summary

A long period of apathy on the part of the youth of Yugoslavia ended in June 1968 when Belgrade University students rioted and a week-long university sit-in followed. Although partially inspired by the example of rioting students in Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries, the Belgrade riots were, as Tito later admitted, largely domestic in origin.

Belgrade's response was a combination of conciliation and firmness. Officials were quick to concede the justice of students' demands, but denounced their methods. Initial student jubilance over the success of their protest quickly waned as the regime began to crack down on liberal elements within the universities and moved only slowly to meet the grievances which Tito himself had labeled legitimate. A new clash appeared imminent, but the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 intervened and produced a patriotic bond between the Yugoslav youth and regime which until recently has eclipsed domestic issues.

Some student demands have been met. At the 9th party congress in March 1969, many prominent but aging Yugoslavs were relieved from office and replaced by younger, more capable persons. The party also has recommitted itself to the reform program and in a more practical vein, steps have been taken to secure work for college graduates. In the final analysis however, the sum total of the measures taken to answer student demands falls far short of the problem and discontent is again very much apparent. Regime officials are concerned over the growing number of Yugoslavs who are turning to drugs as a means of escaping their self-managing society. In addition, student publications are taking pot-shots at regime policies and the number of young radicals who are seeking a "way out of the ordinary" is on the increase. A collision between the students and regime is again a very real possibility.

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The June riots started with a trivial clash between young people at a musical performance on 2 June. The disturbances soon took on a political character when student anger at police tactics and pent-up frustration over the lack of job opportunities resulted in sweeping demands for change. An ad hoc student action committee quickly formulated a four-point program which demanded:

- Removal of all antisocialist manifestations and economic and social differentiation.
- Steps to remedy unemployment and reduced job opportunities for university graduates.
- Greater democratization of all social and political organizations, a more independent press, and quicker removal from office of antireform "conservatives."
- A thorough reform of the university, to provide greater autonomy, a student voice in university affairs, and improvement in the living conditions of students.

Several Serbian officials, including the president of the Serbian parliament, were appalled by police brutality and promised to investigate and punish the guilty. Cognizant of the developments in Paris, the regime set out to keep the students and workers from uniting on the basis of mutual economic grievances. The Belgrade press was filled with telegrams--probably regime-inspired--from factory committees who supported the students' "just" demands, but denounced student violence and pledged adherence to the regime's programs. The regime succeeded. No workers joined the students or started sympathy strikes.

The sit-in at Belgrade University did not end, however, until 9 June, when Tito admitted on television that there had been delays in implementing the economic reform, in eliminating "shocking" salary differences, and in dealing with youth problems and educational reform. Reminding his audience that the party had been debating all these problems for many months, he

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asked the youth to push his reform programs. Tito promised new party guidelines to deal with domestic problems--indicating that they would be final and nonnegotiable. Although Tito implied that if he and the rest of the leadership could not solve Yugoslavia's problems they should resign, he gave no hint that he would bow to the students' demand that those responsible for police brutality be sacked.

Czechoslovakia

The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the fear that Yugoslavia was to be the Kremlin's next victim completely overshadowed internal problems. Appealing to patriotism, unity and internal strength, the party launched a successful drive to bring in more youngsters. It was rumored that some of the more militant student leaders were called into military service. The kind of street action that erupted at Belgrade University in June 1968, was clearly out of the question as long as alarm over a possible Czechoslovak style invasion of Yugoslavia continued.

It has been officially estimated that about 75,000 young people joined the party following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This figure does not include new members in the Yugoslav armed forces, and is impressive when compared with 1967's very modest figure of 23,235 new members. This upsurge marks a sharp reversal of the process which had seen Yugoslavia's party membership steadily declining. It has added new vigor to the party, given it a more youthful composition, and strengthened those elements who support the party's reform programs.

The Generation Gap

The students' demands for jobs after graduation reflected more than a narrow self-interest. There is a profound difference in outlook between the young and old, and the regime must cope with a widening generation gap.

The 9th party congress which met in Belgrade in early March 1969, attempted to come to grips with one

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of the students' major grievances. At that time a number of prominent but aging party officials were replaced by younger, more capable and more liberal persons. In the past, the regime had had only limited success in enforcing its "rotation" of office policy, but the 9th congress--under Tito's leadership--was singularly successful in removing some of the "old guard" from top level positions.

What has been true of the top leadership has been even more evident at the lower levels of the economic and political ladder and it is here that the older generation remains entrenched. Many factory directors and lower level bureaucrats owe their positions to their prewar party and wartime partisan service. A large number are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with the sophisticated socialist market economy which the regime hopes to create. Understandably, they do not wish to give up the income and status they feel that they deserve.

Partly as justification for its privileged position, the older generation for years has exploited wartime sacrifice and glory. The values of many of these older people are an admixture of unsophisticated Communism, middle-class aspirations, pride in what they have accomplished, and, in some, a residual local nationalism.

Meanwhile, universities have been turning out thousands of better educated young technicians. Many are impatient with the bungling of their elders and with the barriers to jobs and influence which the latter have created. Tito himself has publicly admitted many times that the Yugoslav economy badly needs thousands of better trained men, and has complained that many enterprises refuse to hire them.

Students Versus the Regime in 1970

The Yugoslav youth in 1970 can be divided into three main groups with regard to their involvement and activity in politics. The first is a small but growing number of radicals who seek drastic, fundamental changes in the Yugoslav system. Ironically, a number of children of top officials, out of impatience with the Yugoslav system, have turned to this

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group as the only solution to the country's ills. Needless to say, the situation is embarrassing to a large segment of the country's leadership. The second group consists of the bulk of the politically active youth. While more moderate in outlook, they nevertheless are highly critical of and do not accept much of the party line. The third, and largest group is the apathetic youth.

Contributing to student unrest are Yugoslavia's economic problems--specifically the country's spiraling inflation. The gains which have been made--including salaried work agreements for some students in the sciences--are being wiped out by the rapidly rising cost of living. The net result is a growing frustration and unrest. One recent manifestation of student disillusionment is the growing use of drugs. Statements by regime leaders earlier this year indicate a sharp increase in the use of narcotics by many young Yugoslavs. The situation is so serious that Belgrade has drafted harsher penalties for drug pushers and users, and has expressed a willingness to cooperate with international efforts to halt illegal drug traffic.

Student discontent also has been stimulated by the party's reluctance to loosen its grip on the universities. Although "self-management" and university control of its own finances has been constantly ballyhooed, university party organizations have usually had to bow to the wishes of their superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate but "safe" intellectuals. In July of 1969, the Serbian assembly amended the law to allow faculties and students a free hand in university elections, but without specifically explaining how the elections would be conducted. As a result the Belgrade University council adopted a complicated and indirect method of election, thus assuring election results acceptable to the party.

The Youth Organizations

Student unrest reveals the effectiveness of the two main regime-sponsored youth organizations--the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ).

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Both federations originally were created to perform as "transmission belts" for party directives and propaganda. Numerically at least, the SOJ has been a success--its membership (2,085,456 in December 1967) includes about two thirds of all Yugoslavs between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the Federation's position as "transmission belt" has grown steadily over the years, and much of the organization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ became a byword for careerism and a haven for young party hacks.

The party's decision in 1965 to change its role from that of an all-powerful, operational organization to one of ideological leadership led to confusion. Many young people wanted the federation to reflect the views and interests of its membership, not those of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to respond to pressure from below. Its leadership, moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to charges of overprofessionalization.

In the aftermath of the fall of Rankovic the youth federation secretariat was dissolved (November 1966) for incompetence and heavy handedness. The Federation was put into a form of "receivership" in order to prepare for its reorganization, which took place over a year later at the Eighth SOJ Congress in February 1968.

Tito's speech opening the Congress offered nothing particularly new. It was a call for more of the ideological guidance the young had already come to dislike. Indeed, instead of innovation, Tito pointed with alarm to the need for the SOJ's directing more ideological political work toward intellectuals, among whom he detected apathy and "alien concepts."

To restore the SOJ's effectiveness, a new statute was enacted decentralizing administration, presumably to make the federation more responsive to its membership. What emerged was a compromise between the old strongly centralized organization desired by the conservatives and the loose coordinating body called for by the ultraliberals. The age limits were widened to include 14 to 27-year-olds; a 27-year-old was elected president.

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The considerably smaller (110,000 members in 1966) Federation of Students suffers from much the same malady as the Youth Federation. If the regime grants the SSJ the autonomy necessary to attract large numbers of activist students, the party risks losing control. Tight regime control, however, results in further alienation of the future intelligentsia and technocrats and an organization steeped in apathy.

Regime control of the students through the SOJ and the SSJ broke down at the time of the Belgrade riots, when the groups were reduced to supporting, *ex post facto*, the student demands while condemning demonstrations and violence. Effective leadership had passed to student action committees not in the party's sway.

The organization of the youth movement in Yugoslavia is rapidly decentralizing. Youth organizations are reducing considerably their connections with their former parent body, the SOJ. In December 1968 members of the SSJ in Serbia and Macedonia sent observers instead of delegates to the Youth Federation Congresses of their respective republics. This tactic was designed to emphasize the independence of the SSJ. In Slovenia the students have gone a step further by announcing their intention to withdraw from the SSJ to form their own independent Slovenian student federation.

These actions have drawn sharp criticism from several fronts, but some higher authorities apparently are willing to tolerate such an emancipation rather than contribute to unnecessary conflicts with the students. The Slovenian threat to withdraw has not materialized yet, but it is likely that the eventual resolution of the matter will take the form of a significantly democratized student movement. The students want an organization more responsive to its membership and consequently less a vehicle for transmitting party policy. This trend may also lead to the fragmentation of the youth movement into students and nonstudents, which might be accompanied by increased militancy on the part of the purely student organizations.

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The Yugoslav leadership is well aware of the unrest among the country's youth and the need to alleviate student grievances--in most cases however, the measures taken are too little and only whet appetites for more. Two years after the riots of June 1968, the regime is still faced with the problem of stimulating youthful support for the party programs, of harnessing the energies of the country's youth, and most important, of finding a place and way in which a dialogue with the students can take place--other than in the streets.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia is history and while Soviet-Yugoslav relations are far from cordial, concern that Moscow will employ force against Belgrade has greatly receded and with it so has youthful patriotic fervor. Conversely student demands are again being heard. A new clash between the students and the regime is a definite possibility.

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